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


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ON

# THE DESIGNS

OF

# RUSSIA.

BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL DE LACY EVANS.

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TO

GENERAL LORD HILL,

*COMMANDER OF HIS MAJESTY'S MILITARY FORCES,*

THE FOLLOWING ESSAY

IS INSCRIBED BY THE AUTHOR.

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# INTRODUCTION.

If any useful purpose be attained, or the public service be in the slightest degree promoted, by the following pages, very little apology need be offered for the attempt I have made;—if not, none ought to stand me in stead.

My object has been to select and examine,—by means of as diligent a research as the time would admit of,—the leading facts which bear upon the matter under consideration. Whether the inferences to be drawn from them shall coincide with the policy intended to be pursued by his Majesty's government, is of course, beyond my humble opportunities of knowing;—but I am by no means unsanguine in the hope, that such may, in effect, prove to be the case.

With reference to the motives in which the invasion of the Turkish dominions may have originated, I would, ONCE FOR ALL, make one observation, namely—that, though territorial or political

aggrandisement should, in reality, have been totally foreign to the previous contemplation of the Russian cabinet,—*still the question remains* as to whether the consequences likely to ensue, may not be the same as if such views had been actually entertained —should the Porte be induced (from whatever cause) to provoke or give pretext for a continuance of this unequal contest.

Sensible of the almost universality of the interests involved in the subject, I am quite conscious of the responsibility incurred in entering upon it.

THE Grecian revolt may be regarded as the first tangible occurrence in the more recent portion of the great political drama now approaching a *dénouement* in the south-east of Europe. It was prepared from within the Russian frontier, and, —there is fair ground to assume,—not without the knowledge of some of the Russian authorities. From that point,—to the installation of Count Capo d'Istria as President,—there has been a series of events, many of which will be but too fresh in the memory of the reader.

The Morea, Attica, and the Archipelago, whither the insurrection quickly spread, and where alone it gained head, may average a distance of about a thousand miles from the dominions of the Autocrat. No sooner, however, were the flames of rebellion (if it can be so termed) against the Ottoman authority lit up within those remote territories, than occasion seems to have been conceived for augmenting the armies of the Pruth and Dniestre.

The savage outrages thenceforward so frequently perpetrated by the Turks—the more than suspicion

entertained by the Porte relative to the sinister intentions and conduct of Russia,—and the loud and peremptory tone of reclamation adopted by the latter,—now tended to exasperate more than ever the ancient and multiplied causes of discordance existing between those neighbouring states.

A general anxiety gradually arose in Europe to bring this afflicting civil war of extermination to a close. The Cabinets of France and England, readily falling in with this popular sentiment, interposed—ostensibly, rather on the ground of the piracies and hinderances to commerce which had ensued,—but far more probably actuated by considerations of the danger to be apprehended from leaving Russia to pursue an unobserved or unrestricted course in the transaction. And this latter most indispensable precaution was, we can hardly doubt, the real originating cause both of the Protocol of 1826, and the tripartite Treaty of 1827.

At length, the indomitable pertinacity of the Porte, in resisting the mediation of the allies, led to the withdrawal of their ambassadors.

A Manifesto, or Firman, was then circulated to the superior vassals of the Sultan, which boasts of having negotiated only to gain time,—declares the sword to be, in all likelihood, the only resort,—and

summons the whole mass of the Mussulman people to prepare to arm.

Bad faith, and monstrous impolicy, are the leading characteristics of this document. Nevertheless, it contains some very grave, and—there are ample data on which to presume—not unfounded imputations against Russia; which, if dwelt on and substantiated with any tact, must have gone far to place the proceedings of the Northern Court in a very unfavourable point of view.

There can be very little doubt but that the fomenting of various conspiracies amongst the subjects* of the Porte, could easily have been traced: and no less so, that this procedure is not only subversive of the first principles of international law, but vitiatory of every complaint emanating from a power that could permit to itself the employment of any such means.

* "Being anxious, for the last fifty or sixty years, to put in execution her culpable projects," &c.—and again, "Russia did not stop there. The military reforms that had been adopted by the Sublime Porte gave umbrage to her. She felt that this organization might one day or other cause all the evils to fall back on herself, which had been prepared for Islamism. From that moment she resolved not to give any respite to the Mussulmans," &c. *It is confidently stated, that considerable incendiary supplies have been distributed to the Janissaries from the north of the Pruth.*

But the Turks are themselves too obtuse on the score of justice, and too familiarly in the habit of violating every species of right, to anticipate probably any advantage from unmasking an unwarrantable or disingenuous line of conduct. Besides, the Hatti-Sheriff does not appear to have been addressed to Foreign Courts*.

But be this as it may, never had Russia so excellent a plea for an appeal to arms; an alternative for which she appears to have been most fully prepared; since, at no former time, had the amount and organization of her armies reached to anything near so formidable a height.

Credit, it appears, is claimed on account of her not having resorted to war at an earlier period, particularly in 1821; but there are several considerations that may have influenced—first—the postponement,—and, secondly, the selection of the recent period for executing this supposed long-meditated attack. For instance, the essential enhancement of the Russian means of aggression, both financial and military, during the last six years;—the abject condition to which Persia has been so opportunely reduced;—but, above all, the

* Since writing the above, a detailed answer to the Russian Manifesto has been published by the Porte.

severe shocks and instability to which the two cabinets, from whom obstruction was most to be apprehended, had been just then almost coevally exposed.

Having conquered, as Russia has done, the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman states, she can never be at a loss for plausible, if not unanswerable, pretexts for engaging in hostilities whenever it shall perfectly accord with her position to do so. These have been now elaborately imbodied, and sent forth to the world in justification of the war.

But it is the consequences, not the causes, of the quarrel, which mainly concern other governments. And here it is, that the Russian Declaration expresses itself in by far the most vague, unexplicit, and least satisfactory manner.

The whole expenses of the war, however extended in duration,—and the commercial or other losses of the Russians, for a series of years back, of whatever amount or description,—are, it is decisively announced, to be borne by the Sultan. The longer the contest, then, the more difficult it will be of adjustment. Nor is it to be inferred from the tenor of the passage alluded to, that the extent of this indefinite claim is to be subject to

the award of any impartial or neutral power: and if the sum required be a large one, how is the drained and attenuated exchequer of the Seraglio to defray it? And what are to be the consequences of non-payment? Are the provinces overrun by the Russian armies to be held till the stipulated debt of contribution be fully liquidated?

The inviolability, likewise, of the commerce of the Black Sea and of the passage of the Bosphorus, are declared to be a *sine qua non*;—the recurrence of such acts, also, as have given the Emperor a ground of war, is to be "for ever" provided against.

How is this inviolability to be established—this perpetual and unqualified security to be achieved,—while the Turks garrison the castles of the canal through which the commerce of Russia must pass,—while the revolting despotism of the Crescent goads and presses upon any portion of the co-religionists of the Russians?—At least while there is no sufficiently immediate countervailing check.

In short, the utmost possible latitude of construction clearly is reserved to the Czar. Nor is there, in regard to future pretensions of any sort,

one word or expression to be found in those state papers, which does not bear the stamp of being guardedly undefined and unbinding; and the Emperor declares that he will not lay down his arms, till these results (whatever they may be) are obtained.

Thus the matter stands—and Europe awaits with solicitude the issue.

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## Review of Topics.

If the war now actually waging on the Danube should really lead, as many seem to apprehend, to the demolition of the Turkish empire, this—in itself, and separated from all collateral considerations—might be a source rather of congratulation than anxiety. A question, however, necessarily arises, as to the subsequent distribution of the territories as yet subject to the Ottoman power. If they went, or were likely to do so, to the formation of a new state, this, also, might perhaps be matter for satisfaction. But nothing whatever has transpired, which can lead the public to anticipate that any project of this sort has been in contemplation.

We are left, then, to infer, that, if any dismemberment takes place, the provinces thus becoming disposable are destined to be appropriated by one or more of the surrounding states.

Thus would new combinations originate, of more or less importance, and, of course, requiring the consideration of all the other governments. But even this might not be found, on due examination, to solicit any peculiar interference, provided at least the states so destined to be aggrandised were of an ordinary class.

Such, however, is not the actual probability. The accession of dominion, if any, appears but too likely to go to a power already too dominant;—whose general course of policy and accumulation of the means of aggression were even previously too preponderant for the repose of other states, and of a nature to endanger, as was generally supposed, that proximate degree of security and independence, which, for the maintenance of separate rights and the well-being of society, must ever continue, AS LONG AS NATIONS ARE ACCESSIBLE TO EACH OTHER—as long as a confederacy is deemed preferable to a single and universal dominion—to be the just, necessary, and common object of the general preservation.

The foregoing are amongst the considerations which have led to the drawing up of these pages, wherein it will chiefly be sought to ascertain,—

1. Whether,—it is not now OPTIONAL with Russia to overthrow the Turkish power in Europe within even the present year*.

2. Whether,—the feasibility of this contingency may not demand, on our parts, a more serious attention, because of the severe terms recently imposed upon Persia, and the further important territorial loss † it has been obliged to submit to.

* If the period, that elapses before a decisive blow be struck, shall turn out to be greater than is here supposed—this every military man knows may arise from the nature of the operations adopted by the invading army, rather than from the obstacles it will have had to surmount. The season for action may be said to continue till late in autumn,—with an interval, however, of some weeks in the middle or latter end of summer, during which no arduous operations can well be carried on, especially in the valley of the Danube, without calamitous results to the health of the troops. But this was formerly felt more severely than it might now probably be, from the deplorably inefficient state in which the Russian medical department then was.

† The district of Gocksca is barren and unfertile, but that of Erivan was one of the finest of the Persian empire. The former, however, was peculiarly desired because it commands a principal pass into the Shah's territories.

3. Whether,—if the Russians establish themselves on the Hellespont, it may not imminently *endanger, if not lead on,* to the loss of British India—British maritime ascendency—and even, not impossibly, British connexion with Ireland.

4. *With reference to France:*—

We will suppose a space of fifteen years * to pass over, during which nothing intervenes sufficiently important to alter materially the political combinations arising out of this *new territorial arrangement.* France may then have a population of about thirty-four or thirty-five millions. She will be then more commercial and industrious in her habits,—she will be enabled to raise a greater revenue,—but her debt, which has been as yet progressive, may very possibly reach three hundred millions sterling.

The *European* population of Russia is now estimated, on all hands, at about fifty millions †. Its

* This will give Russia an interval between this and the next war, in which to prepare herself for another great onset, about similar to that which has elapsed between the opening of the present, and the termination of the past, one.

† The French empire, in 1812, previous to the invasion of Russia, counted forty-three millions of souls; including Holland and the German departments. There were, however

present annual advance is calculated at twelve hundred thousand*, which gives, in fifteen years, eighteen millions. To these add five millions for Roumelia, Bulgaria, and the Principalities, which is no more than one-fifth of the population these luxuriantly fruitful provinces are capable, at no distant period, of supporting.

Thus will seventy-three millions, be then, at the lowest computation, the number of the Russian people, westward of the Volga. And this supposes that the Czar has, during all the intermediate period, abstained from carrying his arms into Anatolia, Thessaly, or Albania; although it is clear that, at least, a large part of Anatolia must, of necessity, be occupied, if only for defence.

The Russian finances will have increased in a yet more considerable ratio than those of France, by reason of the peculiarly advantageous outlet now about to be obtained for the rich products of the southern governments of the empire, and of the great impetus to industry this may be expected to afford.

besides, six millions and four hundred thousand in the kingdom of Italy, and one million and a half in the Illyrian provinces.

* Dupin.

Now, if any cause of umbrage should spring up, and we can fancy many,—for instance, the clashing rivality of their pretensions in Spain, Italy, the Levant, Egypt, &c.,—it will be for those whom it concerns to consider, while there is yet time to do so, *whether* the Rhine may then be counted on as a sufficient barrier against the columns advancing from Warsaw on the one side, and the higher Danube, or Servia*, on the other, and corresponding in strength with the anticipated census above stated; aided also by, or propelling the armies of thirty or forty millions of Germans, whose feeble courts, and virtually captive sovereigns, will long previously have been thoroughly subdued to Russian influence, and chained down to follow in the wake of the Russian policy? I do not pretend to state whether France may, or may not, be enabled to overthrow this combination. But it appears distinctly demonstrable that, at the period pointed out, she may have to contend against a power wielding the resources of a

* In the first coalition to which the late autocrat acceded, the main Russian army debouched from Gallicia. With this, there co-operated two maritime armaments, which may be termed wings; the one disembarked at Naples, the other at Pomerania, the latter being destined to penetrate, in conjunction with the Swedes and English, to Hanover,

Russo-Germanic population, exceeding in amount one hundred millions. There is nothing chimerical in the supposition of operations on this extended scale; similar, and yet greater, have taken place in our own time.

But even granting that the semi-barbarians of the north have no relish for the enjoyments afforded by France and Italy,—that the popular feeling has been untinged by the inflated accounts of the successful soldiery, who twice so prominently assisted in subverting the governments of those luxurious and inviting countries,—still, it cannot be denied, that if the Russian flag waves over the towers of Constantinople, the present influence of the autocrat, in the German Courts * of every class, must not only be very decisively augmented, but will in a little time reign paramount along the shores of the Mediterranean, reducing that of France to comparative insignificance.

Toulon can never send forth the fleets that may

* Already by political connexion, and by blood and marriage relationship, there are ample materials prepared for a Russo-Germanic Confederation, resembling that which was created by Buonaparte. The grand Duchy of Warsaw then formed the chief strength of French interest in Germany;—that now is in the hands of Russia.

be prepared in the Marmora. That sea, the Asoph, and Euxine, will then be Russian lakes, pre-eminently adapted to make good seamen*; whose shores, and those of the rivers that disembogue into them, abound in all the materials for a navy on the largest scale: the practicability of which has been already more than proved by the creation in the ports of the Crimea, under infinitely less favourable circumstances, of a considerable marine, comprising ships of one hundred and ten guns. There can be very little doubt that at Constantinople ships of war may be built †, fitted out, and provisioned, at about one-third of the expense necessary to be incurred at Toulon; and also at a far cheaper rate than at Sevastopol and Nicolief;—the materials at present required by the Russians in the Black Sea, being chiefly brought from the Baltic: which, in the event supposed, need no longer be the case.

But to return to the heads of topics,——

* "Both possess (the Black Sea and the Asoph) that which renders them invaluable as a nursery for good seamen," &c. &c.—JONES, (Captain, R. N.)

† For more ample information on this head, the reader is referred to Pallas, Leckie, Pasley, Eton and Jones,—but on maritime affairs, especially to the latter.

5. Whether,—though the future means of Russia be likely, under certain favourable contingencies, to become almost irresistible,—she may not at present be less invulnerable in reality than in appearance.

6. Whether,—she has not now become proportionably more formidable in offensive than defensive warfare.

7. Whether,—the invasions by Charles and Napoleon afford sufficient data to invalidate the affirmative of these queries.

8. Whether,—it is not still perfectly competent either to France or England, *separately*, to exhaust her means, and effectually paralyze her operations, especially on the southern and Asiatic frontiers; and even most probably force her, at least, to recoil on her own line:—although, after she gains possession of the entrances to the Black Sea, it should, perhaps, require a very onerous series of efforts on the part of both those powers, in conjunction, to restrain the other within any reasonable limitation of its pretensions.

9. Whether,—the sanguine expectations and expensive efforts of the Russians, relative to the appropriation, in a considerable degree, of the

British Eastern trade, and the supplying the German, Italian, and other markets, with Eastern produce, by land, from the Tigris to Trebisond,—and by water, from the Tartarian shore of the Caspian, to Taganrog,—may not be unlikely to be realized in great part—though certainly not in regard to heavy or voluminous articles of merchandise.

10. Whether,—there is ground to anticipate a dismemberment of the Russian empire, within such given period as may render a reliance on it safe, eligible, and politic.

11. Whether,—if suffered to proceed in her career, and to arrange without obstruction her materials of operation, this power may not shortly acquire a degree of intercourse with India that will *enable* her—1st, to disturb and disaffect the public mind of that country towards us; 2dly, to move (say thirty thousand men*, exclusive of the maintenance of communications) from the Caspian and Aral as a base, and by the Oxus as a

* "As to attack from abroad, the intention (says Lord Hastings) must be long previously discovered, so that India could not be found unprepared." On this point, I would beg to direct the attention of the reader to a detailed note on the subject at the end of the volume.

principal line of communication, to the neighbourhood of Attock on the Indus, or into the Punjab,—there, perhaps, to take post during a period as a rallying point for the disaffected, or as a beacon for their encouragement and direction;—whereby India must soon become either untenable to us; or, from the excess of expenditure over receipts, resulting from this state of things, unworthy of further retention.

12. Whether,—the national debt has really increased in the ratio that is generally supposed; whether it is a full and unveiled picture of the financial affairs of the country, that is usually presented to the public through the medium of Parliament; —and whether the existing condition of our resources really presents a due obstacle to the adoption of the measures, now by so many supposed to be requisite for the prospective security of the national interests.

The general bearing of these propositions will now be briefly entered on; with such preliminary notices on collateral points as may seem necessary.

## British Indian Possessions.

Though nearly the whole of the Mogul empire, (besides several adjoining states that were not included in that sovereignty,) together with a far more extended and confirmed authority over the subjugated people than was ever possessed by the Mogul monarchs, have, within the last seventy or eighty years, been brought by some able and heroic men, under the dominion of the British crown,—still one may occasionally hear this splendid acquisition spoken of, as if its concerns were on a par with some petty insular or colonial dependency.

Whether any one may have hitherto happened to class it with Ireland, in the degree of its importance, I am not able to say; but a parallel may certainly be drawn in some respects.

It is true, that it is more distant from the superior state, and that we ought to retain our ascendency for ages longer in the one than we can hope to do in the other. But, on the other hand, the area of British India is to that of Ireland in the proportion of twenty to one; the

population of fourteen to one; and the revenue* in that of six to one: the value of commercial interchanges† is also, by several millions, greater, being, in fact, considerably beyond that of any other branch of our external commerce. The amount of property likewise (public‡ and private) annually transferred thence to the capital of

* £24,000,000,—being far superior to the revenue of any other empire or state in the world—France and England excepted.

† The imports and exports to and from the East are now thirteen millions sterling annually; with no other country or dependency do they exceed ten millions. Besides the peculiarity of the former having doubled within the last ten or a dozen years; thus affording the most brilliant prospect of a yet further and progressive extension. This circumstance could not, of course, have been known to M. Say when he published his (in a degree) depreciatory essay of British India.

‡ The Marquess of Hastings states the average annual supplies from India to England (beyond those from England to India) between the years 1814 and 1822, to have been £1,323,814.

It is usual with all Eastern governments to reserve a cash balance in the treasuries, as a preparation for emergency. By the authority of the above-quoted Governor-General, the aggregate amount of this item in the coffers of the three presidencies, after defraying the regular expenditure, was, in 1821, £12,200,000.

The value of property remitted on private accounts from India to England is, of course, not easy to ascertain, but must be very considerable.

the English wealth, not falling short probably of the sum of Irish absentee money spent in this part of the United Kingdom—with this advantage, that the one is a clear addition, while the other is but an abstraction, and, perhaps, injuriously so, from one integral part of the state to another.

India enables us to keep on foot about thirty thousand British troops (King's or Company's) over and above our other forces; besides a highly disciplined native army of two or three hundred thousand men; both being maintained free of all expense to the home government;—being armed, equipped, and clothed also from England, thereby furnishing no inconsiderable item of employment to our manufacturing population.

It is commonly supposed that the Indian army is only available on the Ganges, and is not directly contributive to the British European defence. This is erroneous with respect to the past, and will, it may be hoped, prove still more so with respect to the future.

During the last war, we transported the Sepoys over distant seas, and triumphed with them at many thousand miles from their native soil—against the Dutch, for example, at Batavia—against the French at Bourbon, Mauritius, and

Egypt; and therefore on the borders of the Mediterranean.

And here it may be observed, that the known fact of so great and efficient a numerical force being at our disposal, cannot fail to enhance the high consideration of the British power in the opinion of mankind:—thus probably strengthening imperceptibly, though by no means unimportantly, our political weight and influence on many occasions, totally unconnected with Eastern affairs.

To these direct and collateral advantages, there may be added,—what is far from immaterial to a commercial and manufacturing nation,—the unlimited control of the mercantile concerns and markets, internal and maritime, of such immense and populous countries.

Finally,—as the precariousness of our tenure of India tends unavoidably to lessen its unequalled value as a possession, so—that very insecurity and sole source of depreciation are the strongest possible reasons for vigilance in regard to its protection! And in all such cases, there is a maxim, which can never, of course, be lost sight of with impunity,—namely, that the defence of dependencies, held by the sword rather than by the affections of the inhabitants, can only be advantageously made, in advance of their frontiers.

## PRESENT STATE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER.

To dilate on the well-known military and political infirmities of the Porte were now only a waste of time. The best,—perhaps the only, chance of safety that remained to it, as a nation, would have been to adopt without limitation the guidance of France and England.

The counsels so often earnestly tendered to the Divan by the representatives of those countries have been without avail. Whether the ill-success of these endeavours be most attributable to the extreme ignorance of the Turkish functionaries,—to the encouragement said to have been at one time held out by the Court of Vienna,—or to the intrigues and studied arrogance ascribed to the Russian envoy, Count Strogonoff,—were now a matter of unimportant inquiry.

By a return said to have just issued from the Grand Vizier's office, the army of the Sultan, regular and irregular, for garrisons and frontiers, amounts to one hundred and seventy-seven thousand men. Of these, eighty thousand only are stated to

be in the pay of the Porte, and consist of raw levies or reformed Janissaries, whom it has been endeavoured to drill after the European system. This half-organized force might overcome troops of an inferior order, but cannot be expected to confront, with effect, the sustained fire and combined movements of any tolerably constituted army.

The ninety-seven thousand irregulars are the armed followers of the tributary Pachas; and these, particularly the Asiatic portion, are, generally speaking, a disorderly, ferocious, and intractable banditti, who repair to the standard of the Prophet partly under the cloak of religion, and partly in the hope of plunder.

By this statement,—forty-seven thousand are allotted for the defence of Asia; sixty-two thousand five hundred for the Dardanelles, Bosphorus, the capital, and Adrianople;—there would thus remain sixty-seven thousand five hundred, for the defence of the Balkan, Bulgaria, and the Danube. But this is the strength of the army on paper. And if we reduce the nominal force by at least one-third, or even one-half, we shall probably be much nearer the effective numbers.—Rapidly, too, will even this diminished strength decrease as the campaign advances.

The formation of an army according to the present scientific European system, is not the work of a day, and requires elements beyond the reach of the Othman chief.

The Russians have been more than a hundred years in making the one they now have; and even yet, although the whole energy, and almost every faculty of the empire, have been directed to the perfection of that single department or machine, it is deficient in an important ingredient, superior intelligence or mind. Numbers, docility, and hardiness, both as to enduring courage, and physical constitution, make up in a degree for this defect.

The Portuguese of the last war were good troops under British officers;—the Hindoos and Musselmauns of India are so, with the same assistance;—the Persians were so under Macedonian officers;—the Italians of the late kingdom of Italy were chiefly under French officers.

On the other hand, several years elapsed before the energetic and indefatigable Peter could enable his devoted and brave Muscovites to withstand the Swedes; although, on all occasions, immensely outnumbering them, and covered to the teeth with entrenchments,—to which he was obliged to resort, even up to Pultawa.

So also the Spaniards,—who are not inferior in manliness to any nation,—who are superior to most in constancy and fortitude,—and who, though actuated by the strongest feelings,—were yet, up to 1814, after six or seven years' experience, scarcely capable of meeting, in the open field, the youngest conscripts of France.

The Turkish cavalry, which in former times was the most brilliant and redoubtable portion of their armaments, still occasionally display a fiery individual valour; but they cannot break steadily formed squares. Their infantry was never good for much, except in skirmishing, or in the defence of walls or entrenchments. Their artillery is represented as still worse.

When the country attacked is not very extensive,—when the invading army has the means of supplying itself from without,—and there are some points and lines of imperative consequence to be held, a superior cavalry (even if that of the Ottomans were such) will not avail against a superior infantry and artillery. The Turkish empire in Europe falls, as a matter of course, if the lines of the Danube and Hemus, the passage of the Bosphorus, and the capital, are possessed by Russia. It is true, that the Ottomans will not probably

abandon their towns and fastnesses without a contest. But as they have no adequate idea of the use of fire, even with small arms, much less cannon, nor any notion of the combinations requisite for rendering a general attack either in the field or against a fortress abortive,—their bravery on the breach can have no other effect in the present instance, than the effusion of blood. When they undergo a decisive defeat, it is well known to be a very difficult matter to rally them; and they seldom, afterwards, make a firm stand in the field during the remainder of the campaign.

The occurrences which, during the last half century, intervened to prop the tottering fortunes of the Crescent, arose chiefly out of the mutual jealousies of the Christian powers,—and are as follow:—

Between 1788 and 1792, the Austro-Russians were completely successful, and the Turks reduced to the most deplorable weakness;—but the victorious armies continued to besiege and storm towns, whether necessary to their line of operations or not, instead of investing them, and marching on to the centre of resistance. This gave time for accident, or what is called accident, and for the interposition of other cabinets.

The Netherlands rebelled,—Joseph's attention

was thus called off,—the Hungarians became turbulent,—Joseph died,—Potemkin, Catherine's prime minister and generalissimo, died,—England, Holland, Prussia, Hanover, Sweden, Poland, which still existed, took the alarm, and resolved to interfere in an efficient manner. England prepared an armament for the Baltic;—Prussia moved one hundred and fifty thousand men towards the Imperial frontiers;—the Polish diet, instigated by Prussia, and, for the moment, under its protection, commenced the levy of a hundred thousand men;—Sweden, instigated by France, and subsidized by the Sultan, invaded Russia from the side of Finland,—the Swedish cannon shook the windows of the Czarina's palace;—St. Petersburg was completely uncovered, and must unquestionably have fallen into the hands of the Swedes, were it not for the disaffection previously sown amongst them by the Empress.

Catherine, thus embarrassed and pressed in other quarters, found it expedient to withdraw for a time from the South, in order to complete—(as an indispensable preliminary to the realization of her views in that direction)—the destruction of Poland.

She was then far advanced in years, and unavoidably much at a loss, on account of the sudden

demise of the able adviser, who had been so many years the sole depositary of her confidence. Subsequently, the settlement of the dismembered republic, and the affairs of France, unavoidably engaged her attention. In three or four years, she was ready, it appears, to recommence the attack upon Turkey;—but death, this time, interposed, and put an end to all this great woman's projects.

Neither was it the prowess of the Turks in 1807, as many suppose, but the victories of the French, that respited Selim:—as may be seen by the treaty of Tilsit, which stipulated for the relinquishment of the line of the Danube. At that time, the Ottomans were unable to muster thirty thousand men in the field. Under various pretexts, however, the Russians evaded the fulfilment of this stipulation, and kept their army in the Principalities, until they renewed the war in 1810.

In 1812, it was again Napoleon who saved the Crescent by advancing upon Moscow with the "grand army," that so soon after perished in the snows. Pressed by this immense host, the Czar now was compelled to relinquish the advanced positions in Turkey, which he had so long striven, both by negotiation and war, to maintain,—but not

without some equivalent,—consisting of the mouths of the Danube *, Bessarabia, and part of Moldavia. The recollection of recent defeats, and the intercessions of the British and Swedish governments, disposed the Porte to this opportune arrangement,—which freed the Russian army of the Danube, and enabled it to move against the French line of communications in the north.

The Divan seeing, soon after, the desperate predicament in which their enemy was placed, was dissatisfied with the treaty, and accordingly the negotiators of it lost their heads.—Until the last part of this brief war, Count Kamenskoi commanded the Russians; and it was generally supposed might have made much greater progress, having had originally one hundred and fifteen thousand men (counting recruits) under his orders. He engaged in tedious, unessential blockades or sieges; occasionally cannonaded, skirmished, or engaged in sanguinary, but in their nature indecisive, affairs, about the camp of Choumla; and, in fact, completely wasted the seasons of action, and ruined the army committed to his charge. It was

* Including the fortresses of Ismael, Kilia, Khotin, and Bender.

the same officer who resigned his command, with such strange abruptness, four years before in Poland. On the last occasion he was superseded by Kutusoff, who had scarcely enough of troops to occupy the line of the Danube. But he signally overthrew the Turks whenever they advanced, particularly under the walls of Rutchuk. One corps was entirely cut off, and surrendered; another, of sixty thousand men, was pursued for some miles, by twenty thousand Russians. The fact, however, was, that the object of the campaigns of 1810 and 1811, was in great part *not* of conquest, but almost exclusively to intimidate the Porte into favourable terms of peace, in order to extricate the army of the Danube, for the defence of the Niemen.

The superiority of the Russians now, to what they then were, is as much perhaps in other respects as numerically: and at present there is no Napoleon, either at Tilsit or on the Borytesnes, with four hundred thousand men, to operate as a diversion in favour of the Sultan.

Finally, in the war of 1806, the Russians brought into the field fifty-five thousand men; in that of 1810, one hundred and fifteen thousand;—

this force was, however, reduced in 1812 to sixty-five thousand *. Between two and three hundred thousand are now reported to be in movement, in Asia and Europe.

The Turks in Europe may amount to two or three millions,—living in the midst of four or five millions of enslaved and disaffected Greeks or non-descripts. Arising *en masse*, in defence of their religion, may, it is thought by some, have the effect of checking the Russians; but, in the present advanced state of the military art,—however patriotically or fanatically inspired a people may be, they make but indifferent combatants when suddenly transformed from the shop-board or plough-tail to the ranks.

Nor is a popular or guerrilla warfare to be calculated on. The country in question is inhabited by two nations. A guerrilla war can never be carried on with effect by the minor against the greater number—especially if a foreign force comes to the aid of the more numerous: but if the minor party can maintain a regular army in the field, these desultory services may or may not be advantageous. There are eight or nine millions of Mahometans, and a million and a half of Chris-

* Four divisions, out of nine, were withdrawn to the north.

tians in Asiatic Turkey: a country said to have contained, two centuries ago, fifty millions of people. This, under the rule of the Crescent, is improbable. Its area, however, is more than double that of France; in fecundity of soil it is superior,—and in picturesque beauty and classical interest, it almost rivals Italy and Greece. Geographers continue to represent this extensive region, as appertaining to the Ottoman empire: nominally, this may almost be correct, but that is all. Large tracts of the interior are entirely in a state of anarchy, being inhabited by tribes of rapacious plunderers by profession. In other parts there are great agas, or independent lords, who maintain considerable forces, and occasionally levy contributions on the neighbouring towns.

The greater pashaliks, especially the more distant ones, yield a mock rather than a real allegiance to the Sultan. The supplies or quotas of troops which they should furnish, are quite precarious, and always scanty in amount. Sometimes these distant tributaries enter into sham wars, either against each other, or some Arab chieftain,—in order to excuse themselves the more readily in disobeying the requisitions of the Porte. The

consequence of this state of things is, of course, a general devastation and frightfully increasing depopulation.

The funds and the regular sources of the revenue, if rapine on a large scale can be termed such, are supposed to be in a great degree dried-up. Confiscations and adulteration of the coin, are amongst the favorite resorts of Moslem financiers; but these are of the class of expedients which soon defeat themselves. The exhortation* in the Hatti Sheriff, to serve without pay; and the proposed sequestration to the public use of the property of the black eunuchs of the palace, who are usually amongst the most influential men of the empire, —are very symptomatic of the wants of the Divan.

The marine, except, perhaps, that of Egypt, is and has for a long time been, virtually extinct.

* "Let no one dream of a monthly pay or remuneration of any kind,—far from it, let us sacrifice both our persons and property," &c. If this be to be the case, the Sultan would do well to create without delay what never before existed with a Turkish army,—a commissariat. Hitherto they have been supplied by a bazaar, which daily opens in the camp or bivouac; and if the soldier cannot pay in this ambulatory market for his food, the merchant will not follow the troops with his rice.

The mosque alone triumphs, but it is upon the ruins of the state. The Turk is unconscious that the desolating imposture of Mahomet, with which he now sanctifies his violence, was, at an earlier period, received by his own ancestors not in a very dissimilar way from the Saracen.

The high martial spirit, enthusiasm, and severe discipline, which once rendered the Crescent so formidable to Christendom, are gone. Fanaticism remains, and supports by an inferior impetus, a comparative degeneracy. And this cannot be more strongly evinced than by the lingering, the protracted, and languishing war of the Morea. The opinion, however, on this subject, of one of their own chief ministers of state, will be subjoined.

Of course, if the Ottoman power is now destined to fall, its ambitious neighbour will be the more immediate instrumental agent in the catastrophe. Nevertheless, this will be no more than an accelerating cause, inasmuch as others of a more inherent and remote origin exist,—namely, the unaltered character of the Islamite domination, —its implacable prejudices, with the consequently impolitic treatment of the subjugated people,—to which may be added, an essential incapability of

assimilating with Europe. A deadly and irreconcileable mutual hostility supervenes between the two occupants of the soil, leading, it would seem, unavoidably, (even without foreign interposition,) to the expulsion or extermination of one or the other.

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## The Morea, Attica, &c.

The advantages derivable to Russia, from the existing state of the Morea, as tending, possibly, to mask ulterior objects*; to mislead, it might even seem, the governments, and the liberal parties of Europe, by diverting attention from the progress of her real designs; as adding to the enfeeblement of the Turks; and as cutting them off from that strong and extensive Peninsula, including Macedon, Thessaly, &c., as a place of retreat for at least a part of their forces,—are all quite obvious.

The *de facto* independence of Greece, or at least

* How is this protection of a republic in Greece, to be reconciled with gratuitously leading the van of a haughty crusade against limited but legitimate monarchy in Naples, Turin, and Madrid? Either there is an extreme inconsistency, or the promotion of free institutions is not the true object in view. The fact is, *liberalism* enfeebles the Turkish power; *ultraism* that of Italy, Spain, and Western Europe, generally.

of the unfortunate survivors in it, which, it may be feared, are now not numerous, is evidently within the easy accomplishment of any one of the parties to the triple alliance, by the employment of a very few thousand men, in support of the native bands, and by a really strict blockade. If this be to be done at all, the sooner the better for every one concerned, Russia alone excepted.

But as for the permanency of the Peloponnesian Republic, that must eventually depend upon other contingencies, as well as on the expulsion of the Egyptians. A really free, not to say republican institution, can no more endure within the vicinity of the Russian bayonets, than under the scimitar of the Turk.

Supposing that the embryo Presidentiary Government gains possession of its assumed territory, and thrives for a little time, which it assuredly will do, under the generous protection or even sufferance of the allied flag:—no sooner are the Muscovites within sight of the Ægean, than their party in the republic will be revivified and insidiously fostered. Nicholas may then play over again, at his ease, the game of the crafty Philip of antique times. Nor will there be any Demosthenes at Ægina or Napoli, to hurl an invective to the Dardanelles.

Still, although all modern Europe mainly owes its civilization to the effulgent genius of this little territory, which has been now so long given up (perhaps somewhat ungratefully) to the unbridled fury of the barbarian,—it must nevertheless be acknowledged, that its emancipation is, at present, indispensably to be considered as quite of a secondary importance

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## WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA—OCCUPATION OF THEM, &c.

THE principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia rather exceed the superficial extent of England. By right of treaty, they are no more than tributary to the Porte: in effect, they have been abjectly enslaved and ruinously plundered, even, it is said, to a greater extent, and in a more systematically grievous manner, than any other of the Turkish territories.

The staple productions of these provinces consist of wheat, oxen, sheep, and horses. The unconscionable agents of the Sultan reserve to themselves not only large supplies in kind, but

the exclusive privilege also of purchasing any surplus quantity of those valuable commodities nearly *at their own price*, which, as may be supposed, is not a "remunerating" one—a grinding system, justified on the pretence of some ancient regulation relative to the supply of the capital.

Thus the population has dwindled to about nine hundred thousand; which, under any tolerable species of government, might, it is stated, be at least fifteen millions *,—so rich and various are the produce. The existence of mines of a superior promise along the Wallachian side of the Carpatian range, is perfectly ascertained; but the inhabitants have hitherto carefully abstained from any attempts of exploring or working them, under a conviction that it could only furnish an additional stimulant to exactions and extortion.

No one, it may be presumed, can now doubt, that it is the settled purpose of Russia to appropriate these fine districts on the first favourable opportunity. Within a brief period, they would actually rival, in value, the whole of Russian Poland. The Danube must then become, what it is naturally calculated to be, a great commercial

* Wilkinson's Wallachia,—British consul at Galatz—a very ably drawn up account.

road between Asia, the borders of the Black Sea, and those of the Rhine.

When Catherine found it advisable to postpone pushing matters to extremity in the South, she resolved, as an intermediate step, to erect, if possible, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, into a dependent monarchy, under the present Grand Duke Constantine, or, as some state, under Potemkin. The former, as is well known, was entirely educated with a view to prepare him for the government of a Greek nation. Her Majesty represented her wishes to this effect with the concurrence of Austria. This took place about eight-and-thirty years ago. But the other courts, and especially our own, being alarmed and indignant at the proposition, denounced it as totally inadmissible.

But it appears the Divan of Wallachia has just addressed the Autocrat, conveying their wishes that he would at once formally annex them to the empire. This address was, of course, got up by the permission and sanction of the Russian provisional government, and probably for the distinct purpose of affording to Europe a display of His Imperial Majesty's continence in these matters. Of course the request was not complied with.

This would have been most gratuitously and prematurely to disclose, without the slightest earthly equivalent, what it may have cost his ministers many earnest protestation and ingenious sophistries to conceal.

There are several passages in the Mémoires ascribed to Napoleon, tending to show that the late Alexander was unvaryingly and intently desirous of following up the designs of the illustrious Catherine. There does not seem any adequate reason for questioning the motive of those passages. Abundant evidence, however, exists of their truth. At the interview of Erfurt, the Czar consented not only to join in an attack upon Austria, but to the elevation of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne of Spain,—on the mere condition, that the Emperor Napoleon should not oppose "la réunion définitive à l'empire Russe de la Moldavie et de la Walachie." See the admissions to this effect—inadvertent perhaps—in the work of the Imperial aide-de-camp, Colonel Boutourlin, written, as is understood, under the immediate inspection and with the critical aid of the Autocrat.

The evacuation by the Russians, stipulated for at Tilsit and Slobodséa, was not carried into

effect,—because, says the same authentic writer, "Le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg désirait amener la Porte à consentir à la cession des provinces cis-danubiennes, sans renouveler les hostilités suspendues depuis l'armistice de Slobodséa ; mais la négociation que l'on entama à ce sujet dans un congrès réuni à Jassy ayant échoué, la guerre sur le Danube recommença avec plus de vigueur qu'auparavant."

Where are the manifestations of departure from this policy by the Emperor Nicholas?—Do they consist in words? And if so—are these words borne but by the stupendous nature of the present invasion, both in Asia and Europe? The Muscovite rule is not, according to our notions, of the most gentle character—but even the knout, under limitation, would be a grateful redemption from the defiling and harpy system under which the suffering Danubian people groan.—But this relief, and improvement of their condition, were purchased at too dear a rate, if the tranquillity and international relations of all the civilized nations were, in doing so, completely disarranged.

Russia is in the habit of posting large armies on her frontiers. We may expect that she would

in this case canton; *at least*, one hundred and fifty thousand men beyond the Pruth. Thus would the investment of the Austrian dominions be nearly completed,—while the political existence of the sovereign of the Bosphorus must thenceforth hang by a mere thread; for it is totally beyond his means to keep on foot a permanent force capable of resisting any sudden advance of a considerable corps from so near a point as the Danube.

But granting that the Autocrat merely insists on the independence of the Principalities,—this is precisely what was done with respect to the Crimea*. What was the result? Briefly after-

* Such was also the preliminary to the appropriation of the Kuban, and several other countries, now forming part of New Russia,—as appears by the Art. III. of the Treaty of Kainargi, 1774. "All the Tartar people, those of Crimea, of Budgiac, of the Kuban, the Edissans, Geambouiluks, and Edischkuls, shall, without any exception, be acknowledged by the two Empires as *free nations*, and entirely independent of any foreign power, and shall be governed by their own sovereign of the race of Gingis-Khan, elected and raised to the throne by all the Tartar people; who shall govern them according to their ancient laws and usages, rendering no account whatever to any foreign power;" &c. &c. &c. These solemn guarantees were soon after found to be no better than waste paper.

wards, the Khaun was compelled, by one means or another, humbly to lay his ostensible sovereignty at the feet of the Russian Empress.

## Russia.

No parity, of course, exists between the disjointed Ottoman state and its portentous antagonist. The peculiar influence of the Russian court is becoming more and more marked and perceptible in several of the continental capitals. The Czars and Czarinas have, during several reigns, extended an uncommon and most gracious patronage to almost every literary or scientific foreigner who may have come under their notice. We must, therefore, be the more on our guard against flattering and exaggerated statements of the ameliorations introduced into that country. No government has ever yet availed itself more skilfully or constantly of the talent and ability of more advanced nations than that of Russia has done. This is a remarkable and, in its consequences, a most important feature of its conduct. There is no doubt that order has been established,

that industry has been promoted,—and the powers and capabilities of the empire put, in a great degree, into a course of developement.

But in point of political rights or personal freedom of any kind, the Russians, with some perfectly unimportant exceptions, are essentially in almost as profound a state of debasement as at the very first day on which the Great Peter, their reputed regenerator, ascended the throne. "Where such a people come as conquerors," says an impartial and candid biographer of the late Czar,—"they trample on the existing civilization; where there is none, it will certainly not spring up under their feet."

The occasional enfranchisement of a few hundred slaves which appear in the St. Petersburg Gazette, are proofs of individual generosity, but of course have no material effect whatever on this vast population. Alexander, it is understood, was at one period desirous of laying a basis for improvements of a more just and extensive nature than as yet exist; but was dissuaded by the magnates and influential persons of the court. The senate is merely a salaried board of functionaries, nominated by the sovereign, removable at pleasure, and employed in the execution of details, judicial,

fiscal, or other wise, as their services happen to be required. The whole nation consists of two distinct classes, those of the slave and the master, between whom the strongest line of demarcation is drawn. The sovereigns have evinced a desire to alleviate the condition of the former,—in which they have been obstructed by the unwillingness of the latter.

The foreign policy of a state whose grandeur is founded upon conquest, must characteristically be that of conquest. It is of course in furtherance of this policy that the great and novel plan of "military colonization" has been devised. Eventually this, it appears, is to place at the disposal of government, three millions of males,—trained from the earliest age to military exercises, and to be held constantly in readiness to reinforce * the embodied army. Whether this number is to be the maximum, will of course depend upon circumstances.

The settlements granted to the Roman Legions were chiefly for defence, and for services performed. These appear to concern the future more than the past; and are obviously calculated rather to assail than protect. The consequence, if not

* Seventy thousand is the number stated to be now available from this source.

the intention, is plainly the foundation of an immense military caste, whose confirmed habits and separate interests must no less dispose and qualify them to rivet the chains of their own countrymen, than to impose an equally galling bondage on every surrounding people.

What political institution, democratic or otherwise, can be so inimical to the safety of other states, as the uncalled-for preparation of such permanent and overwhelming means of aggression?

The number of serfs stated to belong to the crown, is fourteen millions; with a still greater proportion of land. The individual members of the Imperial family also possess a considerable number—the remainder, with a small exception*, being the property of noble or private persons,—all being equally subject to unlimited and uncontrolled military conscription. It cannot therefore be alleged that other governments have their remedy by adopting a like system, because to no other government are there means of a similar amount and character available.

Whether these colonies may or may not produce to the full extent what appears to

* About one-eleventh of the population is the proportion, it is believed, that are free.

have been contemplated,—is, as yet, uncertain. But the stupendous project completely discloses the *animus* of the government.

The succession to the throne of the Russias has not unfrequently been broken, and even the occupants cut off, by conspiracies,—which have usually effected their purpose, through the aid of such portions of the army as may have been at hand. But these tragical events have, in no instance, wrought any essential change on the general conduct and external views of the government. Such are amongst the perils which must ever be the penalty of an injudiciously exerted despotism.

In this instance, however, it is unnecessary to resort to generalities. It is perfectly true that both the father and grandfather of the present Emperor perished in this violent manner; but it is no less so, that they were capricious and unmanageable maniacs,—equally the objects of ridicule and terror, and in whose hands there was no safety either for public or private interests.

But that there is no wanton or habitual tendency to licentiousness or regicide fairly attributable to the Russians, may further be inferred from the historical fact, that for about seventy out of the one

hundred years intervening between the death of the Czar Peter and that of the late Alexander, the empire has been prosperously governed, with scarcely any interruption by a succession of females,—some of whom were persons of a very ordinary capacity.

In general, the Russians of a superior class, especially those who reside or travel much abroad, are amongst the most instructed and prepossessing people to be met with in society. But the social structure, if it can be so termed, of which they form a part, considered only in reference to its political bearing and aspect cannot be regarded with an equal complacency. This may be said to consist of the unrelenting, inexorable ambition of the Romans —unredeemed by the spirit of republicanism,— abased by the unlimited vassalage of feudal eras, —and directed by the polished finesse and calculating intelligence of modern times. A military cement, a layer of soldiers, binds together, for the present, this strange admixture—these seemingly incongruous elements.

Several of the nobles are wealthy* ; and like the barons of old, are surrounded by their villains.

* Their wealth chiefly consists in their boors. Some possess as many as 50,000, and even 120,000.

This produces, especially while the countenance of the court is not withheld, a corresponding weight, influence, and respect. But they have no castles, no *armed* followers, or personal rights or pretensions of any sort, with which to contest a point with the Autocrat,—who is irresponsible, and may at pleasure inflict the knout, banishment, or the scaffold; and who, in fact, is the only feudal lord in Russia. Nevertheless, as education is extending in the upper ranks, the power of opinion is extending with it; and accordingly, the desire of institutions which shall give the noble and the wealthy an aristocratical position in the government, is now strongly manifesting itself. And thus is there furnished an additional impelling reason for entering upon war, in order to turn off attention from internal affairs, and provide the more stirring spirits with the prospect of foreign commands.

As for the finances of this government, all that need now be said, is, that if it has money enough to provide a powerful army*, the army is very likely to provide it with money. It has just sent in a round sum from Persia. The Cossack and

* The actual pay of a Russian soldier is little more than half-a-crown a month.

the Muscovite have already tasted of considerable stipends,—voluntarily from England, compulsorily from France. They now put forth a threatening indefinite demand against Turkey: which, if it is not impossible, may fall very little short of the permanent revenue of the Sultan. A great army will also obtain credit, as well as a great mercantile firm. Every thing depends, in these cases, on the idea of stability. If *power* be well ascertained, and at all likely to endure, the sordid, the timorous, and the base, will always adminster to its purposes and bow to it. The strong rarely seek in vain for allies or accomplices: accordingly, were the Czar's agents now negotiating a loan on the London Exchange, which is not unlikely to be soon the case, the reports, true or false, relative to the great amount of his force, could not fail to facilitate their object, and obtain from the capitalists more advantageous terms than might otherwise be conceded.

Before quitting this topic, it may not be irrelevant to remark upon the similarity of the present proceedings generally with those adopted towards Poland. In that memorable transaction, also, one of the interventional pretences, frequently advanced by the northern cabinet, was a religious one. A sixth of the Poles were of the Greek church, which

was not the dominant one.—The Empress declared that *all exclusions on account of religious belief were contrary to a* "LAW OF NATURE"—that "those so situated were ABSOLVED FROM ALL NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE, and had *a right to appeal to the rest of the human race, and choose from amongst them judges, allies, and protectors.*" If this be still the doctrine of the Russian court, it affords matter for consideration, and certainly great scope for its benevolence.—WHERE,—in effect, it may be asked, is the country which might be exempt from the influence of so sweeping a clause, or from the interference of so universal a protector of sects?

One of the last declaratory acts preliminary to a dismemberment of Poland, after setting forth her autocratic Majesty's great love of peace, and how careful she had been to preserve it, runs thus:—"Filled with these sentiments, it is with regret that the Empress sees his Polish Majesty follow different maxims with regard to her, and make no return to her friendly proceedings*

* "The Emperor sees, with grief, that the Porte, instead of duly appreciating this truly friendly policy," &c. (1828)—Is it friendly to encourage and league with the Greeks? Is it friendly to bribe the Janissaries?

but by proceedings directly opposite," &c. &c, The further instances of her Majesty's *friendly* regard are now matter of history.

The people of England were, we are informed, filled with surprize and indignation at the partition of the republic. *The cabinets of London, Paris, Stockholm, and Copenhagen loudly* REMONSTRATED.—How fruitlessly need not be told! Nevertheless Poland was very far from being a primary object with her Majesty. The priority in subjugation was, indeed, yielded to this ill-fated country,—not so much because of the extreme facilities afforded by its distracted condition, (which was so cruelly no less than adroitly aggravated and administered to)—but in a considerable degree, because of the strength the yet uncorrupted party were rapidly gaining, leading, it was apprehended, to their being enabled to protect and vindicate the national integrity, if not immediately crushed.

Nor did this event concern, in any comparative degree, the *maritime nations*. Though so much enhanced in strength, the character of the Russian state remained unchanged. It was still an *inland*—a military, and not a naval power. The extinction of the Ottoman sway, and the throne

of the sultans for her grandson, was universally known to have been Catherine's most cherished ambition,—the great and unvarying aim of her political life,—and no less so that of her ablest counsellors. Nor will the fulfilment of any of her views, to whose lot soever it may fall to do so, be an inconsiderable title to fame.

Finally, a very casual inquiry into the proceedings of this half Asiatic, half European cabinet, shows most incontestibly, that though Russia is physically without a rival, it is resolved not to rely *alone* on force; and thus it is that we see schemes of a gigantic violence carried on with as much caution, craft, and stealthy tortuousness, as if there were no other means for executing them than the condottieri of the times of Cæsar Borgia.

It is now obvious to all, that if an able, ambitious, and ardent prince should succeed to the Muscovite crown, there will be much difficulty, to say the least of it, on the part of the other states of the European confederacy, in maintaining themselves against him. The autocrat Nicholas may be of that character, for aught that is generally known to the contrary. The subjugation of nations, who are inferior in the scale of social life, is happily not always an unmixed evil,—

inasmuch as improvements are, in such instances, introduced in the train of the victorious army, which may go far to redeem the violation of general right. When the picture is reversed—when semi-barbarians * overcome a civilized people, it inflicts an immedicable wound upon the best interests of mankind.

The great question is—DOES SUCH A CONTINGENCY NOW IMPEND OVER EUROPE?

But this consideration would seem to demand additional attention from the fact, that,—though the Northern sceptre should be wielded by a succession of more moderately disposed sovereigns,—still there will be wanting an adequately countervailing chance in favour of the general security and repose; since it is a perfectly well-known fact, that the plans of Peter and of Catherine were not only of the most grasping and boundless character, but are fully recognised in the cabinet of the Czars as a sort of political

* "But it must not, for a moment, be imagined" (says the recent publication of one of the travelling fellows of Oxford) "that simplicity of character is at all connected with the gross ignorance of a Russian; on the contrary, in cunning he surpasses all people. The Greek of Athens, the Jew of Salonica, even the Armenian so celebrated for his duplicity, must yield the palm of *finesse* to the bearded Muscovite."

gospel—are enshrined in their portfolios of state as the acknowledged dicta of unerring wisdom;—and impart to the measures, of which they are the guide, a perseverance and consistency to be looked for from a government of institutions, rather than from one so entirely under the influence, —were it not for this circumstance, of the personal disposition of its chief for the time being. And it must be admitted, that if the physical ascendency can for a moment be considered as preferable to the moral and internal prosperity of a nation, then those bold sketches for a universal empire are well deserving of the profound deference they receive, being not only monuments of the genius of their authors, but the most inestimable boons they could have bequeathed to their descendants.

## Operations on the Danube, &c.

In addition to the enormous and unprecedented military establishment of Russia, an Ukase has been just promulgated for the conscription of a reinforcement of one hundred thousand men. Are these prodigious preparations necessary to crush the crazy, feeble, and worn-out strength of the Seraglio?—Clearly not. There is but one interpretation of them. They are meant to overawe the West,—to prevent interruption in the progress and hostility as the sequel of this operation. Nothing is more evidently possible, than that the autocratic government may for the present deem it most politic to restrain itself to gaining, as a primary step, the line of the Danube. Thus might the public mind in other countries be more gradually reconciled to the eventual result.

From the fortresses of the Danube, as a secure basis, or even from the left bank, they might go on, after due collecting of means, and when occasion serves—to the goal of the enterprise: occupying about as many days in doing so, as would

convey the intelligence to Paris or London. The fatuity of the Turk will never leave the Czar without a most sufficient reason for exhibiting to all the courts in ostensible amity with him, that the honour and interests of his throne and people imperatively demanded of him the advance of the troops, and the sacrifice of his much-loved-peace.—It seems a great deal more likely, however, that he will now proceed at once to the condign castigation of his misguided opponent. Still, the slower method would be the more prudent—all the contributive means and combinations, military and diplomatical, could thus be better matured.

The present Turkish lines of defence are the Danube and the range of the Hemus, which latter is nearly parallel with the river, at about forty miles in rear of it, and at about two hundred from the capital. The Turks do not pretend, it appears, to keep the field in the plains of the Principalities. But the Danube can no longer be counted on as a defence, since the invaders, being so disproportionately superior, both by sea and land, besides being in possession of the mouths of the river and of Ismael, may turn this whole line with impunity—when, how, and where they please. —A bridge, and a tête-de-pont, will no doubt be

established near Silistria,—and perhaps also at Sistova.

Twelve thousand men, it is reported, have been embarked at Sevastopol for Varna, which it is probable there will be no great difficulty in gaining possession of. But if this be the sole use the Russians propose to make of their undisputed command of the Black Sea, it will be a proof of no inconsiderable inaptitude, and deficiency of enterprise. It is idle to talk of the late naval action, as having deprived the Ottomans of their means of defence in the Euxine: it is many years since they could venture to appear in force upon that sea. It was at Chismé, not at Navarino, that their inexpressibly contemptible maritime impotency was principally exhibited and consummated. By all accounts it is not easy to conceive more incapable or more pusillanimous sailors than the Turks: on that element even their personal courage has usually abandoned them.

The Hemus or Balkan is of no great elevation. The roads over it are few and indifferent. There are, however, two or three of them, which, according to travellers, are practicable, with very little reparation, for twenty-four pounders or any other carriages.

The position of Chumla, on the direct road to the capital has been designated as the Thermopylæ of the Turks. The title has been rather gratuitously conferred. It is represented to be a strong position, and has never been captured; —neither, however, has it ever been seriously attacked. It is a town in the hills, surrounded by a mud wall, of no great thickness, and with scarcely any flanks; this, during several late wars, has been made the nucleus of an entrenched camp, for which, it appears, it is well adapted. In the case of protracted operations in the hills, during summer, I have understood, that one of the chief inconveniences to be contended against would be the insufficiency and badness of the water; but in the accounts of the campaigns I have met with, I do not see the circumstance mentioned.

If the Russians were not in possession of the sea, —if a series of well-connected entrenchments were thrown up along those hills, under the inspection of capable officers;—if the Sultan had a sufficiency of cannon,—a military chest,—an hospital,—and one hundred and fifty thousand disposable troops*

* If the Sultan has one hundred thousand men at present under arms, (not counting the rabble that might be assembled for a particular occasion,) then, one-third will scarcely suffice

with which to line these entrenchments, then there might be hope entertained of his sustaining himself upon them. But none of those suppositions coincide with the fact.

It is impossible to say what the Russians *will* do, but we may conjecture what they *may* do in this campaign.

We will suppose that only one half the invading army enters the Principalities, and passes the Danube. The right places itself near Ternova, in readiness to force the passes to Philopopolis, and Sophia, &c.; the left, in front of Rasgrad, observing and menacing Chumla; a detached corps invests, besieges, or has taken possession of Varna.

The remainder of the army *may be*, and perhaps *is* collected, near the mouths of the Danube, at Odessa, Sevastopol, &c.; the Russians having in those ports and others, at least from sixty to eighty thousand* tons of shipping, lying unemployed,

for the principal garrisons, at least another third will be required for reserves, for Constantinople, and the sea-shores: thus there would not remain above thirty thousand for the field.

* This of course comprehends some hundred merchantmen, averaging perhaps a hundred and sixty tons, chiefly under neutral flags.

including fourteen sail of the line*; and some hundred zebecks, galliots, gun-boats, &c. The wind during eight or nine months of the year, blows steadily from the north or north-east. The usual passage for single ships does not exceed two days.

Thus, in a week or two from the period of embarkation, sixty or seventy thousand men, with their stores, may be landed on the line of coast between Burgas† and Media inclusive. The latter is forty miles from the capital. The corps in Bulgaria, before mentioned, will at the same time press vigorously to their front.

Constantinople receives the water for its consumption from Doumousderé, twelve miles off. These reservoirs are on the sea-side, and almost within reach of the cannon of the Russian ships; were they cut off, the town must fall a bloodless prey‡: a simultaneous attempt to force the Bosphorus might also, perhaps, take place; both wind and current singularly favour this operation. But it is a far more formidable passage than that of the

* One half of these might be converted into transports.

† The defences along this line of coast are known to be unimportant. The Turks are proverbially negligent on this point.

‡ Jones, 1827.

Dardanelles. Granting, however, that provision of water has been made, and that entrenchments have been thrown up round the unimportant walls of the city, still its fate would not be delayed beyond an inconsiderable period. A well sustained cannonade, storm, and bombardment, could have only one eventual result.

Finally, if the Russian army be as numerically superior as is represented, it ought, and probably will, act in three great corps; one observing or besieging the places on the Danube,—the second operating against the Balkan,—the third embarked in the shipping. There are already two other corps in the field,—those of Armenia and the Kuban.

Mahmoud, we are told, will hold with a firm grasp the last fragment of dominion, and that he is resolved to bury himself beneath the ruins of his capital. This (if it be so) would probably quite accord with the policy of the invaders; nor is it at all unlikely that their occult machinations may purposely lead to that result. The signal massacre to be anticipated in such case, would, in the estimation of such calculators, be amply compensated by the added terror of the Russian arms,—and the consternation it would spread, especially in Asia. The final

extinguishment of the Mahometan power might thus also be forwarded.

And, though the whole of the edifices at present composing the capital, from the serai, mosques and minarets, down to the humblest shed, were thus given to the flames, what would that signify? Unlike the fall of Carthage, this pre-eminent place must rapidly rise again to more than a renovated and palmy zenith of grandeur. The heroic conqueror of the former once powerful city is said to have wept over its ashes. But in executing the stern, ungenerous command of the senate, the last blow may be considered to have been struck in the accomplishment of the unbounded domination of the republic;—all the rest was an unresisted march of victory.—And yet at that time it cannot be asserted that Rome exhibited to the nations, in any comparative degree, the assured, well-organized, and preponderating mass of physical force that Russia now does. THENCEFORWARD IT WAS THAT SHE TOOK HER STATION ON THE SEAS, AS WELL AS ON THE LAND.

BUT it may even so turn out, that the Sultan's army will be unable to keep the field at all ;—for the Asiatics, who form so considerable a portion of it, are extremely likely to begin their return or desertion to their own provinces, so soon as the movement is known of,—which (if not already undertaken) is inevitable, against Erzeroum.

This great and populous city, which contains a considerable number of Christians, is not unlikely to form one of the permanent acquisitions now intended by Russia. The country around Erzeroum is known to be, in every respect, one of the fairest portions of the world. Even now, it is highly cultivated, of an abundant produce, and flourishes in spite of all the injurious and paralysing influences of its political condition.

It is the centre of several great communications—namely, those of Erivan, Tiflis, Teheran, Ispahän, Bagdad, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo. From thence to Moossul, (on the site of Nineveh,) the first navigable point of the Tigris, it is two hundred and fifty miles ; and on the other

side, to Trebisond, about a hundred and fifty*. Here the wants of a large army may be supplied for a considerable time,—the means of transport being also particularly available,—horses, camels, oxen, and mules, being a chief produce, and of a remarkably fine description.

In a commercial point of view, also, this city is of no less importance,—being superlatively calculated to become a great inland mart for the interchange of India with those of the vast countries lying along the great northern rivers, (Volga, Don, Danube, &c.,) that disembogue themselves into the Caspian or Euxine. From Trebisond, on the latter, to Moossul, as before observed, is but four hundred miles of land-carriage. The Cossacks will have no great difficulty in putting down the Khoord plunderers, at least along the river and caravan roads. From this point, likewise, as a great central position, both Persia and the lesser Asia may with advantage be controlled and overawed.

* The question of a rival commerce between Constantinople and India by this route, with that between London and India by the Cape passage, does not simply depend on a comparison between sea and land carriage,—but rather of that between about four hundred miles of the latter, and some ten or twelve thousand miles of the former.

## Russian Frontier Position

The Russian line, as opposed to the western nations, will, after the reduction of Constantinople, be as follows: the right and centre as before, at no great distance from the capitals of Sweden, Prussia, and Austria; the left will have been moved forward from the mouths of the Danube to the shore of the Ægean. In this extension, of some hundred miles, there is a principle of weakness; but the point itself on which the flank would thus rest is well appuied. From the Ægean to the Euxine is strong ground; and there are still more secure and available ranges, rivers, or obstacles on the Asiatic side, at a suitable distance;—so that, if necessary, a great detached periphery of defence may be formed. And were even the communication with Ismael, or the Pruth, interfered with by a hostile army, the sea line will remain open, and be beyond all molestation.

Nor could any army beyond the present frontier by possibility be more favourably situated for supplies. The herds of Bessarabia, the corn of Wallachia, the Crimea, &c., offer, in these essen-

tials, a cheap and sufficient resource. Wine is the common produce of several of the adjoining provinces. The provisioning of this army ought, with good management, to cost very little more than if it had remained in concentrated cantonments. And even were it isolated upon the Bosphorus, it were well worth the while of the Autocrat to incur the hazard and expense of its maintenance on so extraordinary and commanding a position.

The mere naval and military advantages, offensive and defensive, would amply indemnify him. Of the latter, the most prominent is, that it will completely lock up, as it were, and cover from all French or British expeditionary attacks,—in the possible event of hostility from those states,—the whole of his exposed, unsettled, insecure, and rebellious conquests in the Caucasian isthmus. Thus, likewise, will be protected the communication with the right flank of the position on the Araxes;—for this army also is chiefly supplied with stores, reinforcements, and even a considerable part of its provisions, by sea.

## Foreign Commerce.—Austria—Prussia—Spain —Persia—Sweden.

To drive the Muscovite eagles back over the Danube or Pruth may not be so easy a task as to have checked their flight ere they had passed those barriers. Prevention is generally easier and always better than remedy. If, however, prevention has not in this instance been compatible either by or through our means, then we have no more to do than reconcile ourselves to the abandonment, at no distant period, of every pretension to the station of a great or influential power—and even eventually prepare to bow our necks to the yoke;—for, if we are already so helpless, such must clearly, it is in vain to deny it, in due course of time, be the result.

The desire of wealth, when allowed to master the other passions, or to engross too exclusively the mind, has been ever found to be one of the most tenacious principles of action. Witness the Armenian and other merchants of Constantinople, who go on hoarding and acquiring, although aware that success is the ordinary precursor of confis-

cation and death. Witness the inflexible constancy of the banker-jews and goldsmiths, of former days, in this our own country. The sovereigns of the times alluded to, when in need of replenishment, were wont to send for some opulent Israelite, from whom it was the established process to extract tooth after tooth by royal command, until the reluctant victim could make up his mind to disgorge the required sum. Undismayed, however, by these sort of admonitory visitations, we find those ancient representatives of the monied interest invariably returning to their bureaux and haunts of business, with as keen an avidity of pelf, as if nothing had happened—as if the security of their gain was inviolable. Now, in following up this inquiry, I persuade myself it will appear very remote from improbable, that what was wont to be practised by the monarch on the Jew, is precisely that which the greater and victorious military state will seek to execute on the less formidable, but more wealthy one. And that amongst the first teeth, as a mere matter of course, attempted to be extracted from us, would indubitably be the "keys," as they are termed, "of the Mediterranean," Corfu, Malta, and Gibraltar.

Many will refuse all credence, at least during our time, to the possibility of any such humiliatory event. Others there are—so various are opinions—who suspect that we are in the last stage of political and financial exhaustion,—and that if anything derogatory be brought to bear against us, our best plan will be to submit—retire within our own shores—occupy ourselves thenceforward with an exclusive domestic industry, and avoid all further intermeddling with our neighbours;—thus, say they, our burdensome colonies will be lost, and our money saved. A no less numerous class are those who neither look before nor behind, and are strongly persuaded, that whatever is, will continue to be,—at least, for as long as it is of any concernment to them to speculate upon. To rouse these sort of persons to any positive belief in the wicked designs of distant potentates, the batallions which are to accomplish them must present themselves—the cannon of the enemy must nearly echo upon their ears. These doubt that any great changes take place without a lapse of ages intervening,—although, in reality, change is no less the order of the political than the natural world;—and is unceasingly presenting new combinations, with more or less of transition, as chance or skill directs its progress.

But I pursue my remarks,—observing, however, first,—that to prefer domestic industry to foreign commerce, and foreign possessions and connexions, may or may not be wise and politic to do—should it become necessary to make an election; but that to carry a preference for the former to the extent of neglecting the due precautions for the preservation of the latter, is no less than voluntarily to hazard the loss of five-sixths of the population subject to our laws;—of a disposable foreign or external revenue equal to one half that of the United Kingdom;—and moreover of the means of livelihood for those amongst us who have been hitherto employed in the annual transport, export, and import, of considerably above one hundred millions worth of commercial produce,—including some sixty millions worth of goods actually manufactured by us for the yearly supply of foreign markets!—Besides,—to render the complete pacific, non-interference system safe and valid, it should undoubtedly be reciprocal. We must not only resolve not to meddle with *others*, but obtain some sure guarantee that OTHERS WILL NOT MEDDLE WITH US.

China has hitherto partially executed this policy; but her safeguards and guarantee consist

in deserts, mountains, oceans,—and if I may so express myself,—her antipodean remoteness. These are the real ramparts that have as yet saved that country from the rapacious ambition of Europeans; but they have not saved it from the Barbarian Tartars, who not very long since have taken possession of the Celestial Empire, and now reign at Pekin.

Austria is very well known to be one of the most inert and unelastic of powers; and though, through our pecuniary aid, she has evinced constancy, her efficient force by no means corresponds with her territorial extent. The contracted and obsolete maxims which still so utterly impede the prosperity, and as completely interdict the union, of the Austrian provinces, must be to us, her natural ally, a source of unfeigned regret; for it is thus that her strength falls so short of what it should be, as a dike against the North. Little of a spontaneously energetic character is to be augured from the court of Vienna. Nay, unless under the influence of foreign impulse, it were rash to assert that it may not in the sequel personate both the dupe and the accomplice. A province or two, if demanded as the price of complicity, will be readily conceded.

The great captor of the territorial booty, thus

distributed, will consider any such transfer as no more than a loan. Additional honours and applause will be showered on the celebrated Austrian minister, whose dexterity, it will be said, has thus added, without the employment of arms or the chances of war, to his master's dominions:—while, in point of fact, the real and inevitable tendency of this pretended aggrandisement will be neither more nor less than that of paving the way for sending back with all practicable speed that Imperial house to its original little domain of Hapsburg; or, if not, for rendering it, within a far more limited period, a mere intermediary and dishonorable channel, through which to convey to the Germanic nations, with as little shock as may be to their honest feelings, the authoritative ukases transmitted for fulfilment.

Thus it was that the Tartar Khauns, and even sometimes the Poles, up to a comparatively late period, governed and trampled on the Muscovites, through the medium of their Dukes—whom it was then customary to treat with the last indignity. The latter are now enabled to return the compliment under a loftier appellation. Such are amongst the reverses and vicissitudes which occur in these matters!—Eventually, the Austro-Imperial idol may chance to be dispensed with

altogether, so soon as the illusion of its rights is judged to be sufficiently obliterated from the public mind.

Possibly, however, the cabinet of Vienna, afraid to partake of the ill-gotten spoil, may assume the respectable bearing of a neutral. This may perhaps be on the principle of the ingenious expedient propounded a few days ago, in the legislature of a neighbouring country—namely, that the balance of Europe would be best upheld, and the ambition of Russia repelled, by "an awe-inspiring reserve" on the part of the Chamber of Deputies!

Prussia, about twenty years back, adopted what, no doubt, her government then deemed a very adroit policy,—that of holding aloof from the passing conflict,—that of looking on with folded arms at the rise or fall of adjoining states. France, with more sail set but less caution at the helm, was then avowedly embarked on the very same voyage in which Russia is now covertly engaged. —For a brief period neutrality prospered. But after contributing in this manner to the subjugation of the continent, it had well nigh erased the Prussian monarchy from the list of nations. Frederick William is now, by intermarriage, related to Nicholas in the same degree that the Emperor

Francis was to Napoleon—but with infinitely greater inducements to a collusion of views.

The personal character of the King of Sweden mainly preserves him upon the throne of that country. His sound judgment, military talents, and irreproachable deportment, render him individually one of the most formidable Princes in Europe. Had it been otherwise, long since would he have shared the fate of Murat! But the intention as to the succession being continued in this dynasty, seems very questionable. Were there nothing else to warrant this doubt, the recent marriage of the son of the ex-king into the Royal House of Orange, now so closely and confidentially allied with that of Russia, would be a sufficient indication. Firm and sagacious as we may suppose Bernadotte to be, his measures can scarcely be unembarrassed,—for he must be conscious that in defective illegitimacy he stands alone;—and the muzzles of the Russian guns are almost within sight of his council-chamber. Stockholm is no longer a fit residence for the Swedish government*. An unswerving alliance with England is the sole bond of security which this power has to look to. Twice, during less than a century, the cabinet of

* It is no doubt in this conviction that so much care is now bestowed on the construction of the strong fortress of Wanas.

St. Petersburg has brought about or confirmed revolutions in the successions to the Swedish crowns; a similar opportunity may ere long be again within its reach.

Persia is now in a very dependent state. Its entire conquest may not possibly enter, at least as yet, into the intention of the Czar's government. Commanding positions on the frontiers, and a completely over-awing influence in its political conduct, are obviously sought for: an important pass has just been seized on, and the Persians are forced to submit to their virtual exclusion from the navigation of the Caspian.

For excellent reasons does Russia protect the ultra party in Spain, for it is they who are the real traitors to their country and their sovereign.—The French troops remaining in the Peninsula, are now only a garrison of ten thousand men in Cadiz, and one of eight hundred in Haca. These, it is expected, will be withdrawn within a short period hence.

King Ferdinand has fifty-eight thousand men in arms. The privates are of a good description—the officers being, it is represented, bad citizens and worse soldiers: they are now six months in arrears. When the last of the foreign troops are withdrawn, this most contemptible of governments will again be in danger of tumbling of

its own accord;—and in such event it will be a general misfortune, should the Jesuits and the Czar's envoy succeed in once more luring France to embroil herself bootlessly in the affairs of the Peninsula.

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## Motives of Cabinets—France—Mr. Pitt.

Full well we may conjecture that the long halt of the columns on the Pruth, is attributable to considerations relative to the possibility of a hearty alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and England. The Northern Cabinet has probably had misgivings on this point, and is alive to the fact, that the union of these powers is yet amply capable of bidding defiance to the world,—of triumphantly protecting the great interests of which they are the fitting guardians,—nay, of rolling back the tide of a brute ambition, and of setting impassable bounds to the progress or the pretensions of every other state, however stupendous its means, obsequious its allies, unlimited its views, or astute its proceedings!

It is quite possible, however, that an unreflecting jealousy of the naval power of Britain, adroitly worked upon, may be a bar in the way of this cordial co-operation:—for on the continent it is constantly forgotten that this is a mere effect and not a cause,

—an effect which must equally flow from the industry and commerce, maritime and otherwise, of any other country, if pursued in an equally continuous, spirited, and enterprising manner.

But in reference to the motives of other cabinets, in hazarding a conflict of opinion or of conduct with ours, there is but too much reason to conclude that a good deal of reliance is placed upon our presumed or at least confidently proclaimed financial embarrassments. It is very evident that constant incitements to this calculation have been afforded.

No sooner are the receipts of any class in this country (especially if an affluent one) likely to suffer the slightest diminution, than straight every enginery of influence is brought into play, and an anticipatory outcry raised that is heard in all directions! In no nation in the world where truth and general principles are in any degree understood, is this species of manœuvre so unbecomingly exhibited.

An approaching general ruin and bankruptcy are on those occasions invariably announced and unscrupulously insisted on, both at home and abroad; in order to obtain a more ready compliance with some special exemption or legislative enactment favourable to the party alleging itself aggrieved; and thus the moderating impartiality

and controlling discretion of the government is but too often subdued to the purposes of the complainants. The reality of the poor man's distress is all this time overlooked, or made use of to point some collateral argument, as matter for some vague harangue; or perhaps is dilated on with stoical magnanimity, as a salutary check to population. It were uncandid to assert, that these representations are, in all cases, fallacious; but certainly it is not the distresses of the most distressed which are most loudly trumpeted.

But what gives currency to these ominous prophecies of the national insolvency is, that there are those who occasionally indulge in the same strain who are evidently above all suspicion of an unworthy motive. Thus it is, that, but a few evenings back, a noble lord, of unimpeachable character for integrity, has not hesitated, at this great crisis, to declare, in his place in Parliament, that he knows not how the government can go on, even under ordinary circumstances, so utterly impoverished are the national resources and necessitous the Exchequer; and this goes forth on the authority of a distinguished member of the Finance Committee, and provoked, too, by no graver matter than some inconsiderable item of

expenditure, amounting to about a fractional part of the personal recompense just conferred by the Russian Sovereign on General Paskowitz, for concluding a third or fourth rate description of war. Such avowals, from persons of any eminence of station, are now peculiarly ill-timed and indiscreet. Besides, the statement is in itself utterly unfounded.

But what are the consequences of those unblushing assertions continued to be made in the very teeth of facts? A foreign government, whose sinister projects may have hitherto been checked, perhaps, solely by a sense of the extent of our resources, *now argues thus*:—"ENGLAND may or may not be in financial difficulties; but certain it is, that the clamour which it would appear will be raised on the least prospect of an extended expenditure or mooting of warlike preparation, must effectually shackle, if not totally debar the ministry from interfering with our proceedings;—and though they were even sure of a majority in Parliament, the greater part of every cabinet will be reluctant to hazard their places in order to guard against a contingent danger which may not, at all events, develop itself for some years." Well—the crisis approaches: we will suppose

that these inferences are correct, and that the British ministry adopts some half measure—intimidated or overborne in their judgment by the prejudice which they are well aware will be otherwise excited against them.—The proper opportunity for action is lost,—the secretly hostile government gains some great and formidable vantage ground; at length all the world sees, that we have nothing left for it, but, on the one hand, to submit ignominiously, and no less destructively, or, on the other, to combat. The latter, it need not be feared, will be the choice. But then we enter the lists with every possible disadvantage; under, perhaps, the inevitable necessity of spending some ten or twenty fold what, in the first instance, might have sufficed; and with an inverse chance of success.

And this it is that will be dignified with the appellations of "economy,—a due regard to the commercial welfare,—the financial interests of the country," &c. &c. &c.—while, perhaps, it were much more justly and accurately described as a compendious method of hazarding the fortunes, impairing the power, and squandering eventually the wealth and property of the nation.

In writing the above passage, I thought I was

merely putting a possible,—an ideal case. But I have since discovered that it is little more than a narrative of what almost literally took place in this country in the year 1791. Our great ministerial leader of that time was strongly impressed, it appears, with the conviction, that, even then, the progress of Russia afforded a ground of alarm to all Europe; although her population and means were scarcely more than one-half what they now are. The Czarina had successively reduced her pretensions to the retention of the fortress of Oczakow, and its unimportant district. But even this comparatively trivial accession the British minister deemed it essential to the general interests to prevent, though at the hazard of a war. For that purpose, he moved an address in Parliament, to enable his Majesty to send a powerful armament into the Baltic, to support with vigour the then kings of Sweden and Prussia, and the expiring efforts of the Polish patriots. A majority of ninety-three was obtained in the lower house. The armament was in a forward state of preparation, but the opposition was conducted with so much energy, both in the Lords and Commons, by some able and eloquent men, and so effectually strengthened and contributed to from

without, by the mercenary clamour of the manufacturers and merchants trading to St. Petersburg, that a general sense was created in the country against the measure. Finding the public mind so successfully acted on by his opponents, the minister surrendered his own opinion*,—confined himself to negotiation,—abandoned, so far as any overt measures were concerned, both Turkey and the North to their fate,—and soon after, Poland fell.

It is impossible to find a case more in point. This was one of the very few occasions in which

* See, in Bishop Tomlinson's work, Mr. Pitt's private letter to Mr. Ewart, our minister at Berlin; wherein it is candidly confessed that the fears of a dissolution of the Cabinet alone prevented his proceeding. His regrets are strongly expressed. "This opinion I formed neither hastily nor willingly; nor could I easily make a sacrifice more painful to myself, than I have done in yielding to it." "You perfectly know, that no man could be more eagerly bent than I was on a steady adherence to the line which we had at first proposed, of going *all lengths* to enforce the terms of the strict *status quo*; and I am still as much persuaded as ever, that if we could have carried the support of the country with us, the risk and expense of the struggle, even if Russia had not submitted without a struggle, would not have been more than the object was worth."—May, 24th, 1791. A single fortress, the capture of which had cost her many thousand men, was all that the Empress then demanded.

this resolute and powerful orator was defeated in parliamentary contest. But extraneous and, perhaps, unconstitutional means were resorted to against him. Of the distinguished persons who led this opposition only two survive, Earls Grey and Fitzwilliam. These are already historical characters, to question the elevation of whose principles were a presumption very remote from my intention, no less than it would be repugnant to my feelings. But in lending their powerful abilities to restrict, at that particular juncture, the government, in a disbursement of half a million or a million of money, there is but too much reason to predict, that they entailed upon Europe,—within half a century from the time when so ill-judged an economy was effected,—probably a general war,—bringing with it an expenditure, of which our own share may possibly be to be counted by scores or hundreds, rather than units of millions.

This is a most unfortunate part of our parliamentary history. In attempting merely the expulsion of the Premier from office, no doubt with a good intent, it so happened, that schemes, the most mischievous to all Europe west of the Russian frontier, were completely co-operated with!

## France.

The atmosphere of the Tuileries has been usually a genial one for the mysteries of diplomacy,—less so now, however, it may be conjectured, than under any former regime. Forty years of political storms or conflict have so nerved and elevated the character of the French people, that it is no longer safe or easy to mislead them. The experiment has been partly tried, the result is a recoil. The equally wise and noble popular impulse which dictated the withdrawal of the troops from Spain, will not, gratuitously, in the present great emergency, sink into dereliction.

Baits, in the shape of proposed territorial extensions, will, no doubt, have been insidiously thrown out to them, but most probably in vain. When they have fortified their rising liberties,—their blood-bought institutions,—when they have consolidated, what it has cost them so many heroic efforts, so many terrible sacrifices to achieve, they will not, of course, neglect the acquirement of such external advantages as may be of a permanent and solid description. But while thus judiciously

employed in subduing the domestic foe, we should wrong the high spirit and penetration of this great and enlightened people, were we to imagine them so absorbed as to prevent their discerning, in the distance, the approach of another and more comprehensive peril from without.

As for jealousies between France and England, they are now little better than ignorant and puerile*. What has either any longer to fear from the other? They are both great in their respective ways, and are proceeding and likely to continue to do so, in a parallel course. Under this persuasion it is that I rejoice to see provision making for an augmentation of the French forces, naval and military. It is to be hoped that the means thus placed at the disposal of the executive may not be misapplied, or frittered away in the unseasonable pursuit of separate, petty, or ephemeral objects.

But this observation, it is thought, is equally applicable, whether they should be such as are calculated to advance the real interests and power of France, or merely of a nature to catch a fleeting and

* A rumour was not long since, for a few days, afloat, relative to a French expedition to Egypt; the futility of any apprehension, on our parts, on the score of any such design, will be developed in an after part of this volume.

meretricious applause: because the entering, at this critical period, on separate enterprises *, might not only have a tendency to disturb the concord and unison essentially subsisting between Great Britain and that country, (which it should rather be the endeavour of every statesman in both to bind indissolubly,) but, what is more distinctly important, must go directly to the weakening and dispersion of the force of the latter, when considerations of a much more imminent and wider import should point out another and an exclusive destination for every man, horse, and gun at its disposal.

The eligibility of taking advantage of the present state of affairs to extend the French frontiers to the Rhine has, it seems, been mooted, or at least touched on, in the course of a declamation in one of the Chambers.

To entertain this sort of proposition may or may not merit attention at a fitting time. But to enter on its consideration while an infinitely weightier affair is on the tapis—and under the idea, too, of thus obtaining an equivalent for an

* The expulsion of Ibrahim, from the Morea, though of secondary moment, would not be liable to this objection. The greater the French or English force brought into the vicinity of the scene of action the better.

acquisition of many times more importance, at which another and stronger power is at the same moment grasping—were too glaring a miscalculation and inconsistency to need any remark. Let the civilised nations set bounds to the irruption of the barbarian, and afterwards settle their own boundaries.

As for the desire of procuring an influence more consonant with its relative greatness, intellectual and otherwise—that may be considered as done. France, it is quite true, has not enjoyed, during the last ten years, her proper station in the international councils of Europe. The part of a satellite to the opaque northern planet was the one which her late administration seems to have deemed most eligible. Under cover of the Jesuit's cowl she was rapidly retrograding into the condition of a second or third-rate power; into a dependency of the Holy Alliance! But all this wretched thraldom is, it may be hoped, pretty nearly broken through. The snake, at least, is scotched. The French and English people are, it is beyond all question, at once the most humane, civilised, and powerful communities that exist. It is good that their influence should predominate. And if the chief men of those communities should forego on

their behalf, a due ascendancy, they will commit a treason to the greatest interests that can be compromised.

And to think, on the other hand, of enhancing the military glory of France by the project previously alluded to, were even yet more inconsequent. The cry of victory with which the Gallic eagles were wont, but a little time ago, to stun the world, is yet fresh in the general recollection. To descend at once into a by-sort-of-warfare—to fall upon a lesser neighbour while an equal or superior one is already in the field, were a strange mode of effecting this object. The chiefs and old soldiers of Napoleon, who yet survive, and have enrolled themselves under the royal banners, must of course, continue to be the soul and directors of this army; and the theatre we must suppose to be alone worthy of *them*, is that on which the great stakes are played for. If Prussia, however, shall be so blind to her true interests as to countenance or abet the designs of Russia, in the remotest possible way, then, indeed, no one could at all object to see her Rhenish provinces seized upon by the left wing of the French army, in conjunction with the whole force of Hanover *.

* In such case, Hanover could bring into the field fifty thousand men at the least.

## Dismemberment of Russia, and of great Empires generally.

But the extension of the Russian dominion is, after all, say some of our able journalists, a matter of no great importance; for it is impossible that so vast an empire can hold together—it must sink or collapse under its own weight—the subjugated states will throw off the yoke, and recover their independence, &c. &c. Such are amongst the vague and careless conjectures on which it is sometimes suggested to rely, in a matter involving no less than every great interest of every civilised community. But on what basis does this anticipation rest?

It seems to me, that, whatever defects there may be discernible in the conduct of the Russians, there is yet no evidence that they hold their conquests by a transient or insecure tenure. The proofs, I should say, are all on the other side.

It is now more than a hundred years since they have begun to busy themselves influentially in almost every great political transaction of Europe;

and throughout the whole course of that eventful period, they have never made peace without advancing their frontiers, and never lost a conquest by war or rebellion. Nor, it may be observed, is there any reason to suppose that the *warlike* qualities of the population of this state correspondingly decline as its means and circumference are enlarged. There is no relaxation in discipline, or falling off in courage, as yet perceivable, as was the case in their prototype legions of old. On those points, they are obviously progressive rather than deteriorative. In fact, Russia has received a great impetus. It yet obeys that impetus; and, rolling onward in the course into which it has been propelled, accumulates in volume, and accelerates in rapidity as it proceeds: and from what data it is assumed to have now arrived at the exact term of its extension,—that it will henceforth cease to be moved by the same impulse, or actuated by the same policy,—that it will forthwith recoil, crumble, and break off into fragments,—or how it is that any one can be so sanguine as to contemplate the probability of this occurrence, not by means of a vigorous and well-directed series of combined efforts from *without*, co-operating with internal causes of weakness within, but rather from some fortui-

tous, self-executed, spontaneous, and sudden disruption, calculated to arrest at once, and in sufficient time for the general preservation, the hitherto unresisted progress of this political leviathan, it is not easy for the uninitiated to imagine. There is no problem in Euclid more demonstrable than that peace in itself is preferable to war. But peace, *without regard to consequences*, can only be desired by the ignorant or the interested.

These are the sort of persons who would convert the adage of "sufficient for the day is the evil thereof" into a political maxim. But, if there be any one duty more incumbent than another on enlightened governments, it is that of providing for the future. In civilised and tolerably well-ordered communities, the people are usually both adequate and willing to take care of themselves, so far as regards the present and passing influence of events.

Between *personal* and *national* conquests, a wide distinction, it should be borne in mind, exists. The external acquisitions of Napoleon, for instance, were *his* rather than those of France. And yet, were it not for his latter departure from sound military principles, his presumptuous fatuity in attempting the overthrow of a great empire,—not by a justly calculated series of operations, but actu-

ally by a coup-de-main, at the very moment, too, in which he was undergoing defeats in the fourth year of a vain endeavour to subdue another, and far less numerous people, some thousand miles off; but, more than all, were it not for the Herculean efforts directed against him,—a very considerable portion of those countries might, at this day, have been under the Buonaparte instead of the Bourbon dynasty. But that extraordinary man, led away and intoxicated with success, and by an overweening confidence in the long ascertained ascendancy of his fortunes, is known to have singularly neglected many obvious precautions for the permanent maintenance of his rule over the countries he had overcome in arms. In this respect, he fell infinitely short of the consummate foresight and excellent generosity of the Macedonian hero*, to emulate whom, it may be imagined, was not unfrequently his aim.

Candour, however, should likewise compel us to

* One of the finest eulogies of Alexander to be met with in any language, is the following—"Qu'est-ce que ce conquérant, qui est pleuré de tous les peuples qu'il a soumis? Qu'est-ce que cet usurpateur, sur la mort duquel la famille qu'il a renversée du trone versé des larmes?"—*De l'Esprit de Loix*, Lib. x.

admit that an infinity of good must have arisen, and, perhaps, continues to arise, to some of the benighted states that sunk beneath the energy of Napoleon, by the shocks that were given by him to false opinion, and by the introduction of many excellent laws and regulations.

But there cannot be a better proof cited of the feasibility, not only of retaining, but of transmitting the most rapidly acquired and immense empire, than this, that notwithstanding the brief term of the Grecian conqueror's reign just alluded to, the vanquished nations submitted without a struggle to his feeble brother Arideus, and, on his death, to the then avowed usurpation of the principal generals. The dynasty of another brother, Ptolemy, reigned for centuries in Egypt; but the hereditary succession to the royal power was a point by no means ascertained by the laws or customs of Macedon.

Nothing, however, is more common than to adduce this early dismemberment of the Macedonian conquests, as an instance of the fate that awaits the Russian empire, in the event of its continued accession of territory. But never was any apparent similitude less borne out, on inquiry,

than this comparison will be found to be. I before drew the attention of the reader to the distinction between personal and national conquests. Those of Macedon fall purely under the former class; those of Russia, under the latter. Macedon was a wretched and petty state, with physical means utterly disproportioned to the splendid fortunes that accrued to it. Not so Russia; her overwhelming powers, in that respect, are beyond all comparison. It was not Macedon that conquered Greece, Egypt, and all central Asia: it is to the cunning, genius, and heroism of two extraordinary men, father and son, not natives even of Macedon, that these stupendous achievements are attributable. Both likewise were suddenly and prematurely cut off. It was the consciousness of the insufficiency of his inconsiderable inheritance to furnish resources, as a great dominant state, which, we may conclude, influenced Alexander in assuming so systematically the Persian character, and in amalgamating, so sedulously, himself and army with the Persian people; and in no other way could he have conveyed those vast countries even to his generals. Hear what he himself is represented to have said, in reproving the mutineers at Opis. "My father Philip (for with him it is ever fit to

begin) found you, at his arrival in Macedon, miserable and hopeless fugitives; covered with skins of sheep; feeding, among the mountains, some wretched herds, which you had neither strength nor courage to defend against the Thracians, Illyrians, and Triballi. Having repelled the ravagers of your country, he brought you from the mountains to the plain, and taught you to confide, not in your fastnesses, but in your valour. . . . But my father rendered you the masters of those, to whom you had been previously tributaries, subjects, and slaves; and, having entered the Peloponnesus, and regulated, at discretion, the affairs of that Peninsula, he was appointed, by universal consent, general of combined Greece. At my accession to the throne, . . . I conducted you from Macedon, whose boundaries seemed unworthy to confine you," &c. &c. Where is the similitude between this state of things and that which exists in Russia? In the former, the kingdoms that were overrun were as a world, compared with the narrow district which furnished the warriors by whom the achievement was first begun; for, as to the consummation of it, that is partly to be ascribed to the vanquished and completely conciliated Persians acting under the di-

rection of Greeks. On the other hand, Russia is already of far greater bulk and immensity than all the civilized nations put together, whom she is ambitious to subject to her influence, if not to her arms.

But the Russians themselves know better.—They compare their empire to that of the Romans, and with infinitely more reason. The one, it is true, is a single despotism,—the other was an aristocratical democracy,—adulterated likewise, though not in an equal degree, by personal slavery. The foreign policy of these dissimilar governments is the same. It was by a series of wars, and by exertions continued through some ages, that Rome became the mistress of the world. Russia is now in the second century of a resembling progress. It was not the Fabiuses, or Scipios, or Cæsars which gave her pre-eminence. It was the original impulse imparted by her lawgivers and founders, by the warlike spirit and tendency to aggrandisement that was inherently constituted as the guiding principle of the national councils and character.

Neither is the gradual augmentation of the Russian power to be individually attributed to Alexei, Peter, Elizabeth, the Catherines or

Alexander, but to the engrafting by all of those sovereigns successively (with more or less of consistency) of almost exclusively military institutions upon vast physical means, well adapted for their reception and developement.

It is true that the Roman empire also fell to pieces—but not until after a lapse of three or four hundred years. But let us not suppose that because the Roman generals succeeded in trampling upon the world, that therefore Russia is also assured of success. Had the Punic invasion of Italy been in the most ordinary degree supported,—had the factions and venalities of Carthage permitted of supplies being sent to Hannibal, there seems very little reason to doubt that he would have crushed the proud republic, ere it had reached the goal of its ambition.—Neither will Russia be arrested in her course, if she be constantly allowed to select a theatre of war beyond her own frontiers.

But it may be observed that Russia consists of many nations. But it should also be remembered that the great mass of the people are Muscovites, who regard the Autocrat almost as a deity,—who are sufficiently devoted and numerous to retain, under *ordinary circumstances*, the subjugated circumference under the same chains by which they

themselves are bound. Besides, this whole mass, with the exception of the surface of society, are nearly in the same state of comparative barbarism.

Charlemagne's dominions were broken up at his death; but he had himself previously directed an allotment of them amongst his children. In like manner, Charles V. divided his immense possessions, previously to abdication, between his son and brother. That empire, therefore, did not fall by its own weight,—nor was it even restrained in its extension, by any enfeeblement arising from bulk or unwieldiness of size, although in reality it laboured under a most virulent inherent affection of weakness, unfelt and unknown in Russia, namely, the conflict of religious sects. Geographically, and politically also, disadvantages appertained to the empire of Charles, from which that of Nicholas is wholly free:—it consisted not of one great mass, under perfect, uniform, and unqualified subjection,—but of several distinct states, violently jealous of each other, and for the most part strongly agitated by internal faction;—besides which a great and hostile kingdom existed in the very centre of them.

Nevertheless, had not the chivalrous Francis, and his able successor, together with the Sultan

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Barbarossa and the sturdy rebel Friar Luther, most perseveringly exerted themselves against the encroachments of the Pope and Emperor, all Central and Southern Europe must have fallen into their hands.

The despot Philip would have inherited those spacious domains, and our own heroic Queen had possibly been overborne by the superior armadas that, under such circumstances, might have been directed against her.

It is true that France, in this prolonged conflict, must have been exhausted in no ordinary degree. But, however considerable her pecuniary distress may have been during a limited period, it were evidently a thousand fold preferable to the permanent rule of the genuine Castilian disciples of Loyola, which had else inevitably been her fate to endure. Behold the condition to which they have reduced Spain!

Was it a wanton, unnecessary contest that was carried on with such unshaken constancy by William, both as Stadtholder and King? On the contrary, there is every possible ground for apprehending that if that magnanimous Prince and his successors and allies had remained quiescent, France had then obtained, in a great degree, the

object of her vain glorious monarch, which was literally the establishment of an European sovereignty.

In both those cases, then, it was the hostile exertions of foreign states, and not the incumbent weight, or any debility attributable to extended dominion, that produced the results.

Very different, however, has been the duration of what may be termed national conquests to those which have been achieved suddenly by the ability or ambition of individuals: for instance, those of the Romans, Goths, Scythians, Arabs, Huns, Normans, Saxons, Franks, &c.

In fact, so far from the greater tendency being to instability or inadhesiveness, it is marvellous to observe how very long the most obviously disjointed and contemptible systems and governments maintain themselves, after every component part is impregnated to the core with decay. Whether this be attributable to the tenacity of opinion which ever lags so heavily behind events, or to what it may be assigned, I pretend not to divine.

Montesquieu foretells with eloquent regrets, but, let us hope, not with a prophetic spirit, the fall of the British constitution and power! A still more admirable writer goes yet further, and predicts

the wreck and annihilation of the great globe itself! We will not then hesitate to admit, that the vast Autocratic empire, and the formidable Autocratic armies, and military colonies*, will (like all other institutions that have preceded them) sink, lose their force, consistency, and energy. But the great question in this case is,—when will that event come to pass?

Now, if history be any guide to us in these matters, it must be acknowledged that no military nation has ever yet VOLUNTARILY abstained from conquest, while there was any thing yet within its grasp to conquer; and that, from the point of palpable relaxation, degeneracy, and decline, to that of extinction or demolition of power, a long and dreary period of not less than centuries has almost invariably intervened: while, in the mean time, and nearly as invariably, both vanquished and victors have been alike hurled into a common turpitude! Every base, pusillanimous, and humi-

* The original establishment of the Janissary system very nearly resembled, on a small scale, that of the colonies alluded to. Two centuries passed away before they lost their discipline and efficiency. Nor would they then, perhaps, have become disorganized and degenerate, were it not for the abandonment by their Sultans of the fatigues of the camp, for the enjoyments and voluptuousness of the harem.

liating vice then concentres in the character of the former—while all the more harsh, ungenerous, and barbarous ones, become the habitual and unconscious propensities of the latter!

## Peace of Amiens.

In 1803, opinions might and no doubt did differ, in this country, relative to the eligibility of going to war. The language then held by Napoleon was even more pacific than that of the Autocrat at present. Many there were, also, who were cajoled by it—put faith in it, and believed him sincere. But have we not since learnt that nothing was more remote from the fact; that, while his words breathed nothing but moderation, peace, and good-will, his ulterior views and those of his cabinet went to the utter extirpation of the British power? that he was, in fact, a ruthless soldier, resolved to have whatever force could gain him?

And, if we had not then taken up arms, ignorant as we at first were of war policy, and, therefore, lavishing resources without reaping an adequate return; had we not subsidized the Austrians,

or at least co-operated in some way with them; had we subsequently refused to lend a helping hand to the patriots of the Peninsula; had we shrunk from committing our armies successively on the Tagus, the Ebro, and the Garonne;—if, in short, we had resolved to await, timidly, or supinely, or *prudently*, the storm on our own shores —*husbanding our resources*, as it would plausibly have been designated—what would have been the issue?

What our debt had now been, it is impossible to say. Our clear revenues, private and public, which are the important consideration, would most assuredly have diminished, and in a tremendous ratio.

Be this, however, as it may, no one can now reasonbly deny that, in the case of our persevering neutrality, Napoleon had been enabled so to confirm his power over the continent, as must have left at his disposition a sufficient mass of force to reduce us, in the sequel, to the condition of a province,—when a French general, or proconsul, or titular sovereign, had unquestionably administered the then dependent government of these kingdoms —no doubt in perfect consonance with the orders

from time to time transmitted from the tent, court, or bivouac of the imperial usurper.

Then it would have been seen that all our interests, commercial and otherwise, were only to be viewed in their relative subserviency to those of France. Our money would then assuredly have been considered in the same light in which the Romans regarded the ships and elephants of Carthage—as the means of a rebellious warfare. For this purpose, therefore, if for no other, a rigorous system of impoverishment—that is to say, within a certain limit (for extreme poverty also breeds audacity)—would have been resorted to against us as an indispensable precautionary policy.

## Provisional Government.—Alexander—Nicholas.

With a similar sort of plenitude, and almost omnipotence, of authority, has the Czar just invested some Muscovite *Senator*, as he is termed, with the unlimited government, by anticipation, of "all the provinces which shall be occupied by his armies *beyond the Danube!*" the Principalities being included in this investiture.

Now, the *second* province *beyond* the Danube (Roumelia), being the very next one to that now actually occupied by the heads of the Russian columns, will enable the Senator to extend the wand of his high office over the waters of the Mediterranean. How many more beyond these two provinces are to be comprehended under the ample "all," it might be hazardous to conjecture; but certain it is that, whatever may be the moderation of the Czar, his armies cannot stop there—they must absolutely go on, or recede.

Much acumen and ingenuity may possibly be exercised in defining the precise scope and meaning of the language employed by the Russian court;

and the assurances it has perhaps conveyed of its guileless intentions; but it may well be questioned whether the recondite talent so displayed will answer any useful end. A celebrated and truly able politician, whose terse and epigrammatic sayings have been often quoted, is reported to have described "words" as given to us, for the purpose of disguising our "thoughts." The Prince of Benevento was much engaged in diplomacy,—to the proceedings of which we may conjecture his sarcastic aphorism more particularly applies.

"*Faith* may be well in religion, but in politics, *distrust* is better. From the earliest periods*, when tradition was the only record, to the present time, it has been the almost invariable etiquette to

* St. Croix, in his learned treatise on the events of an era two thousand years back, observes with reference to a list of grievances advanced against Darius, that "The weakness of a neighbouring nation, strong political probabilities of success, and the destruction of an enemy, are often the real causes of wars, which are entered into with apparent principles of justice. The conqueror of Asia had no other motives. Polybius, with his usual acuteness, hath penetrated into them, and hath had the sagacity to separate them from those pretended reasons for hostilities, in which the Grecian vanity was too much interested, to allow of their suspecting the propriety."

precede wars, however unjustifiable, by justificatory appeals.

But there is another and a safer way of proceeding in this instance, than by instituting an acute or critical inquiry into the bearing of some studied paper, drawn up possibly with the express intent of eluding this ingenious description of ordeal, namely, by the past policy of the state referred to,—its interests either real or apparent,—the character of its preparations,—the amount and position of its armies, magazines, depots, &c.

But we have been told of the moderation and good faith of the Emperor Alexander, and now the same qualities are as liberally bestowed on the Czar Nicholas. The former is indeed well known to have been of an amiable disposition and of great amenity and goodness of heart, whose memory therefore well deserves being cherished by his subjects. He was a successful, indefatigable administrator in all the departments; a martinet in military details, but destitute of the higher qualifications of that or any other art; a civilian by temperament; and, though incapable of creating great plans, labouring with a laudable and unwearied assiduity on those that were handed down to him by his celebrated progenitors. Furthermore,

it may fairly be assumed, that, in his greatest peril, he evinced a calm fortitude, and in the hour of victory was not devoid of equanimity. Here his panegyric ceases.

Fickleness, political immorality, and, to use a gentle term, political duplicity of the deepest die, are flagrantly distinguishable of his public deportment in other respects. From the treaty of Tilsit, or at least from the interview at Erfurt, he appears to have been totally deluded, perverted, or subdued by the magic superiority of Napoleon's genius. He came into Austria, to assist the Emperor Francis; soon after he joined in an attack on that Prince, and accepted, as his share in the spoil, Austrian Gallicia. He entered the North of Germany, ostensibly to restore the then profoundly and not undeservedly oppressed Prussian King: he was almost instantly beaten, and bribed into an iniquitous compact, which transferred to him a good portion of his Prussian friend's dominions. He now required, that his brother-in-law of Stockholm should imitate this memorable versatility, and declare war against England. The Swede refused to violate his engagements. Alexander invited the subjects of his relative to forswear their allegiance,—made pecuniary tenders to

the Swedish soldiery,—invaded Sweden,—permanently possessed himself of those commanding stations and bulwarks of the Baltic, Finland, Bothnia, Aland,—leagued with an infamous party of boyards against their Sovereign,—and, in short, compassed the deposition of the imprudent Gustavus.

For years he appears to have been perfectly content to witness and even aid in the open violence or flagitious machiavelism, by which the ancient monarchies of western and southern Europe were successively usurped or subverted. He pandered, in truth it may be said, to the terrific and wide-sweeping career of the French Emperor, on the condition (and that only partially conceded) that he might himself be permitted quietly to dismember, in a more gradual manner, the states of his weaker neighbours.

It was not the generous sympathy or the enlarged and magnanimous statesmanship of the Autocrat, which made him a chief actor in the emancipation of the nations. Far from it. He would have been—(deny it who can!)—an accomplice,—but the infuriate presumption of Napoleon would insist on his being also a degraded dependent.

And as for the intrinsic spirit of the Muscovite councils, let the reader compare the feeble and

deprecatory remonstrances of 1812, and the insolent subserviency of the autographic letter of 1807, with the equally well-judged, noble, and eloquent reply to the latter, on the part of our own King,—at a moment, too, when almost every other court and people were struck with stupor, astonishment, and fear, and it will be seen how little, in this respect, can be said for the late Emperor.

Had he, indeed, succeeded in peacable times, to a constitutional authority, he might, and probably would, have been a well-principled and beneficent prince; but having, in effect, been born to a military one, he has performed the rôle allotted to him by the accident of birth, and fulfilled his part in the pursuits of a characteristically aggressive domination. And so it is that he contrived to appropriate districts, states, or provinces in Europe and Asia, of more than double the extent of the British empire, besides a prodigious tract, to which he laid claim and sent colonies, on the continent of America.

Scarcely any adjoining power has escaped the consequences of this purloining and incorporating system,—even China not excepted. It is but recently, 1823, that seven Khauns of the Kirghis

and Calmuck tribes exchanged the supremacy of Pekin for that of St. Petersburg. Accordingly, the population of these dominions, which, at the accession of Alexander, was under thirty-six, amounted at his decease, by the lowest computation, to fifty-four or fifty-five millions.

If I mistake not excessively, the above is not a tirade, but a mere enumeration of historical facts. This, then, is the sovereign, whose immaculate political justice, and incorruptible moderation, we are wont to extol, and even adduce as a sure guarantee for the integrity of international rights, as a pledge that, under the asylum of his power, no infringement need be apprehended—unlimited confidence might be reposed, that no harm could be meant, and no sinister design harboured!

Of the present emperor less, of course, is known. When with the armies in France and Germany, he was scarcely twenty years of age, and not being heir to the crown, attracted little observation. His fondness, however, for the kingly profession of arms, or at least for the semblance of it, military organization and arrangement, especially in the higher and more scientific branches, have been

constantly and unequivocally displayed; while his personal intrepidity and firmness were no less conspicuous during the insurrectionary movement at the period of his accession; and which, it is averred, (by those who appear not unacquainted with the state of that country,) had considerable ramifications; but the immediate explosion of which we may certainly attribute, in a very great degree, to the fermenting inaction* of the army. A large unemployed army is everywhere a dangerous implement. The remedy has been now adopted."

On the accession of Nicholas, an opinion, pretty nearly in the following words, was expressed by one of the highest functionaries of the Empire, whose name, were it right to be mentioned, would carry with it, even in this country, a degree of authority. "*Russia has now an emperor, whose*

* "That if war was perilous, peace likewise had its dangers; that by leading back his armies into the interior, he should inclose, and concentrate within it, too large a mass of audacious interest and passion, which leisure and communication would occasion to ferment, and which he should then be no longer able to control; that a direction must be given to these dangerous influences; and that, after all, he feared less from them abroad than at home." So said the late French Emperor.

*character is marked by much stronger traits, and who is of a far higher ambition than distinguished his late brother; but those qualities will not suddenly reveal themselves. They will be gradually disclosed by his public conduct.*" The truth or inaccuracy of this opinion will soon, from the greatness of the pending events, be resolved.

Few instances, I presume, if any, can be pointed out, of a sovereign succeeding, in the most vigorous spring-time of life, to unlimited power,—to the command of an immense, well-appointed, and warlike army, with difficulty restrained from action—who has not allowed these elements to develope themselves—who has not given the reins, in some degree, to his or their ambition.

But it surely must have required something like credulity, or at least a determined resolution to discard all thought of precaution—to have placed any stress on the upright political intentions of Alexander,—observing, as all must have done, that the general pacification of 1815—an epoch when all the governments were unnerved, and exhausted by excessive and prolonged exertion, and when every people sighed for repose, was precisely that wherein the northern cabinet commenced the organization of a greater armament than any that

had been hitherto embodied during war; and for which there is no possible mode of accounting, unless we suppose that some great ulterior project was in contemplation, or that some renewed and desperate attempt upon the existence of the empire was apprehended—which, as every one knows, was out of all question. In fact, no sooner was peace restored, than the greatest of all the military powers immediately converted the whole of her south-western frontier into one vast military camp,—thus giving the most substantial grounds of inquietude, and imposing heavy burdens and expenses on several of the continental states.

And with respect to the reigning autocrat—although it is but the other day the diadem has descended to him, has he not already found time to prosecute successfully an aggrandizing policy? The ink is scarcely dry which has signed away to him, by means of a most indefensible exercise of force, the banks of the Araxes,—and yet it is concluded that the same hand will gratuitously reject the splendid, and incomparably superior prize that now lies nearly prostrate for acceptance. We presume then, not only that a luxurious court will prefer the frozen swamps of the Neva, with their

worse than hyperborean atmosphere, to the superb and unequalled shores of the Marmora*;—but also that a young military monarch will be so reluctant to give umbrage to other nations,—that he is so averse to war, so enamoured of peace, and altogether so imbued with a fine sense of abstract right, that although this transcendant achievement (the ultimate aim of all the national conquests) be now ripe for execution, and, as it were, courts him on, he will yet forbear to give it effect. This is to be more than moderate.

It will be to disregard the fervent aspirations of his officers; the desires of his clergy; the wishes of his people (for on this subject even the serfs have an anxious sympathy); it will be to decline what comes recommended to him by every great name of Russia; to be unmindful of his own glory; to

* "The situation of the capital of the Ottoman empire, when viewed, for instance, from the summit of the tower of Galata, is beyond all conception superb. The city itself, with the elegant minarets of its innumerable mosques, the sea of Marmora, the lofty range of Mount Olympus, the canal of the Bosphorus, and the populous Asiatic town of Scutari, combine to form a picture familiar to many from panoramic representation, but otherwise of such splendid magnificence as to baffle all power of description."—1819.

contemn the substantial interests of the empire,—and even, not improbably, to hazard what we may well conceive to be one of the chief bonds of union between the throne to which he has been preferred and the chiefs by whom it is upheld and surrounded, and who, it is no more than reasonable to suppose, now ardently and sanguinely look forward, through the medium of this very operation, to the possession in their own persons, or those of their descendants, of high appanages, lordships, and princely satrapies, amidst the softer climes and wealthier and more inviting regions of Southern Europe.

Therefore I contend, that there was nothing in the conduct, character, or circumstances of the late Monarch, which afforded a guarantee that views of aggrandizement were not contemplated and would not be pursued;—and no less so,—that there is nothing known concerning the temper or situation of the reigning Prince, which can justify a similar confidence being reposed in his political abstinence and rectitude.

## Commercial, Foreign, and Maritime Policy of Russia after gaining Possession of Constantinople.

But it is precisely the contingency we have some pages back contemplated—namely, the fall of the Turkish capital into the hands of the Czars, which has been so long and anxiously looked to, as pregnant with momentous change.

It is well known that the site of this capital is, beyond all comparison, the central point of the sea and land communications, commercial and otherwise, of the old world,—combining also other and literally unrivalled advantages. "*The Promontory of Thrace, which stretches*" (says Gibbon) "*into the Propontis, and is placed between two seas, was unquestionably the most eligible situation in Europe for founding a city which might aspire to universal dominion.*"

Nor probably is the estimate of the historian in one iota exaggerated. Innumerable instances, ancient and modern, will doubtless occur to the reader, of the consequences of locality, even when affording entirely an inferior order of facili-

ties, to those now referred to; and also when contending against disadvantages that here do not exist. Amongst the former, perhaps the two most remarkable were Alexandria and Palmyra; both surrounded by everlasting desert, and yet rising to an astonishing opulence, grandeur, and power, owing merely to the well-situated sea-port of the one, and the convenient mid-way position of the other, on the caravan route between the Levant shore and the Euphrates. A distinguished statician, Dupin, supposes the influence of the site of cities to be so great, that had Rouen been anteriorly chosen as the capital of France, it would have caused that country, instead of being a military, to have been a maritime and commercial state. Perhaps the converse also, with reference to England, had been no less true, *as far as our insular position would have permitted*, if York, instead of London, had been the chosen residence of government.

It was in pursuance of a similar idea, that Peter the Great forced his nobles to follow him to a port on the Baltic, to which they have not even yet conquered their repugnance. Nor was the project without as much result as could fairly be anticipated from it, considering that its ap-

proaches are navigable only for little more than half the year; that it is at one of the most inhospitable, unfruitful, and ungenial extremities of the empire; and that it is, unluckily, more contiguous to the sources than the navigable estuaries of the great rivers, along which the mass of the Russian resources lie. But the founder of St. Petersburg had then no alternative; he could not reach the South. Eventually it will, perhaps, be no more than the station of a governor-general of the northern provinces, and of the admiralty of the Baltic.

The choice of antique Byzantium as a chief seat of the imperial power of Constantine, is distinguishable on many accounts. It was coeval with the dethronement of Paganism, and erection of Christianity as a state religion; and also was apparently a means of preserving the relics of Roman greatness for nearly a thousand years beyond their duration, in the more ancient mistress of the empire, which, it may be added, was already far advanced in decay. For many ages, though peopled by a contemptible, effeminate race, the united dregs of Greece and Italy, it continued to be the depositcry of whatever of letters, arts, wealth, or splendour were yet in existence.

A fierce band of martial puritans at length burst into Europe. Having soon overrun several provinces, their attention was recalled, and eager cupidity excited, by the celebrity and reputed treasures of this place. For good part of a century, isolated and enfeebled though it was, it baffled or deterred its ferocious beleaguers, ultimately proving their Capua, and thus passively contributing to avert, from other parts of Europe, what else seems to have been far from impossible, the substitution of the Koran for the Gospel—so far, at least, as the force of arms could effect the conversion.

Thenceforward, during a lapse of four hundred years, it has been bound down and trodden upon in the dust, by merciless ulemas, atrocious soldiers, and the iron and blood-stained sceptre of the Sultans. Such then has been the perverse fate of this capital—and thus, for so long a period, have its perfectly unparalleled capabilities been in abeyance.

To any people not anti-social or sunk into a torpid and slothful inactivity, such an acquisition must be of the greatest possible value; to Russia it were beyond all price. Rapid without precedent as have been her strides in the lofty career marked

out for her, she has nevertheless been most materially retarded by embarrassments peculiar to her position. The ice of the north, and the closed gates to the southward, have hitherto palsied every effort, and barred every approach to a deployment of the maritime means in which happens to consist one of her chief staple and indigenous products.

The removal for ever, of such deeply felt and mortifying obstacles, by the appropriation of a great port, whose attributes are not only above all parity, but which must have the effect of nearing, by some hundred miles, the most fertile regions of the empire to the rich markets of the west, is what every Russian, with the least ray of intellect or sense of the national interests, must most ardently desire.

Granting then, suppositionally, that this anticipated event may have already taken place, and that nothing immediately occurs to disturb the stability of the conquest—beyond, perhaps, the desultory attempts of eastern hordes, or the elaborate remonstrances of some of the western courts (likely to be about as effective as were those of Canute against the encroachments of the sea),—we will now cast our view a little in advance, and

imagine, during some few years, a course of policy which will go far to lull suspicion, to sooth inquietude, and discountenance all advocacy of war.

Let us then conjecture that, with this one exception, which will be defended upon plausible pretexts of the inevitable nature of the case, a general spirit of forbearance and even a disposition to concession on every other point, marks in the commencement the political bearing of the Autocrat: for the materials of resistance elsewhere may yet, possibly, be esteemed too formidable to be meddled with indiscreetly; and so, for some time, no violent assumption calculated to arouse the general feeling in other states will be adventured on. Peace, mutual concession, mutual confidence, liberality, commercial prosperity, good order, repose, and tranquillity, &c., will be the unctuous expressions now in habitual use with this aspiring cabinet, —the only views it will acknowledge to entertain. The ministers of other courts, anxiously wishing that such may, in truth, be the case, will be the more disposed to rely on so satisfactory a prospect for the future.

Constantinople will, at least for a certain term, be made a free port. Every possible facility, pro-

tection, and encouragement will also be given to foreign merchants. The profits of the exchequer will thus, in the first instance, be wholly remitted and disregarded. And thus will commerce suddenly be impelled into those new and congenial channels; and the important influence, everywhere, of the mercantile class, be conciliated and predisposed to exert itself against the disturbance of pacific relations.

The newly-acquired domains will then be arranged on a stable footing,—the roads improved, —forests thinned,—marshes drained, and settlers invited from all parts; but not from Russia—there the formality of an invitation on those occasions is not resorted to. Thence they are sent off in tens and twenties of thousands*, in the heats of summer

* Two instances will be enough,—the one in 1778, the other quite recent, about the year 1824.—"While I was in the quarantine at the Russian frontier, there passed seventy-five thousand Christians, obliged by the Russians to emigrate from the Crimea (thirty-five thousand, seven hundred and sixty-nine males). The Armenian women, who came from Kaffa, were more beautiful, and, I think, approached nearer that perfect form which the Grecians have left in their statues, than the women of Tino. These people were sent to inhabit the country abandoned by the Nogai Tatars, near the west coast of the sea of Azof (Palus Mæotis); but the winter coming on before the houses built for them were ready, a great part of

or the dead of winter, as it suits the caprice of a minister, and with as little ceremony as a herd of cattle are driven into some new pasture.

Grants and allotments of land, according to the established practice in these matters, will now be conferred on the magnates, generals, and superior officers in the cortege of the conqueror; and the exuberant soil thus appropriated, hitherto so long fallow under the hoof of the barbarian, will ere long begin to render up a fruitful return to the calculated labours of the serf.

them had no other shelter from the cold than what was afforded them by holes dug in the ground, covered with what they could procure; they were people who all came from comfortable homes, and the greatest part perished; seven thousand only were alive a few years ago."—ETON.

"Not more than three years ago, twenty-five thousand souls were ordered to be removed from the frontiers of Poland to the territory of the Tchernemooski Cossacks, their numbers having greatly diminished, from various causes, since their compulsory migration by Catherine. The reinforcement arrived in the beginning of winter, when numbers perished from the inclemency of the season and from want. Strange to say, the only reason given for this injudicious time for removal was, that the order had arrived to transport them, and that, consequently, they could not be returned in the population report of the new year, as inhabitants of the old government, and must be included in that of the Tchernomooski Cossacks."—JONES.—(1827.)

Those of the pachas, agas, or beglerbegs of Asia Minor, who may not have already renounced all nominal allegiance to their ancient head, will be invited to do so. This will answer as a temporary arrangement. They can afterwards be successively put down or reduced to subserviency as opportunities arise. The reflux of the European Mussulmans will no doubt cause confusion. The courage of the Sultan, should he still have eluded the bow-string or the sword, and be really possessed of that quality in any energetic degree, can alone serve to gild the decline of this odious domination, and furnish a creditable exit, as a ruling dynasty, for the Osmanic race. Soon he must sink into insignificance; and the boon of a retiring pension will, if he please, be his alternative. Such was the lot of the traitor Stanislaus,—of the Dukes of Courland,—of the Kauns of the Crimea,—of King Heraclius of Georgia, and of several other scions of royalty, of more or less importance, who have been successively relieved by the considerate Moscovites from the "*cares**" of government.

* "Cares enough are already united to the extent of her dominions" (those of Russia). Declaration of War, 1828. There is no rash avowal, however, of a resolve not to increase the burthens thus so gently complained of.

But in the mean time Nicholas will have added the crown of the once celebrated Eastern Empire to those of all the Russias,—or will have placed it on the head of one of his brothers,—or have amalgamated the country as an integral frontier province; with perhaps a nominally separate administration, as that of Poland. It will not signify which. But this last decisive step may, perhaps, be delayed, at least the public manifestation of it, until some causes of dissension amongst the other cabinets have been sufficiently nurtured, or the general feeling of Europe becomes tolerably reconciled to this view of the affair.

During all this time, a most imposing force will be kept in readiness on advanced positions. Nor will any endeavour be omitted to exaggerate the rumours of its great numerical amount. This will be no more than consecutive to the system which has been pursued, with very little variance, for the last thirteen years,—peace with words, and war by preparation.

Forthwith, new and closer bonds of intercourse will be opened with the states around the Mediterranean. France excepted, they are all politically diseased. The Russians, though unacquainted with factions, in the ordinary sense, at home, are

pretty well versed in the management of them abroad. It is not unlikely that Sicily will soon be coveted as an advanced post, and that an interest will be sought to be created in that island. The alliance with the United States of North America, we may be well assured, will be one of the most intimate. A community of object, the subversion of our naval and commercial supremacy*, will lead to and cement this incongruous and disingenuous union,—disingenuous it certainly will be on the part of our free and enlightened descendants.

Soon the number of the British pendants in the Mediterranean, and also the land forces on that station, must receive a considerable augmentation.

As immediate a result, however, will be the establishment of relations with the court of the Escurial, of the most confidential nature. Ferdinand (if he still reigns,) will at once be taken under the special protection of his Imperial Brother of the east. The warm solicitude of Russia relative to the domestic affairs and system of government in Spain have been already pretty strongly evinced: nor is

* It was to effect this express purpose that, about fifty years ago, Russia, taking advantage of our distress in the American war, placed herself at the head of what was called the *armed neutrality*.

it unlikely, that, as a mark of particular friendship, and in compliance with entreaties to that effect, the Emperor may be prevailed on to send to Madrid some half-dozen thousand good Muscovite troops, as a household guard and security for the royal person, against the plots of the Descamisados.

Simultaneously with these arrangements, a new and general * impulse will be given to all the commercial overland intercourse with the East. To promote this purpose, which will have a military and political even more than a commercial object, the merchants will be invited to place establishments under the guarantee of the government—at Trebisond, Erzeroum, Mussool, Bussora and Bagdad;—at Khiva, Balk, Bokhara †, and Samarcand ‡. "Depuis quelques années, (says Gamba,

* The readiness of the Russian government to be at great charges for purposes of this nature was fully evinced by their conduct in regard to Odessa. When it became an object to give that ill-chosen and worse-situated port, a temporary prosperity, ships were actually built at the public expense for the use of any tolerably intelligent foreign speculator, who might have come there without other credentials than a mere recommendation of respectability.

† See note in an afterpart of the volume.

‡ Up to the middle of the last century,—when the Russians compelled our company at Astrakan, at the head of which Hanway was, to withdraw—we carried on a considerable com-

consul-general—Tiflis, 1826,) un assez grand nombre de marchands Russes de l'intérieur viennent s'embarquer à Astrakhan pour le Golfe de Koultiouk, sur la côte méridionale de la Mer Caspienne; de ce point ils vont en caravan à Khiva, et jusqu'à Boukhara, en traversant le pays des Turcomans, qui occupent une partie de la côte."

To these ends a secure armed protection will, where necessary, be provided,—the roads and river-navigations will be improved,—dams and weirs will be removed,—aids in point of conveyance, especially on the Caspian, Tigris, and Oxus, afforded,—and lucrative privileges, or what nearly amounts to the same thing, fiscal exemptions, granted. The ukase of 1821, on this subject, is an indication of this course being likely to be pursued—collaterally, and at no considerable distance of time, the Imperial treasury will be amply indemnified.

"Il n'est pas douteux, (says the same writer, who denounces the commercial superiority of Britain as a grievance, against which all nations should

merce on the Caspian and with Bokhara, Samarcand, &c. It is worthy of remark, that the Tartarians along the eastern shore of the Caspian use the tea-leaf in a far greater proportion than we do. The land-carriage of it, therefore, cannot be expensive, for the people are not rich.

unite,) qu'une grande partie du commerce de l'Asie reprendra son ancienne route, parce qu'elle est plus courte, plus avantageuse, et qu'elle n'est dominée par aucune compagnie privilégiée!" This zealous commercial functionary is probably a little too sanguine in his views,—but it appears that the Russian government have favourably received the plans in conformity with them.

From London to the ports of the Indian Peninsula generally, the voyage is estimated at sixteen or eighteen thousand miles. From Constantinople to Bombay or Surat is at most three thousand, including four * hundred of land-carriage; in a country abounding in cheap means of transport, namely, mules, camels, and draft-bullocks, with the redeeming conveniency of passing through a most important intermediate mart, Erzeroum †.

* This land-carriage, as before observed, lies between Trebisond and Moussul.—From Moussul to Bagdad is two hundred miles, navigable for large flats. From thence to the Gulf, the river has the appearance of a vast canal,—slow, deep, and level—and is navigable for large sea vessels.

† "In the event (says Colonel Macdonel Kinneir, our present envoy at the court of Persia) of any European power ever undertaking the invasion of India, there is no spot, east of Constantinople, better calculated for assembling a large force, than the plain of Erzeroum; horses and cattle

This, of course, supposes the latter city to be in the possession of the Russians; which, in point of fact, may even now be the case. Between the Volga (on which steam-boats are already established) and the Don, there is about fifty miles of land-carriage—the connecting canal not being yet open, although it is supposed to be very nearly completed. On this short over-land transit, there is already considerable traffic carried on, in which above fifteen thousand carriages * are, during the season, in constant employment. And here also,

are cheap and abundant, forage is everywhere to be procured in the spring and summer, and a considerable stock of corn may be collected from the neighbouring provinces. The roads are excellent at this season, and well calculated for the transportation of artillery in the level parts of the country, where carts drawn by oxen are much in use with the natives. The inhabitants of the town carry on an extensive trade with all the large cities in Turkey and Persia, particularly with Constantinople, Bagdad, and Erivan." This, however, is not the line that the Russians will probably adopt for an attempt upon India. The eastern shore of the Caspian and the Aral is evidently more eligible to be their base of operations.

* A good part, however, of these are engaged in conveying fish. The fishery on the Caspian is astonishingly productive. All Russia is supplied from it, and the quantity required is by no means inconsiderable, the fast of the Lent being kept with great punctuality.

so very moderate is the expense of land-carriage, that many of the boats which ascend the Volga are broken up and carried across to the Don, there to be reconstructed for navigating that river.

The two great lines of trade from the East to the Black Sea, which it is likely the Russians will now endeavour to establish, will pass through the Persian Gulf* to Trebisond—and from the borders of Tartarian China, Bokhara, the Punjab, &c., to the embouchure of the Don.

From the entrance of the Don, and from Trebisond, it will converge to Constantinople as an entrepot, and thence be transmitted into the Mediterranean, and up the Danube and the other great rivers, probably by steam. Coal abounds especially about Taganrog,—lying even in some districts on the surface. From the Danube to the Rhine is no great distance, It has been long projected

* Pearls, for all the Eastern markets, form a much more considerable branch of commerce than might be supposed, from the comparatively small quantity of them used in the ornament of European dress. For some few years a very lucrative pearl fishery has been carried on by the Arabs in the Persian Gulf. A number of large vessels are constantly employed in it. During the recent period, when so many fictitious, fraudulent, or ill-judged joint-stock companies were created in London, an attempt was I believe made with respect to this fishery, which failed. This is to be regretted.

to connect these rivers: the expense, it appears, would be moderate; Buonaparte estimates it, in the Memoirs ascribed to him, at about seven hundred thousand pounds. All this traffic, now enumerated, may, and probably will, be carried on, without any sort of participation on our parts—except on the Indian Seas. The relief from anarchy and spoliation, and the improved condition of the Lesser Asia, &c., granting that such will ensue, might no doubt be highly beneficial to our manufacturing interests, could we go into their markets on equal terms with the subjects of the dominant State. But the prohibitory* system, already unscrupulously resorted to by the latter, for the protection of her infant manufactures and of her trade generally, leaves not a doubt that our passage through the Bosphorus will, *after a time*, be gra-

* Four years back a Russian embassy was sent to Pekin; since then a most important increase has taken place in the caravan trade with China: it is to favour this, that several articles of Indian produce, which used to be sent from London to Russia, are, within the last year or two, rigorously prohibited. There is no longer any favour shewn to the English merchant in Russia. The tea brought by these caravans is of better flavour than ours, but much more expensive. It has already found its way in small quantities into the German and French markets.

dually so hampered and impeded with restrictions, that British merchants will not find it for their interest to persevere in the attempt. On this point some further developement will be found in a subsequent note.

By means of the intimate intercourse that may thus subsist between Constantinople and the East, connexions and correspondence will be established with Caubul, Lahore, Sind, the Mahratta's, &c. Emissaries will penetrate into those countries;—the project of re-establishing the overthrown mussnuds of every class will be diligently disseminated;—the more warlike and dissatisfied portion of the population will be incited to prepare and organize themselves, under the intimation that a general attack is contemplated against the British ascendancy, both in Europe and Asia; auxilliary aid, too, will of course be tendered, and the fidelity of our native troops tampered with.

Thus will the public mind of those countries be thrown into a state of high excitement and effervescence; for, notwithstanding the ameliorative character of the British sway, from various circumstances, some of them beyond control, others unintentional, India is filled, throughout every part of its extent, with the families of ruined zemindars,—

defeated chiefs,—chastised Pindarries,—and dethroned rajahs or nabobs, with their numerous followers, relatives, and adherents. A large population of disbanded soldiery also exists, in many of the central or north-western states, whose caste and destination by inheritance is that of arms;—accustomed to military adventure, to lawless and predatory habits, individually daring, who are now without resource, and who sigh for action and revenge.

Neither, perhaps, would the idea of restoring to a portion of his ancient supremacy, the Mogul Emperor*, still holding by our permission his nominal court at Delhi, be without effect, at least amongst the ten millions of Mahometans scattered over the Peninsula.

Those proceedings alone would compel us to add to our Indian army by at least fifty thousand men (European or native); and thus will commence a rapidly increasing expenditure with as rapid a diminution of receipts.

* "Perhaps the only pretence which any forecasting enemy can have imagined likely to awaken sensation, would be the restoration of efficient rule to the house of Timour; while such a war-cry would have been a call on the fealty of the Sovereign of Oude," &c.—*Marquess of Hastings's Summary.*

And again—"There is in India, (says the same authority) a numerous class, by descent and by habit, from early youth, professedly devoted to a military life."

An appeal will then doubtless be addressed by us to the court of Constantinople, relative to the use made of the Czar's name on the frontiers and in the interior of India. Explicit and unqualified disavowals will follow, together with warm and fervent protestations of undiminished amity: perhaps, even the idea will be treated as a mere calumny, a "malevolence," as the rumour of ambitious views has been designated in one of the late manifestoes.

Thus, by no more than an insidious and untangible mode of warfare, will any advantages derivable from those great possessions, (capable, under other circumstances of yielding us, it may be hoped, ere long, not less, in surplus revenue and commercial profit, than several millions annually)* be worse than neutralized; the Indian debt will not long remain at its present amount; loans

* "*After revolving every circumstance with the coolest caution, I cannot find any reason why, subsequently to the present year, an annual surplus of* FOUR MILLIONS *sterling should not be confidently reckoned upon.* THIS OUGHT NATURALLY TO INCREASE; *for the causes which will augment the receipt have nothing in them tending to require further charges.*"—MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.

"There is every just ground to reckon on its progressive augmentation."—*Ibid.*

will be obtained from the oriental shroffs with difficulty, and at heavily usurious interest;—and yet this will be termed a peace establishment. When governing a conquered people by means of their own armies, the purse, let it be remembered, is at least as necessary as the sword. The regular disbursement of pay is almost the only tie upon the fidelity of troops of this class.

But to return to the proceedings of the Russians. The Black Sea, which, during more than one former era, was the heart of an active and most lucrative industry,—whose bosom was wont to be covered by the barks of the unskilful navigators of those times,—whose shores were studded, at different epochs, with thriving settlements and prosperous towns, will thus again become what its position so admirably adapts it for; and its winds, ports, and currents, necessarily be as familiar to the mariner of every nation as are now the tides and soundings of the Thames.

Here is a positive good achieved, so far as the countries alluded to are separately and immediately concerned; and is it proposed to obstruct or finally prevent those grateful and highly gratifying ameliorations?—Certainly not. The object of this humble but earnest attempt is, that they should go

to the formation, or at least to the preparation for the formation, rather of a new and a rival state, or federacy of states, of ordinary strength, than be allowed to become accessory to the further development and augmentation of one in another quarter, previously too great for any salutary purpose. That the present condition of these affairs should rather be made subservient to the laying of the basis of one or more states, which, though they may, indeed, be less rapid in their earlier career of improvement, will not only be beneficial, but also innoxious to others; and which may yet, in the end, attain to a height of moral eminence, and real social advancement, beyond what the purely despotic and serfage system of Russia can by possibility lead to.

It is not, of course, that Russia or any other country may become rich, that can be a just cause of inquietude. *The converse is known to be the case.* The exception here (and it is surely a valid one) —is, that this new competitor in the race of public prosperity and wealth, is at the same time a puissant military power, — in the full march of conquest—with adaptations and capabilities for the following up of this universally hostile policy, which even antecedently were incompatible with the

actual or at least prospective independence of every community within its reach. The instance is a distinct one. With the great sinews of war—"IRON AND MEN," she is already but too well provided. If to these be added, to any considerable amount, an extended "MARITIME COMMERCE AND ITS CONCOMITANT, GOLD," where, it may be asked, can there be then found an expedient for arresting her overwhelming course?

It is on the prosperity of France and England, and the integrity of their independence, that undoubtedly depend the interests of civilization, and of free and healthful institutions in every part of the Old World. And if any essential prejudice be done to the relative strength or future security of those two States, in permitting the transference of a considerable territory from under a cruel tyranny to a more gentle but likewise incalculably more potent despotism—then the remedy is worse than the disease—we hazard all for the relief of a part.

## Present International Relations of Europe.

It were in vain to deny, and injudicious to slight, the efficient influence of that modern engine of opinion and government—the periodical press. It is powerful in itself, and the exercise of its power adds to its strength. There is in the last Quarterly Review, which I have but this moment seen, an article on the State of International Relations subsequent to the late peace of Paris.

This concise essay takes a comprehensive survey of its subject,—developes, *for the most part*, just views,—and is pervaded by an excellent spirit.

The merit it displays, and the sound basis its theory is built on, renders it the more incumbent to mark the importantly erroneous conclusion at which it arrives.

The Reviewer examines the different historical periods in which it became INDISPENSABLE TO CONFEDERATE,—at one time, against the House of Austria,—at another, against the House of Bourbon;—and fully recognizes the fact, that henceforth the great object of the general diplomacy must be that of arranging and giving impulsion to the elements of resistance, not against either of

the former, but against this new power which has entered into our federative system. This is of course not to be denied, but it is put in a too feeble, and generalized manner.

The inconvenient preponderancy is indeed acknowledged, and also the clear necessity of looking forward to the combination of means for counteracting its pressure and operation. But the amount and character of that preponderancy, as well as the degree of urgency for proceeding to the adoption of those measures, the expediency of which is so unconditionally conceded, are evidently seen through a very vague and indistinct medium.—In fact, the question of degree, (here a most momentous one,) can only be approximated by means of a tedious and laborious inquiry into, and comparison of, a considerable body of details, which not a great many persons are disposed to submit to. Such is far too dull a vocation for ingenious or brilliant discursive political theorists. Besides, on this particular topic, I rather think that no great firmness of opinions can easily be attained, without some practical knowledge of military affairs; or at least, peculiar aptness for apprehending them.

The diplomacy of Europe conformable to this

new state of things, is, says this clever writer, as yet in embyro, unformed—chaotic; no treaties, as he states, have been as yet entered into, of the smallest importance, which bear upon this point, or afford the least promise of a refuge against the clouds and storms impending in the north over the general horizon.

This is but too true:—and furthermore, if the notion elicited in reference to this point, were acted on, the desideratum of adequate preparatory alliances would never be attained, or would assuredly be attained too late: inasmuch as a continued passive quiescence and waiting for events is, in effect, what is approved and counselled, in the paper referred to, as the line of policy now most befitting the principal powers interested in resisting the Northern Cabinet. This is unconsciously to plead the cause and facilitate the dark designs of the latter.

If England and France are not to take the initiative in fortifying civilization against a coming danger—on whom is it meant that that great duty should devolve? Is it the Grand Seignor that we are to look to for the timely preparation of those alliances? Is it the Prince Metternich—whose intrigues have so successfully gone to repress, not

promote civilization,—whose shallow but consummate ingenuity has for so many years been employed, not for the amelioration and honest advancement of the Empire over which he is supreme,—but to the extinction of internal freedom and external independence throughout the world? Is it from the enlightened and respectable, but universally enthralled and insignificant members of the Germanic Confederation that we are to anticipate this indispensable desideratum? Are we to take for our guides in this matter the Court of Berlin*, which—had its generous and high-spirited people permitted—would have still crouched, even after the Russian campaign, beneath the chariot-wheels of Buonaparte—and which has since so unwisely broken its faith with that same generous people, whose patriotic enthusiasm rescued it from ignominy? The Pope, Don Miguel, and Ferdinand VII., are, it is scarcely necessary to observe, more likely to clog than assist our devices for obstructing the head of the Greek Church, the leader of the Holy Alliance, and the great protector of the vile faction which

* Every one is aware of the exemplary amiability in private life of the Prussian Sovereign and royal family; but in state emergencies other qualities than these are requisite.

has triumphed in the Peninsula and is struggling for resuscitation in France.

If it be true that Russia has arrived at too great a degree of power,—if the diplomacy of Europe requires to be reconstructed, and should in future be directed to the restraining of that power,—if the moral and political condition of France and England render them the fitting guardians of free institutions and of the European common weal,—then there is not a moment to lose on the part of the two latter, in taking the initiative,—in placing themselves in front of the nations, in giving such order, proper direction, and consistency, to the international relations generally, as is best and most vigorously adapted to meet the pressing exigence of this new state of things.

The writer goes on to recommend, most properly, the speediest possible realization and consolidation of the freedom and power of Greece,—with a view to its becoming a safeguard and barrier of Europe against the irruption of the Muscovites, and of being the future theatre of the contests of France, England, and Austria, against the Czars,—as the Netherlands were, during the ancient confederacies, against the alternate ascendancy of the Houses of Bourbon and Austria.

There is here an inaccuracy. The Netherlands were but too often the battle-field of Europe, but they were never, in themselves, a barrier against the progress of any great power. They brought but little weight into either scale. It was their feebleness, their wealth, and the supplies with which they abounded, that rendered them so eternally the prey and victim of conflicting armies. It has been only recently that an inherent strength for self-defence has been sought to be imparted to them by the boon of independence, and by their re-union with Holland,—certainly one of the best results of the revolutionary wars.

Livadia, Attica, and the Peloponnesus numbered, previously to this cruel and exterminating contest, about a million of inhabitants. Perhaps one-third or one-fourth do not now survive the miseries of want and the swords of their tyrants. The soil is poor, but the situation excellent. Let us suppose that, by commerce and the influx of strangers, the population amounts in ten or twenty years hence even to two millions; and then what species of obstacle could this diminutive state for a moment present to the myriad Russians—whether advancing from Thrace, the Danube, or the Dnieper?—for as to which of these shall then be

the boundary of the Czar's dominion seems, to the author of the sketch adverted to, to be matter of comparative indifference. In short, the premises laid down are excellent, but the conclusion most lame and halting. He perceives the dangerous and growing supremacy of Russia, and proposes that Austria, France, and England should direct their exclusive attention to the restoration of Greece, as a remedy for this evil.

The drift of this advice would suit inimitably with the views of the Russian cabinet. THUS WE SHOULD BEGIN THE CONTEST, (which he admits the diplomatists should make arrangements for eventually entering on,) by surrendering, if Russia insists upon it, the rich intermediate dominion, calculated to add so enormously to those powers of aggression, to check and limit which is the object sought to be attained!

A strange mode this of arresting the advance of the Czar,—by voluntarily, in the very first instance, retreating, as it may be termed, seven or eight hundred miles,—thus at once shifting the scene of action, by that distance, to the rear; and so evacuating, or at least yielding up to the enemy all the political advantages belonging to so vast, strong, and prolific a neutral territory,

before a blow were struck,—instead of endeavouring to contend on more equal terms along the shores of the Black Sea, in preference to those of the Mediterranean,—or rather, it should be said, on the right bank of the Pruth,—for that in reality should be the Rubicon—the true position of the out-posts of Europe, and beyond which, should they be permitted to retrograde, subjugation and calamity can alone be the augured consequences!

I take leave to assert, without fear of contradiction, and regardless of the imputation of presumption, that this country is deeply, nay vitally interested to prevent the establishment even of a pulk of Cossacks to the south of the Pruth; and I support my assertion, and am emboldened in my convictions, by the words of the high authority I have more than once before appealed to,—who did not hesitate to declare from his place in Parliament, and as first minister of the Crown,—that, "IF THEY (his opponents) ANSWERED, '*Let Russia take all her conquests, and drive the Turks out of Europe, we have no interest in it*;' "WITH THOSE WHO MAINTAINED SUCH A PROPOSITION HE WOULD NOT ARGUE!"

And this was said when Russia had not Poland;—when she had not Finland;—when her southern

and almost every portion of her frontier was far within its present line, and when her strength and resources were, in every respect, so much less matured and consolidated than they now are!

The ardent desire of the Russians to possess a fleet, has long, expensively, and even prematurely been displayed. And thus it is, that though incapable hitherto of adequately employing them, they have usually, nevertheless, incurred the burden of maintain about fifty sail of the line; a large proportion of which are necessarily frozen up during nine months of the year,—the remainder being at all times without any egress to the ocean.

A new era must, under those circumstances, be anticipated in naval affairs. Russia having at length accomplished the establishing herself on the Mediterranean, will descend into the arena as a maritime power. The port of Constantinople cannot now fail, from its resources and locality, to become, in a very short time, the most formidable arsenal in the world.

But very few and unimportant marine stores will any longer be necessary to be sent from the north, by the Borysthenes. The forests* of Asia Minor,

* The timber of which is considered superior to the English oak.

the iron of Caucasus, the copper of Calcedon, the hemp of Synope and Trebisond, celebrated for its long staple and strength, all will flow to the provisioning of the depôts of the Bosphorus. *A more extended application of steam, as an auxiliary, will also probably be essayed.* The extraordinary cheapness of ship-building in the Marmora has been already alluded to.

No great number of years is likely to elapse before the Czar will have a hundred sail of the line in construction, or exercising in the Marmora and Euxine, manned by the expert Greek and docile Russian, and possibly under the severe and skilful direction of North American officers. If Napoleon had had such unassailable lakes on which to make sailors, the invasion of this country might not have been impracticable,—the war might, perhaps, have taken another turn.

Nor in this comprehensive course of preparation, will the Autocrat be reduced to falter from the paucity of means. No sooner does his flag float in apparent security over the "seven-throned-city," than there will assuredly be found gambling millionaires of the Stock Exchange, quite ready to enter into compact with his Imperial Majesty, for the advancing of all necessary aids towards the

furtherance, on the largest scale, of those great and useful objects. Not that the contractors will trouble themselves in the least, as to the purpose to which these loans are likely to be applied. Whether they shall, or shall not, be raised in order to provide the munitions of war against the country of those by whom they may have been furnished, is a point that will not be too curiously inquired into.

Ten millions* sterling have been recently raised for Russia in London. And yet we have claims upon the consideration of the millionaires—for honour, and even authority and command, being here the reward of wealth, much more frequently than wealth is of honour, there is thus, it may be said, a more favorable market provided by our laws and customs for their money, than in any other part of the world. This, however, will not prevent the dealers in an article for which there is such universal competition, from disposing of it to the highest bidder—friend or foe—for good or for evil purpose.

* Altogether, in the ten years subsequent to 1816, there appears to have been lent by *English capitalists, to foreign governments*, ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR MILLIONS STERLING. *This is the nation that complains of poverty!*

## Of the Relative Decline of the British Power, Maritime, Commercial, and Revenual.

The Russians will now begin to feel strong, and to assume a higher tone towards their European brethren. In the mean time we shall have been going on without any very remarkable occurrence to observe upon:—our external commerce and financial resources reduced, it is true, but the public expenditure likewise lowered as far as possible,—several of the national establishments, however, being consequently and unavoidably permitted to sink into a degree of dilapidation.

But if the establishment of a popular frame of government in the Spanish and Italian Peninsulas, on the plains of the Guadalquiver and of Naples, be found unpleasing and inconsistent with the Muscovite ideas on legislation, then it cannot be denied that the existence of free constitutions with the inseparable palladium of a free press, must be at least as obnoxious if permitted to endure in France and England.

When, therefore, by the success of its present

measures, this colossal state shall have secured so considerable an accession of strength as to warrant its throwing off the SUAVITER and confronting the other Cabinets, which it can scarcely yet prudently hazard doing—is it inconsistent to imagine that, at some convenient season, it may find occasion to intimate a desire, a friendly desire, to the governments of one or both of these Kingdoms, that some slight modifications should take place in their systems of civil polity;—that some of the unseemly ingredients of democracy which disfigure the French "Charte," and that render the debates of our own legislative assemblies, doubtless, so indecorous and wounding to the refined apprehensions and lofty sensibilities of an Autocrat, should be expunged or neutralized?

Assuredly, were any one now to hint, within the walls of Parliament, at the possibility of any such audacious proposition, the individual who might be so indiscreet would incur the risk of some ungracious if not indignant and contemptuous reproofs.

But by and by, when the supreme military Chief of the North is flushed with the success of the projects which it has fallen to his lot to execute;—when he holds, perhaps, a still more numerous

army in the leash than he even now does;—when his military chest will have been recruited by the increasing obroks of seventy or eighty millions of vassals, whose opportunities of profitable industry will, by the present proceedings, have been so greatly extended;—when to these tremendous materials he will be enabled to add the resources of, perhaps, half as many more of obsequious and subservient allies, whose wretched courts may still continue to rejoice in the triumph of the Russian designs, under the full persuasion of being destined always to participate in the fruits of them;—when, in fact, the Czar is no longer locked up within the Baltic and the Euxine —when his fleets will ostentatiously parade the Mediterranean, as his armies have, during some years of a profound peace, been injuriously exhibited along the frontiers,—when all the world begins to succumb to the evidence of his power—then it may be doubted whether he will retain so unfeigned a respect either for the French Chambers or the English Parliament, or the obnoxious, impertinently inquisitive press, as may be the means of averting such a profanation as that which has been above contemplated.

Besides, a request, coming from such a source,

couched in all the becomingness of amity and high consideration,—recommending, in gentle terms, merely an arrangement of the powers of government more assimilant with the well-ordered condition of things in the superior state, will not have the air of being so unreasonable; and the less so as the proposition must apparently go to the strengthening of the authority of the native rulers; —nor is it by any means certain that there may not then be advocates in this country, even avowed advocates, of the Russian system. Few, at all events, in a short time, are the governments of the earth, that will refuse to lend an attentive, a deferential ear, to the communications of an autocratic envoy.

Perhaps the following, however, may be the course taken:—When the Czar is in readiness to pick a quarrel with us, or finds himself strong enough to try, at all hazards, to levy a contribution on this "shopkeeping" nation,—which will not be resolved on till the new acquirements are well organized,—and the fleet in the Marmora is in a forward state—and until some arrangements on the *Eastern shore of the Caspian, the Aral, and the Tartarian frontier* * generally are made towards

* It is curious enough, that though this is obviously the

smoothing down any difficulties that may be encountered in a *preliminary movement* against the northern provinces of India, even now a matter of the most *perfect* facility*—Then it is not improbable that the Russian representative at our court may be instructed to represent the earnest hope of his Imperial master, that the duties upon corn should be altogether done away with,—that they are conceived in an illiberal and unreciprocal spirit,—that they are specially injurious in their operation to his Majesty's Ukranian, Crimean, and Wallachian subjects,—who would undoubtedly buy a good deal more of our calicoes, cottons, &c. if they were enabled to send the produce of their farms to the London market. The ambassador will argue this point learnedly as an economist. Finally, a treaty of commerce will be proposed on a plausible basis of reciprocity with respect to corn and some other specified articles of agricultural or unwrought produce—all the benefit of the reci-

best, and only convenient line by which to assail India—and the one along which Catharine and afterwards Paul actually proposed to begin this operation, still it is, of all the adjoining countries of India, the one which we have left most unexplored, and with which we have sought least communication, commercial or political.

* Vide Note in an after part of the volume.

procity inclining in such case, as it may be conjectured, to the side of the foreign grower.

I merely suggest this as one of the expedients that may be resorted to, for embarrassing the British cabinet, and preparing the way for a rupture. Ingenious diplomatists will never be at a loss for ample matter of disagreement, when disagreement is found to be convenient.

The London capitalists, then thoroughly aware that the prosperity of the country has at length completely passed the culminating point, will no longer receive with their long-wonted complacency, the propositions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; for the barometer of the City in these matters distinctly consists in the supposed available resources of the government. The ministers will, therefore have abundant reason to temporize, however grating it may be to their feelings. The haughty and unceremonious communications occasionally made to them from the court of the autocrat will, therefore, be listened to with a suppressed—a smothered resentment.

In the mean time, the pressing conduct of the Russian envoy will get wind. Some of our manly and determined champions of the agricultural interests, justly alarmed for the consequences, and

sensibly alive to the theory of rents—will go down to the "House,"—threaten the Government, and vituperate the Emperor. Other country gentlemen, warmed possibly into eloquence by the peculiar nature of the subject, will loudly chime in with and support the bold admonitions and profound maxims of their distinguished leaders.

His Imperial Majesty will have every word faithfully reported to him,—and will undoubtedly add this to the catalogue of his grievances,—making it the more immediate groundwork of a rupture,—preluded by a complaint, in high terms, of the insults thus passed upon a faithful friend and ally by the turbulent assembly of the English Commons. Then will there be found amongst us those who will dilate on the benefits, under all circumstances, of tranquillity;—on the Utopian absurdity of the representative system;—on the unfitness of popular governments;—the illusiveness of that obsolete chimera of political visionaries—the "balance of power," &c. &c.

Still, however, it may be alleviating to admit that, though diminished in activity, the looms, the anvils, and various scientific aids of industry will have only partially discontinued their useful labours. Our home consumption alone will as yet

preserve to them a considerable activity. The industrious and confirmed habits of a commercial people, usually long remain to mitigate the decline of their national integrity and strength. The diminution will be gradual, not violent.—Eventually, indeed, the arm of the British artisan may relax its vigour, if, with despair, he discovers that an arbitrary subtraction from his hardly-earned gains goes to the tributary sustenance, or forbearance, of a foreign army,—or for the replenishment of a foreign coffer,—leaving him but a scanty and insufficient surplus for his individual maintenance, or for that of his necessitous family.

But, possibly, to complicate this matter, to invest it with more plausibility, and involve us more ingeniously,—in short, to give a decent and colourable appearance to the whole transaction, the President, Capo d'Istria*,—or his successor,—the Knights of St. John, who have been long

* By every account this is a most respectable person. But it is supposed by many, who appear to be acquainted with these matters, that he is even now no more than a proconsul of Russia, and that he is in the receipt of a salary from the Czar. But this will not disprove his good intentions. The Morea, even subject to the direct influence of Nicholas, would certainly be more happily situated than under the iron grasp of Ibrahim or Mahmoud.

under the special protection of Russia—and the Spanish King Ferdinand, if he yet survive, will be incited to demand of us, respectively, the restitution or relinquishment of our present Ionian, Maltese, and Spanish fortresses.

Their great ally, the Czar, to whom an instigated appeal will be made, will cause those demands to be supported by the best selection of sophistry available for the purpose: a strenuous and uncompromising resistance being, of course, on our parts offered. France during these proceedings,—*should she have been previously entrapped into erroneous and ignoble counsels*—(which however must be admitted to be extremely improbable,)—will betray uneasiness—be disposed to retrace her steps, and to coalesce with us. Too late she will have discovered her desperate predicament. A vacillating ineffective conduct ensues. At one time, pacific policy will predominate,—at another, she will augment and assemble her forces on the Rhine. But these irresolute and tardy demonstrations will be held in check by the German and Russian troops in observation in the neighbouring countries. Every indication of an impaired power will then declare itself in this country even to the common mind.

Some few of our colonies may not perhaps, even

at present, be in a very flourishing condition; but all, indiscriminately, thenceforward will perceptibly decline in prosperity. Those who may chance to have visited the remains of the once affluent Dutch and Portuguese settlements, in different parts of the world, will remember what sad miniatures they present of the declension and fall of states. Under those circumstances it is, that the onerous pressure of our debt would begin to be severely felt.

Long ere this, the quarter's revenue would also, we will suppose, exhibit, on each return, a progressive falling off. Disorder and discouragement must, consequently, pervade the departments of government. Still it will be felt,—that, though inability exists to meet the public expenditure, a considerable degree of wealth, comparatively unreached by taxation, remains amassed in the country.

The propriety of spoliating the great landed, church, and funded properties will now be familiarly agitated. The passions of the poorer classes will be appealed to. Goaded by their wants, many desperate, intelligent, and partially-educated persons will emerge from obscurity, and discover a calculated energy not hitherto to have been en-

countered in popular commotions; excesses will be less frequent, but the agitators will not be the less formidable. To restrain them, rigorous precautions and penal enactments must be resorted to.

The spoliations above alluded to, once entertained as an ordinary topic of discussion, and a violent conflict of opinion inevitably takes place; —the fears of those who possess, and the lust and cupidity of those who desire to do so, will be fiercely arrayed against each other;—public credit then receives a severe shock;—consols fall at least as low as in 1797, and all the branches of the public service will be in arrears.

## THE SAME HYPOTHETICAL * NARRATIVE CONTINUED.

AT the period to which we have arrived in this suppositional glance into the future;—those formidable structures, at present to be seen floating in certain of our depôt rivers and harbours, carefully housed-in, in stately and complete preparation for immediate war,—which it gladdens the heart of an Englishman to look on, for they are associated with deeds that must for ever cast a lustre upon the name of his country;—those moveable fortresses which have so frequently contributed to the national security,—and carried into effect the

* I beg here to remind the reader, that this series of conjecture is grounded solely on the presumed *uninterrupted* progress, during some years to come, of the commercial, maritime, and territorial power of Russia. I am quite aware that it is liable to the objection, of being visionary, imaginative, &c. The real intention is not that of vainly presaging the occurrence of *specific* future events,—but of endeavouring to embody something resembling what may be expected to be amongst the results of certain premised contingencies; and of thus presenting them with more of identity and realization, than might otherwise be attainable, to the apprehension of those who may not have previously given the subject much of their attention.

national mandates even within hostile ports and capitals,—which as yet constitute the embattled chain of connexion with our subject colonies and kingdoms, will now be discovered, by reason of the suspension of annual and necessary repairs, to be scarcely sea-worthy: filth, rust, rot, and corrosion will have already made havoc in every beam, plank, and stancheon belonging to them*. The arsenals and dockyards, too, so judiciously at present stored with every species of naval provision, would be then, it is to be apprehended, found destitute of the supplies and equipments requisite for a great and sudden emergency: large quantities of these stores having been occasionally sold, we may suppose, to the merchant service, in order to meet if possible, by this apparent saving, the ordinary expenditure in the accounts of the Admiralty department.

* "*These stupendous masses now reposing on their shadows.*"

Nevertheless, the ancient courage of the nation, undiminished by one jot, would arouse itself. The trammels of well-meaning arithmeticians who may have too long unconsciously imposed their partial and limited views upon the country, under the garb of science,—the devices of the merchants and manufacturers connected with the Levant, the Baltic, and the Western Archipelago;—and the deprecations of the short-sighted and nervous fund-holder * will be disregarded or broken through. The impolicy, in short, of temporizing

* It is next to impossible to persuade a fundholder that those measures which may reduce the ideal, or at most transferable, value of his property, by ten per cent. for a year or two, may, in the end, be the means of preventing a far greater reduction of it during a far greater period of time, or even of irrecoverably impairing its security. In reality, it is only those who keep floating capitals in the funds who are materially interested in their rise and fall.—Were it not for those absurd fears which are artfully administered to, the price of stock would not vary in so strange a manner, at least to so great an extent, and would generally adjust itself more steadily to the real value of the currency for the time being, in reference to labour.

with a great danger will at length be revealed, and another course unanimously resolved on.

A great effort and generous sacrifices will be made, and, to the surprise of those who may meditate our destruction, a considerable fleet and army will be dispatched to the Mediterranean and India, and for a few months we shall again hold the trident with as lofty an ascendency as in the days that are gone by.

War, which had been so long covertly waged to the undermining of our stability, will, of course, have been previously declared. The Russian squadrons will then be forced successively to seek shelter in the Marmora, within which we shall blockade them.

At the same time the movement against the frontier of India * will commence. This, as before has been observed, will probably be made along the valley of the Oxus, and through the beautiful and fertile countries of Balk and Bokhara †. The petty

* There are many persons who are strongly persuaded that any attempt of this kind were romantic and absurd, and those who know nothing of military affairs are not the least positive on this head. The point will be adverted to more in detail in an after part of the volume. Here it would interrupt our conjectural view of contingent results.

† "In all the regions of the earth," (says Sir William

Khauns who govern these industrious and populous cities, and also Samarcand, will probably lend their assistance. The promise of a share in the plunder of the great emporiums of the Ganges will be the inducement. They are at all events totally incapable of resistance. The Usbeks and Turcomans very likely, who are the only warlike part of the people, will hire themselves out for the occasion. The co-operation of these freebooters is to be had by any one who holds out to them the prospect of military license and enterprise.

In the west, the Muscovite infantry will descend to the Adriatic shore, and thence pass in open boats in spite of all our cruisers, during calms, &c.* into the Seven Islands—proclaiming them independent, or as united to the presidentiary republic. Corfu will be invested, and ultimately besieged, so soon as guns and stores can be gradually got over from the main land.

From those islands, and from all parts of the Albanian coasts, attempts will perhaps be made to

Ouseley) there is not a more flourishing or more delightful country than this, especially the district of Bokhara," &c.

* It is impossible that cruisers could prevent the escape of small flotillas in the night across so narrow a passage.

send detachments, by night, &c. in small vessels to Tarentum, Brundisium, and any of the little adjoining ports which they can make:—nominally to protect the King of Naples, but in great part to proceed into Sicily, and from thence menace a descent upon Malta.

Now a considerable dispersion of our naval force will be deemed necessary.—A number of ships will be dispatched to the coasts of the Morea, to the Grecian islands, to the Bay of Naples, and Alexandria, (whither a strong Russian column will have proceeded by the way of Syria,) in order to detach those feeble governments from the Muscovite alliance.

Encouraged by those circumstances, the fleet of the Marmora, supported, perhaps, by steam-frigates, will debouch from the straits and hazard a general action.

Great as the numerical odds may be against us, they will be driven back under the guns of their castles, but after a heavy loss on our side.—Bad weather comes on; our disabled ships must proceed to refit at Malta;—the hostile fleet, being close to the amplest resources, will of course be ready for sea, and reinforced much quicker than ours can be.

They will again come forth from their strong hold. The small British squadron then remaining in the Archipelago, will make a daring effort, but, from total disparity of numbers, with ill success;—they will fall back, pursued by the enemy, upon Malta.

The ships repairing at that place boldly come out of the harbour, though but half refitted, and inadequately manned. An engagement ensues, indecisive in its results—but owing to the previous condition of our squadrons, they are necessitated to return into port.

The British reinforcements and supplies for the Mediterranean will have been delayed or reduced in amount by the sinister, and finally hostile, conduct of Spain and the United States; and the consequent necessity of increasing the force in the Tagus, the St. Lawrence, and the West Indies, and of blockading Cadiz, Corunna, New York, and the Havanna, where a Russian squadron will, perhaps, have been stationed.

For the first time, during a long period of the naval history of this country, a British port (Malta) will be regularly invested by an enemy's fleet, strengthened by the numerous frigates and lighter vessels from the Grecian islands and Morean

Peninsula. The Muscovite troops will now be rapidly brought over from Sicily, and the siege of Valetta commenced.

The Autocrat, promptly availing himself of his superiority in the Mediterranean, dispatches a land force to Spain, with the full concurrence of the Spanish monarch, long ere then a mere puppet in the hands of some prelatory premier, Jesuit confessor, or dignitary of the Holy Office, who will have readily sold himself to the Czar under the influence, perhaps, of a similar prospect, with that, which swayed our own Wolsey to the views of Charles.

The investing lines of Gibraltar will be reconstructed—descents threatened from Algesiras,—and a petit-guerre of privateers, steam-boats and small craft, carried on from thence against the bay and mole.

Cadiz and Corunna (possibly even Lisbon) will then be crowded with Russian and Spanish troops, ostensibly for the succour of Ireland, to enable it to throw off, as it will be termed, the English yoke.

Should the American general now a candidate for the highest office in the UNITED STATES still survive, and be then, for instance, in his

second or third Presidentship, (which is by no means impossible, being a remarkably hale and strong man,) he is one that would co-operate against the British ascendency in Ireland with a peculiar zeal and determination. His parents are said to have been exiled from that country, and he himself is understood to cherish for it a most fervent remembrance.

The desire of conquest indulged in by our trans-Atlantic descendants is, considering the nature of their institutions, sufficiently absurd; nevertheless, such is the fact: and there is no public man in all the Federacy, more likely to push that policy to its uttermost, especially against us, than the individual just alluded to.

The Canadas and some islands of the Western Main are primary and unquestionable objects of their ambition. Now if Ireland should be then in a disaffected or insurrectionary state—should some imitative phantom of a presidentiary government have been created within it, and be in a condition to fulminate, from any beleaguered fastness*,

* That there really exists any positive likelihood of this sort, is more than I can pretend to say, having no other data to go by than the accounts which go to this point in most of the public prints. But if these are not great exaggerations,

seditionary decrees resembling those now sent forth from the nascent republic of EGINA—in what better mode could the American general promote the aggressive views on his own borders, than by preparing a number of small fast-sailing vessels or steamers, for the successive conveyance, as they are wanted, of arms, ammunition, and stores to the insurgents? How are we to prevent these supplies being landed in some of the multitude of fine ports which everywhere indent (especially to the westward) the Irish coasts? American cruisers or privateers would, also, under those circumstances, swarm in the Irish Channel and seas.

it might be well to remark that though Ireland, being of limited extent, is the easier held by a regular army—that though, in some parts, it is not very mountainous, it still contains not only an overwhelming population, desperate from want, believing itself aggrieved, and characteristically susceptible of enthusiasm—but also presents a very observable peculiarity of surface, offering, with very little spade labour and no expense, numerous, extensive, and almost inexpugnable positions for entrenched retreats as places of depôt, drilling, organization, &c. Many of these are unapproachable to cavalry and artillery; or even infantry, except in files and with guides. But there are several military considerations most seriously connected with this topic, that seem to have been as yet uninquired into. A civil war can yield no military glory; soldiers, therefore, cannot touch upon such themes without regret.

A more obvious, an easier, cheaper, or more decisive diversion against the British power could not, it is manifest, be effected. Is IT BY VAINLY ATTEMPTING TO CONCEAL THESE MATTERS THAT THEY ARE TO BE GUARDED AGAINST?

Whether, however, at the time now referred to, the Sister Island may be in the ascending vigour of a youthful prosperity, the citadel of our strength, and a new source of financial aid, or, on the other hand, the breach through which every enemy will seek to pass to the heart of the national power—is, it may be presumed, totally dependent on intermediate circumstances, which are wholly foreign in their nature to the subject of these pages—and such as the writer is not conversant with. But the actual condition of Ireland, without any reference whatever to its causes or possible remedy, is not by any means an exclusively domestic concern; on the contrary, it is obviously and intimately connected with our external defence and foreign relations: perhaps far too much so. But to pursue this supposed or imaginary war further were superfluous. France would then dread our ruin more than she has ever done our ascendency. At her earnest intercessions, a temporary peace would be conceded to us. Indemnity for the whole

expenditure of the contest would, in any such case, be most probably imposed on us. If this were equal to the contributions levied by the allies on France, in 1815, it might amount to about forty millions. We should be expelled from the Mediterranean; and in India, driven back behind Oude and the Nerbudda.

*If the* FACTS *previously brought forward are correct*, the supposition of some such disastrous course of events as that which has been just traced, follows, I conceive, as no more than a necessary and a reasonable corollary. Everything, however, which regards the future, whether deduced from sound or from deceptive data, is open to disbelief and to the flippant imputation of being chimerical. But the note to page 164 will best explain the motive on which those speculations are hazarded,—and which of course have no foundation whatever, excepting in the contemplation of the continued immobility of Europe during the prosecution of what must bring with it a relatively overwhelming accession of strength on the part of Russia.

## An armed Intervention.

But now let us see what might fairly be anticipated from measures similar to those so strenuously advocated by a former British ministry, in regard to the very same power under precisely relative circumstances.

The dangers incurred by an opposite course it has been the endeavour of the foregoing statements to develope. According to the idea about to be entered on, the hazard would be more immediate than certain; while, by neutrality, it would, in our opinion, be more certain than immediate.

In such case, the objects of proposed attainment might be:—

First,—The inviolable freedom of commercial transit between the Mediterranean and Black Seas, as far, at least, as mutual rights, mutual safety, and the mutable nature of such affairs, admit of.

Second,—A fair indemnity to Russia for the sequestration of ships or cargoes in the Ottoman ports, supposing that she can establish a claim on that score.

Third,—An equitable territorial adjustment between the Turks and Greeks,—such as may lead to permanent security, by means of the eventual establishment of a new Christian state or confederacy of states on this side the Hellespont,—and such as is consistent with the general interests of civilization. Henceforth, also, Turks to live within the Greek territories, and Greeks within those of the Turks, without a right of appeal for protection to foreign states.

These, or at least the greater part of them, are what Russia, above all other powers, could not, with any colour of propriety, object to. If she does, then the mask is discarded, and the whole universe must see what her real purpose is. They are, with very little modification, the ends she proclaims to be her own.

The next question is how these desirable arrangements might be accomplished. On this point it is not presumed to mark out any specific plan; but the following suggestions are thrown out for the consideration of those better qualified to judge of their practicability, or of devising other and more applicable expedients.

The splendid monarchy of the Moors extended during many ages over Spain and Portugal,—a

rocky nook of the Asturias alone excepted. The empire of Morocco, on the other side of the Strait, was possessed by the same people. The Christian Visigoths, by successive struggles, recovered possession of their country. Gradually the Moslem frontier receded, and became limited to the province of Grenada.

It is almost exactly the same course of events which now appears to be in progress in European Turkey. Thus cause and effect follow and are reproduced with unvarying regularity. What the gallant, generous, enlightened and magnificent Arabian of the Iberian peninsula was not exempt from, neither will the brutal Turk of the Thracian promontory. What is, at all events, then about to take effect,—even without any foreign intervention,—namely, the recession of the Ottoman frontier,—but not (if left to its own course) without long strife, suffering, and probable confusion,—might surely be advantageously, justly, and even, perhaps, bloodlessly accelerated, by negotiation, supported by a great and imposing force, on the parts of France, England, and their allies.

Humanity, as well as the general repose, forbids that the Greek and Mussulman should any longer

inhabit the same soil. Let, then, a division of territory proportioned to their respective numbers take place.

In this case an European domain might remain and be guaranteed to the Sultan, bounded on the one side by a line running along the summit of the Balkan, and on the other by some natural demarcation; or, if that cannot be conveniently found, by a line due north and south, passing westward of Adrianople, or by the Maritza river. This would leave to the two or three millions of European Turks, a square several fold more fertile than Scotland, not above a third less than it in area, and fully capable of supporting double the above population.

Let the Greeks be the people who shall, at some distant period, drive these irreclaimable fanatics out of Europe, as Ferdinand and Isabella did, with such infinitely less reason, the Moslems from Grenada.

As yet the Greeks are not strong enough to be intrusted with the gates of the Bosphorus.

According to the idea of partition above thrown out, there would be ample means for creating a federacy of considerable Christian states, whose principal towns might be Bucharest, Philopolis,

or Salonica, Athens, &c. Only let them be protected by the great powers during a short minority, and they will ere long be enabled to protect themselves.

The unqualified commercial freedom of the canals of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in favour of *all* nations, might, it is presumed, be adequately established by treaty; and the observance of it, sufficiently secured by procuring the cession of one of the islands of the Marmora to such secondary maritime state, as may at once be least dependent on other powers, and least obnoxious to jealousy. Were any such idea adopted, the choice might, perhaps, fall upon Denmark or Naples. As for the recent occupation of the Neapolitan territory by Austrian troops, that was no more than a usurpation on the part of the Northern league, to which every continental state was equally liable.

Another expedient might be adopted—that of giving up to the occupation of a small European force, the two or three castles on the narrow part of the Dardanelles. A moderate toll on the shipping in their passage through the gorge, would go near to defray the charge of such garrisons.

But the former suggestion, if not the most effec-

tual, would perhaps be the least objectionable.—This island should be established as a rendezvous,—a place of supply and refitment for not more than one or two large ships of war, from each power, which might choose to station them in the Marmora—such amount of naval force, and no more, to have at all times the privilege of passing and repassing the Dardanelles. Thus would the vigilant interposition of the Christian ambassadors in preventing hinderances to commerce, and procuring the execution of treaties, have an armed support always at hand, to give weight and efficacy to their instances.

The place chosen with this view, might also be declared a free port;—its security to be under the protection of all the commercial nations; and each to have the privilege of placing in it a marine depôt and commercial establishment.

Those states not possessing territory on the Euxine, to have likewise the right to send into that sea some small vessels of war, for the surety of their trade-shipping.

Whatever expenditure might be incurred by the government in whose favour this insular cession were made, would of course be gladly defrayed—the manifest commercial advantages and

political consideration resulting from the acquisition affording an assurance of the most ample equivalent.

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## On the feasibility of effecting this Suggestion.

If a project of this character were found to be feasible, and calculated to effectuate the object, the next query is how it might be brought about. —And this, I should imagine, could only be attempted with any prospect of success, by means of an Anglo-French expeditionary armament proceeding to the scene of action.

While the Russians are so near at hand as Bulgaria, it would be scarcely safe to trust, within those land-locked seas, less than fifty thousand troops and twenty sail of the line; two thirds, for instance, of the latter might be furnished by us—two-thirds of the army by the French. Thus might prompt consideration be procured for the propositions of our respective envoys: and thus also, by the opportune display of an imposing force and of firmness of councils, at an expense, perhaps, of three or four millions, might an expenditure at

another and no distant time of hundreds of millions, with fearfully multiplied chances of failure, be happily avoided. To do otherwise, will be to sacrifice the future to the present.

This proceeding ought and could be supported (for France and England can indubitably move the whole continent) by a concentration of the Swedish, Prussian, and Austrian armies, with those of their allies, towards their eastern frontiers; and by the assembling of an allied fleet at Stockholm. To go into any detail, here, of the means which present themselves to France and England for compelling the different states to enter into those arrangements, which, in fact, are but conducive to their own safety, would be superfluous. So far from any disposition, however, to refractoriness being to be apprehended, it is more than probable that all the governments bordering on Russia will be but too glad of such an opportunity of effectual coalition for common defence.

Has Russia any right to complain that the marshalling of troops in this manner would have the appearance of hostility, or be such as to afford just cause of umbrage? Certainly not. It is no more than what they are even called upon to do, while a war is carrying on in the vicinity of their

frontiers:—it is no more than what she herself has continued to do, for the last dozen years, without any such pretext.

As to the disposal of the armament before spoken of, ten thousand might take possession of the principal castles on the Dardanelles, and eventually the Bosphorus. Those on the Dardanelles especially, are not of a nature to stand a sea and land attack. On the inner sides they are chiefly defended by loop-holed walls; and being all of a contracted dimension, they could not resist a plunging fire of shot and shells from the high grounds by which they are domineered. But the Turks will now be extremely ill inclined to resist, in any way, the French and English forces: they will, on the contrary, hail the arrival of our armament, in the conviction of its being for their relief. It is on the anticipation of some such measure that the obstinacy of the Divan has been grounded.

Ten thousand more might be entrenched on the heights above Scutari, from thence to overawe the capital and quicken the resolves of the Porte; for never was delay more mal-a-propos, or decisive proceedings more imperative.

If the Czar did not immediately arrest his columns, the thirty thousand remaining troops and

the greater part of the fleet might proceed into the Euxine, and menace at once the whole left flank and maritime communications of the invading army; insisting, as a preliminary, that the ships of both belligerents should retire into port. This is no more than what Russia herself now does, in conjunction with us, in regard to the Morean contest.

This amphibious force alone would probably put an end to the forward movement of the invading columns. The capability of transferring a corps of this strength to different points successively, ought to occupy the attention of at least a hundred thousand men.

Should, however, the Muscovite troops have already penetrated into the plains of Roumelia, and be actually directing their march upon the heights of Ejub, the Mont-Martre of Constantinople, before the expedition arrives (if any such take place) at its destination, then the troops might be disembarked at Silivri, and at once entrench themselves on the most favourable ground to the northward of the capital, in conjunction with their Moslem allies,—a strong naval force, at the same time, passing on into the Euxine.

It is thus that while the troops in position might safely defy the advance of a Russian attack,

and while the remainder of the shipping point their guns upon the city, that the more disinterested negotiators of the western nations would be best enabled to impose reasonable terms on all parties;—and so restrain at once the overweening Muscovite ambition and arrogance, and subdue the senseless pride of the Asiatic. This would not be war, but, as was so well said—"taking the last chance of peace." In the din of arms, when one has to do with stupid barbarians, on the one hand, and with a military court, at the head of a successful army on the other, the talents and appeals of the pacific negotiator run but too much danger of being unappreciated, unattended to, unless an instant power be furnished him of enforcing respect.

But if, in conjunction with this operation, considerable corps, as we have just contemplated, are concentrated in Transylvania, on the Rhine, on the Oder, at Stockholm, the probabilities of an immediate and satisfactory result will, of course, be greatly enhanced.

These are no more than demonstrations, and would cost comparatively little to the respective governments; and with all the vaunted preparations of Russia, we may venture to conclude that

they are not on a scale, nor can they yet be so, to warrant the further prosecution of an offensive war to the southward,' while the other extremity of the empire lies thus exposed to become the theatre of a general and extensive warfare.

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## WHERE THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IS MOST TANGIBLE OF ATTACK.

STILL, before embarking on this course of action, it were doubtless indispensable to take into maturest consideration the possibility (notwithstanding its extreme improbability) of the most serious collision being the consequence; since it is certainly optional to Russia to brave this combined and formidable demonstration, and press forward, at all hazards, to the fulfilment of her schemes; although it is, on the contrary, morally certain that she will decide on postponing their execution, until some embroilment, rebellion, war, or convulsion elsewhere shall occur to embarrass the cabinets of St. Cloud and St. James's. A general rising, for instance, in Spain, or even within our own confines, might possibly be looked forward

to, as the more fitting opportunity. The efforts, too, for the resumption of the ministerial power in France, by the faithful allies of Russia, the Jesuits, would not be extraneous to the calculation.

But we will assume the former resolution to be adopted; and consider where Russia is most liable to injury in the event of a general war.

The political effects of the seizure of an enemy's capital have been often found to be of great consequence. When the war is a government, not a national one, it has not unfrequently proved to be decisive. It was on this principle that Buonaparte almost invariably marched upon the principal city. In proportion as this is populous compared with the numbers of the people generally, so will its fall into the hands of an invader be of importance; and if it be also a great military and maritime position and station, that importance must be correspondingly increased. Such is Lisbon, so also is Constantinople. Whatever enemy holds possession of Lisbon, has gone far to possess himself of Portugal. And accordingly, if Buonaparte had had the discretion, before contemplating a march to the Kremlin, to send two hundred thousand of the troops assembled in Germany, to drive the British forces out of

Lisbon and Cadiz, he would, perhaps, have died in the palace of the Capets, and not as a prisoner on a remote island. For it may be confidently averred that even the Russian campaign of 1812 had not so great an effect upon the public mind of France, as the descent from the Pyrenees of the Anglo-allied army, and its seizure of the line of the Garonne.

But to return to our subject :—

Moscow is wanting in all the requisites which we have attributed to Lisbon, as rendering it a considerable point of acquisition. Besides which, it is placed at an enormous distance from any base of operations or means of reinforcement which any southern invading army could establish. It is not a *cul de sac*,—it is not even the seat of government,—it is not a naval or military position,—and its population, compared with that of the empire at large, is only in the proportion of one to *two hundred and seventy-five*,—while that of Lisbon, compared with the Portuguese people, is as *one to ten*,—that of London relatively to that of Great Britain as one to about *twelve*,—and that of Paris to France as one to *thirty-seven*. Moscow likewise is surrounded for several months of the year with an interminable desert of snow, which ag-

gravates all its other comparative ineligibilities as a great object of attainment.

Thus it is that a sudden advance against that place can at no time be other than a loose and erroneous application of the general principle, on which the attack of capital cities has been made. It is the circumference of Russia which is most disaffected and most invites an enemy; and of this, the portions most remote from each other would of course require the most distressing efforts for defence. Thus also would she be in a great degree deprived of the benefit of acting on a centre, which belongs to lesser nations when assailed by different lines of approach.

Of the latter, a brilliant and most remarkable exemplification was displayed by the Emperor Napoleon, in the campaign of 1814*.

Now the armies which Russia might have for her defence in Poland, and those on the borders of the Black Sea and in Persia, could afford each other no sort of assistance, and could not be transferred during the progress of a campaign from one line of operation to another, the intervening distance being about two thousand miles.

*. Excepting, of course, the last movement of it.

Russia was most efficiently supported by us during her worst extremity. We, in effect, completely covered her flanks, by shielding her maritime frontiers; and by strenuously assisting to obtain for her the alliance of Sweden, as well as peace with Turkey and Persia*. Thus the attack she had to sustain was reduced to a single front, nay, ultimately she had but to defend *one great road*; and as the place to which this road led was not actually of paramount importance, by relinquishing it, the incalculable advantage was procured, of giving perfect freedom to the movements of the defensive army, converting it, at least, by the course of events, almost into an offensive one: for there being no longer anything within reach which it was in the least essential to protect, it manœuvred at once, with impunity, upon the enemy's line of communication. Some of these advantages may not belong to her on another occasion.

Austria had consented to receive Illyria as indemnity for Gallicia. Then why, it may be asked, did Napoleon forbear to strike the severest blow it was possible to inflict against Russia, by proclaiming the liberation, national existence and re-

* Of Bucharest and Gulistan—the latter mediated by Sir Gore Ouseley.

union of Poland? At this crisis, his characteristic decision and audacity seem to have forsaken him—he sunk into half measures. Instead of fanning the flame of liberty which had burst forth on his approach, he answered the deputations from Wilna, Warsaw, &c. in an equivocal, tepid, discouraging manner. Never was the vacillation of the politician and the temerity of the warrior more strikingly ill-timed. It seems universally admitted that a more solid and prudential plan had been that of primarily organizing Lithuania, Livonia, &c., and reconstructing in them a general government,—previous to any further considerable advance. In that event,—and all remaining quiet in the rear,—the Czar would probably have been driven to capitulate, on moderate terms, in the second or third campaign,—aided though he was by us * ;—by Spain,—and secretly,

* In that instance, the commercial interests of the Russian nobles were completely in unison with the views of their cabinet; and it is this, which is universally understood to have chiefly contributed to the firmness displayed in the national defence. These interests would now, on the contrary, clash, and more so than ever, with the ambition of the court and army? inasmuch as the exports, which produce the revenues of the magnates, are now far greater in proportion to the imports than at any former period. Our merchants would also, on the other hand, suffer comparatively less.

or at least in full anticipation, by Prussia and other states.

Had this been adopted, there seems reason to conclude that scarcely any reinforcements would have been required from France. The Poles might have been expected to bring into line, in the second campaign, at least a hundred and fifty if not two hundred thousand men, whose passions were enlisted in the contest. As it was—seventy or eighty thousand rose in arms, and are said to have been the troops afterwards most contributive in checking the pursuers and saving the remnant of the retiring army.

A European coalition may yet redeem that great political fault. The spark of patriotism is, by every account, far from extinct, and may easily be relumed amongst a people who fought and bled

Further be it observed, that from the campaign alluded to, to the end of the contest, we granted to the allies in aid of their exertions against France, and by which Russia was the chief gainer, in round numbers, FORTY MILLIONS STERLING! But the greater part of people forget these things, and suppose that Russia single-handed overthrew the legions of Napoleon!—Never again, it may be hoped, will she fight under such favourable auspices. The subsidising of great powers is also, on our parts, it may be anticipated, at an end!

so lately, as under Koskiousko *,—and even partially in the same sacred cause under Napoleon. Deplorably bad as was the grinding tyranny of the aristocratical and anarchical system, which for so many ages prevailed in this nominal republic, it has left the germ of aspirations for independence, and constitutional government, much too deeply implanted, and too fervent of purpose, for any foreign rule to destroy within half a century.

The Finlanders are a race far superior to the Russians, and who, entirely partaking of the manly character of the Swedes, disdain the yoke that has been imposed upon them. The Tartars, likewise, being above them in civilization, reluctantly assimilate with their political masters.

Although wisdom has undoubtedly characterised the Russian councils in regard to religion, there has been a total failure in conciliating or securing the allegiance of the Mahometans of the Crimea and the Caucasus. And accordingly in such of those countries as are really subdued, (and scarcely less so, along the whole western frontier,) the serfs,

* So late as the year 1823, a deputation from Poland, at the head of which was a nephew of this patriot-hero, presented themselves to the constitutional government at Madrid, in the view of concerting some extensive co-operation.

boors, or villagers are virtually prisoners and cannot stir beyond the precincts or immediate district of their huts, without the express indulgence and written permission of a police as searching and inquisitorial in its appointed functions as it is rigid in their execution—unless when bribed. Every stranger and every person that moves from one place to another, must state his business and prove that he is of *good principles*,—a very significant and ample qualification!

Thus do the central Muscovites retain the iron rod of their sway over the subjugated border provinces of the Empire. It is clear, by these and other irksome regulations, that the government fears the light, and is alarmed beyond measure lest political contagion should seize upon the people.

About eighty states or nations compose,—and forty languages are spoken in this wide spreading dominion. Heterogeneous as these materials are, they answer very well for external war,—as long as they are permitted from without to remain intact,—as long as foreigners do not turn against the Autocratic rulers their own Machiavelian arts,—as long as it is omitted to disseminate emissaries with promises of support amongst the various races of

men who long to sever the ties which bind them in this general servitude,—and who, for the most part, burn to reassert their respective independence.

As for the Moscovites who form the fulcrum of the machine, they are profoundly superstitious, and scarcely less disposed to worship their sovereign than their God;—but this does not prevent their hatred in many instances of their owners, or those who are set in authority over them,—and accordingly, bloody and desperate insurrections are by no means unfrequent. On those occasions, strong measures are always adopted.—They are shot in hundreds without form or mercy, and not a word said of it in the government organ, the press; and these occurrences are even often, it is supposed, concealed from the Emperor.

Of late years the Russian government has had the audacity to issue the most rigorous prohibitions*, in effect, against our trade, for the protection of its infant manufactures. Accordingly our exports thither have diminished altogether in variety; and in value remain almost stationary, while her exports to this and other countries have

* If the reader will take the trouble to look over the more recent Tarifs, he will find nearly two-thirds of the articles of usual interchange, lately marked—*défendu.*

increased by rapid strides; thus leaving a great balance in her favour. As a British market, therefore, compared with our present immense foreign commerce, Russia is a very inconsiderable and unimportant one, and what we obtain from thence we can procure with equal facility and convenience from Norway, Sweden, America, &c. But, on the other hand, every particle of their external trade lies completely at our mercy;—a stroke of the pen in the King's council at Windsor or Downing-street, at once puts an end to it, and deprives them of every kind of sale or market for their surplus produce, which would be the more felt, as it has been of late so greatly and lucratively augmented.

Thus we may be perfectly assured, that there is no war which the Russians can be more reluctant to enter into, during their inferiority as a maritime state, than one with us. Nor can there be, in the nature of things, one which would so thoroughly disgust the boyards, or which must go so directly to shake the influence and popularity of the present executive, if not endanger its stability.

Finally,—Russia, in the event of a general coalition against her, *(which it is perfectly competent, we have conceived, to France and England to create,)* is assailable,—

First,—By cutting off her commerce, and thus placing the present pecuniary interests of the nobles at variance with the projects of the government.

Second,—By attempting the destruction of her great naval depots at Cronstadt, Sevastopol, and other stations.

Third,—By a predatory, and properly supported series of incursions along her maritime frontiers, especially in the Black Sea, within the shores of which, and even in the rear of her line of military posts, she has a host of unsubdued, armed, indomitable mountaineer enemies: by also ruining every establishment with which the government is in any way specially connected.

Fourth,—By aiding the Persians in the recovery of all the possessions which have been wrested from them; and to this end supporting them with a powerful detachment from the native Indian army, with a small reserve or nucleus of British troops. Amongst the British forces there might be successively incorporated a certain proportion of the élite of the Persians, by which means discipline would be rapidly diffused; and accordingly as they were fit to be removed from our ranks they might be formed into independent

corps, under the command, or partly so, of British officers.

The Persians are a warlike people who will receive our instructions with gratitude and avidity; and profit by them, even with more facility than the Portuguese. Nor is there, by all accounts, a Prince in the world more desirous of tearing asunder the meshes of the net which Russia so astutely endeavoured to cast around him—more anxious to go hand in hand with us, and even place himself under our guidance, or more zealously willing to favour the introduction of improvements both military and civil in pursuance of our councils and tuition, than is the heir apparent, Mirza Abbas, to whom the active part of the administration is in a great degree confided by the Persian King. But, in point of fact, we have, it may be feared, more than once sacrificed the interests of Persia, in regard to which we ought, if possible, to have, perhaps, been more tenacious*.

* Exposed as our executive has, more or less, been during the last year, to the tempests of party conflict, no doubt it would have been very inconvenient to interpose between Persia and Russia, or recognize the demand made upon us by the former on the ground of the casus fœderis. But I rather believe it may still in reality be a question, whether we are not bound to pay the subsidy stipulated for (one hundred

Persia should now be considered the ally of Europe. The auxiliary* Sepoy force suggested, would not, in the first instance, be employed in general actions (unless, indeed, where a favourable result seemed almost inevitable), but in compelling

and eighty thousand pounds per annum), in the event of aggression on the part of Russia. The rupture took place, as far as I have been able to learn, in the following manner:—General Pascovitz and the Prince Royal entered into a treaty for the exchange of certain districts of territory, expressly to be of no effect without the confirmation of the Czar and the Shah. It was brought about, as was generally supposed, by corrupting some of the attendants of the Prince. Be this as it may, it was considered, when made known to the Shah, to be so utterly disadvantageous, that he refused to give it validity. The treaty, therefore, to all intents and purposes became a dead letter, and of this the Russians were perfectly aware. In defiance of this fact, however, they send, while the negotiation is still going on, a strong corps into an unoccupied part of the district referred to, where an intrenched camp is immediately established. The Persians remonstrate reiteratedly against the violation of their territory. The Russians positively refuse to move, and declare that they hold the country by right of treaty. The former contend that the treaty, being unratified, does not convey this right according to the law of nations, and at length send a body of troops to dislodge the intruders. If this be a true statement, the Persians may indeed have fired the first shot, but the Russians, nevertheless, are the aggressors.

* The distinguished Governor of our nearest station to Persia, Bombay, is luckily, perhaps, of all men the most qualified for employment in that country.

the Russians to concentrate, and thus affording the Persian cavalry the means of enveloping them,—of laying waste the country in their vicinity,—of securing the flight of the herds and flocks belonging to the inhabitants,—and of overrunning their communications.

This should be supported by operations on the Caspian. Fifteen hundred or two thousand sailors, with an adequate supply of the excellent native shipwrights of Bombay, might be dispatched at once to Astrabad and Balfrush, there to construct a flotilla, capable of driving the Russians, at least for a couple of seasons (perhaps for much longer), off that sea. There is excellent timber within a mile or two I believe of these two ports, and such of the materials as were sufficiently portable might be carried overland*. Luckily, vessels of a small class only require to be built, as the navigable depth of those waters is but eight feet. If this were done, the utmost celerity would be requisite, as the enemy would otherwise probably destroy the attempt in embryo, by a debarkation of troops.

The Russians, it is true, can collect enormous resources at Astracan, but the sailors habitually employed in the fishery and armed ships are pro-

* Six hundred miles from the Gulf.

verbial for their inaptitude, stupidity, want of skill and of enterprise.

Now the army of the Araxes communicates with Russia, and is reinforced and provisioned by the Euxine and Caspian; and if our flag waves on those seas, it is clear that that army, if it attempts to maintain an advanced line, must eventually perish, or be reduced to surrender in detail. And if it retreat, which it, of course, must at length do, it will still have perils to contend with; for its march will lie through a country without carriage roads, filled with formidable mountain passes, destitute of supplies, and defended by at least a hundred thousand individually brave and inveterate foes*.

* Les troupes Russes, en s'avançant sur le territoire Persan, laisseraient derrière elles au moins cent vingt mille Caucasiens bien armés; de plus, toute la population Georgienne d'istme, qui n'attend qu'une occasion favorable pour se révolter; enfin, les tribus Mahometanes du Karabagh, du Chirvan, et du Daghestan, toujours prêtes à secouer le joug des infidèles. —*Klaproth* (1827).

*This able writer is, I believe, considered a most superior authority relative to the Caucasian countries; and as it is understood that he is not to return to Russia, he is free from any suspicion of bias. The following is from the same source.*

Depuis que la Russie a étendu ses possessions au delà du Caucase, elle est obligée d'entretenir une armée nombreuse dans les provinces nouvellement conquises. Cette armée ne trouvant pas dans les contrées qu'elle occupe les vivres dont

On no account, and particularly when Erzeroum and Trebisond are within his grasp, will the Czar voluntarily retrograde from this frontier; and yet there is no theatre of war around the whole circuit of the Russias, wherein a properly sustained contest must entail more exhaustion of the Imperial resources, or be more hopeless in regard to the issue.

Fifth,—By embarking a large corps of troops on board an allied fleet in the Gulf of Finland,—to menace the flanks and reserve of the Russian armies of Poland and Finland. This armament

elle a besoin, on est obligé de les expedier en grande partie par la Mer Noire, et à travers le Caucase, par un chemin où les voitures ne peuvent passer que rarement. Tous les autres objets nécessaires à l'équipement et l'armement des troupes arrivent de la même manière en Georgie; on peut donc juger que la possession de cette contrée doit être très onéreuse pour la Russie. Quarante mille hommes suffisent à peine pour contenir la population de la Georgie et les tribus guerrières du Caucase, qui épient toutes les occasions de piller le pays et emmener les habitans en esclavage.

Toujours menacés d'un côté par les montagnards non soumis, les Russes ne peuvent disposer librement des forces qu'ils ont au sud du Caucase; une guerre avec les Persans doit les gêner beaucoup; car, s'il est facile d'ordonner à cent mille hommes de passer cette chaine de mons inhospitaliers, il devient impossible de les nourrir quand ils sont arrivés au lieu de leur destination.

would necessarily occupy the attention of three of the enemy's corps,—the two just named, and one to cover the capital.

Sixth,—By efforts to create insurrections and a servile war, which there is every reason to conclude, are by no means unfeasible. For this purpose, a considerable fund would be set apart, and numerous emissaries employed. In a country where the judges on the bench may be bought, what may not be done by the agency of money?

Seventh,—By bombarding Petersburg, if that be practicable *; of which, however, from want of time for sufficient inquiry, I cannot speak positively. The shoals, on which there are no more than nine feet of water, are known to be its best defence on the sea-side. But I rather think bombs may be prepared of no greater draft of water, or at least may be sufficiently lightened for the purpose. The largest three-deckers are still built in Petersburg, and are brought over those shoals in their way to Cronstadt, on camels.

This city consists, more exclusively perhaps than

* I believe there is danger to a fleet without a port in this gulf, from heavy westerly winds. But with a land force on board, one or two places of refuge might be seized on and entrenched, in cases of temporary extremity.

any other, of public establishments and mansions of the wealthy, and though unfortified, it would be perfectly justifiable to bombard it, with a view of injuring the credit and resources of the government.

Eighth,—By territorial armaments against Poland and Finland;—having mainly and avowedly for their object, the final and complete re-establishment of at least the former. Prussia and Austria to be indemnified, let us suppose, for Gallicia and the right bank of the Vistula, by the Russian duchy of Oldenburg in the one case, and Servia or Bosnia in the other: an arrangement by which they would both be very essential gainers.

Buonaparte was, it appears, in the habit of estimating (at least in his conversations with those of our countrymen whom he admitted to his presence) the military force of Britain, disposable for external operations, at forty-five thousand men. This is strangely inaccurate: we had above sixty thousand native British troops in 1814 in the south of France,—we had another corps in Belgium,—another actively engaged in the field in America,—a large Sicilian force in our pay, and larger garrisons than necessary at innumerable stations and colonies in various parts of the globe, from

which drafts might have been made. And if to these we add the Hanoverian forces, which we have a right to do, the estimate becomes still more erroneous. It is, on the contrary, probably quite competent to the English government to send into the field, at least one hundred thousand native troops, and support them, when there, at an expense of about ten millions per annum. And I believe it is scarcely necessary to inform the reader, that it would require a very far larger force of any other nation in the world, together with a good deal of perseverance and ingenuity, to stop the march of a British army of this amount, or force it from position.

In the event of any such wide scene of warfare, the improbability of which is, we admit, apparent, because Russia durst not, it may be conjectured, as yet encounter it, we could likewise bring to our allies what—were it possible by any calculation to reduce it to numbers might be put at a very high amount, namely, a chief, for the conduct and direction of the combined armies, before whose renown all petty rivalries must vanish—and whose presiding genius, whether in the council or the camp, must be regarded as amongst the most powerful presages of victory.

It is in vast combinations such as those, that the personal advantage alluded to would tell in so surprising, so inappreciable a degree; nor could it be easily counter-balanced by numerical odds. —Nothing is more general than a belief, that the difference of talent requisite for posts of the second and first order in matters of government and war, is only an interval of gradation, whereas the qualities, it may be conjectured, are of a different genus; and the separating distance immeasurable!—But it may be asked, how does it happen that Russia should have hitherto so triumphantly repelled the assaults of foreign Potentates?

## Of the Invasion of Russia by Charles.

Most of the modern continental nations have many times had to withstand the incursion of hostile armies. Russia, dating from the period when she was wont to be alternately overrun by the Poles* and Tartars, has been only *twice* subject to this sort of visitation. The cause is obvious. The finest districts of Europe, as well as the feeblest in a political sense, were Italy, Spain, the Rhenish banks and the Flemish provinces. These, therefore, became the more constant objects of contention, and theatres of war. An insatiate ambition or compulsory view to remote consequences could alone have directed attention to this new power. "The current of the human race is not to the north." Even the natives themselves of the Sarmatian hemisphere, have ever gladly turned their backs upon their own homes.

Both the invasions above mentioned were, on

* In the seventeenth century, the then Sovereign of the Muscovites died a prisoner at Warsaw.—Prince Repnin I think it was that demolished his tomb, and carried away the remains into Russia.

their first onset, successful, and both also had a most disastrous and memorable sequel.

Availing themselves of which, the government writers of that country—and every writer in that country must be a government one,—appear solicitous, *as if it were a matter of state policy*, to instil the belief of its invulnerability. But on a brief inquiry, the reader will, I think, be disposed to admit that something further is requisite to maintain the assertion, beyond what is to be found in the course of the remarkable events just alluded to.

On the military quixotism of Charles XII., it were needless to enter into any serious disquisition. He penetrated the Russian frontier with forty-two thousand men; and had his judgment borne the slightest parity with his valour, it appears probable that, even with this small force, he would have brought his antagonist into the greatest difficulties.

Peter sent to offer terms, but Charles deemed it unworthy of his fame to treat except in the Czar's capital,—whither he directed his march, straight forward, for some hundred miles, successively overthrowing the troops that were opposed to his progress. Presently, however, meeting with unforeseen obstacles, he accedes to the pro-

positions of a traitor feudatory of the Emperor, the Cossack Hetman, and deviating from his course, proceeds for many hundred miles away from the base of operations; without so much as leaving a company, or troop, or fortified house to mark or secure his communication with it.

In performing this march, he had neither guides nor maps; and being without provisions or stores of any kind, or the means of procuring them, he saw, on one occasion alone, two thousand of his men starved to death before his eyes. He left his cannon in quagmires; lost his way and wandered for weeks together, at the head of his columns, amidst unknown and unexplored swamps and forests;—and yet by pure soldiership*, and the admirable qualities of the troops, was enabled to maintain himself during eighteen months of winter and summer campaigns, almost uninterruptedly victorious, even up to Pultowa. Nor does it seem at all certain, although he had then but eighteen thousand Swedes, with whom to fight a general battle, blockade a fortress, and cover a depôt, that the fate of that day which Europe has to deplore, would have been adverse, such was the usual

* Latrille, I think it is, who not inaptly characterises him as "*worthy to have been the first soldier of Alexander.*"

effectiveness of the King's personal exertions, were it not for a grievous wound of the previous evening, which placed him on a litter.

The fate of such an expedition proves neither the strength nor the weakness of Russia,—nor, in short, anything else, except the superior and comprehensive abilities of Peter, and the dauntless eccentricities of the rival who so unwisely treated him with contempt, and to whose mania for military adventure, undirected as it was by the slightest degree of general information or political sagacity, this gallant body of troops was so absurdly sacrificed.

## On the Russian Campaign in 1812.

An opinion after the event, may be expressed in reference to the conduct of great men without presumption,—since causes and effects being then developed, there remains only to place them in juxtaposition.

Three hundred and twenty-five thousand * fight-

* Statement of the French Staff.—Another account, said to have been procured at Paris by espionage for the Russian Staff, puts the corps, as it is averred, at their full original complement, and amounts to four hundred and fourteen thousand; others again carry the numbers to five or six hundred thousand. According to the former (the French estimate) there were one hundred and fifty thousand French soldiers, thirty thousand Austrians, thirty thousand Prussians, and the remainder of other nations. The French army in Spain was then reduced to one hundred and seventy thousand. In 1815, the four great powers stipulated to bring forward contingents, the minimum of which was to be one hundred and fifty thousand each, besides garrisons and the quotas of the lesser nations. And accordingly the combined armaments actually in movement, or in preparation, scarcely fell short of eight or nine hundred thousand. The treaty which wisely provided for these immense contingents, might perfectly well answer for re-enactment in the event of coalition against the north, interchanging merely the words France with Russia, and Nicholas for Napoleon.

ing men, and nearly one thousand pieces of cannon, passed the Niemen under Napoleon's orders. The composition of this army was not good, as inferred from the subsequent defection of the Prussians*, Austrians, and lastly of the Saxons.

The Russians, in retiring, for the most part swept the population with them, burning at the same time and laying waste everything they were unable to carry away. This was most judiciously done, but it gives no evidence of strength,—and is a Tartar or Parthian mode of defence, rather than that of a powerful, invulnerable nation.

Buonaparte precipitated the pursuit, so as to outmarch his supplies† and droves of cattle. Thus it was, that, from even the first few days, marauding for subsistence, and famine, made their appearance in his ranks. Disorganization and frightful losses were ere long the consequence.

Much controversy has taken place amongst many highly-instructed French military writers re-

* A wise and honourable defection, in the opinion, it is believed, of most persons.

† At Wilna, it is true, there were provisions, but time or opportunity was wanting to profit by this depôt either in passing or repassing.

lative to the conduct of this "Grand Army" of invasion; but nothing need be said in its defence. *It vanquished everything that opposed it,* and won the position upon which its march was directed,—in short, it accomplished, within an incredibly short space of time, all that was pointed out to it to do. And if, instead of the Russian Court becoming INTIMIDATED, (the expectation of which was obviously what prompted this UNSUPPORTED FORWARD MOVEMENT,) terrible disasters ensued, then that which is proved by the operation is mainly this,—that a fallacious plan for the campaign was conceived—that the principles on which it was based were probably unsound *: when a regular army, which has not been beaten in any great action, is subjected, for seven hundred miles, to the destructive insults of a species of cavalry, so insignificant as to have no

* This inference holds good, although it be fully admitted that the consequences were aggravated beyond anything that foresight could have contemplated, by a conjunction of circumstances, some of which were beyond human control—others for which the French Emperor was not responsible. According to Boutourlin, only eighty thousand of all the invading columns repassed the frontier. By the same authority we find that Kutusoff's central army did not muster, on arriving at the Niemen, above forty-five thousand men. The wings, however, had not suffered so much.

place in an order of battle, can there be any doubt but that *false movements* have been the cause?

Of the Russians, on the other hand, it may be said that they displayed great valour, firmness, and good judgment; and that they inflicted and suffered immense slaughter. But it must also be admitted that they were overthrown, though with honour, on every battle-field,—and that after attempting without effect to cover the approach to one of their capitals, they found it necessary to leave uncovered the road to the other: thus, taking all the previous circumstances into consideration, imitating in reality the mariner, who being in the last extremity, cuts away his masts, or abandons his most valuable cargo.

In truth, they were compelled to trust for safety to retreat,—to the signal improvidence of their foes,—and to the consuming torch, which a noble despair inspired them with the resolution of applying; but above all, to what they well knew were just then most seasonably and opportunely impending for their deliverance,—namely, the storms of heaven.

Nor can it be alleged that this severe climate is a sufficient rampart, if proper provision be previously made. In such case both parties suffer,—

that which retreats, of course, the most. In this very instance the pursuing army lost half its numbers in the march. A hundred years ago, it is on record, that winter operations were carried on, at least on a limited scale, which had nearly proved fatal to the rising greatness of the Russian empire.

And it may be added, that instead of thundering upon the heels of affrighted fugitives, as is commonly supposed in southern Europe, the attenuated remains of the regular Muscovite battalions approached but comparatively on a few occasions*; and then only feebly contended with their famishing or dying opponents, who were fleeing literally before want, disease, and the elements.

Fully corroborative of these statements was the opinion of the Crown Prince of Sweden, (Bernadotte,) in his letter of March, 1813, to Napoleon, which pointedly attributes this calamitous result, not to the inattackable nature of the Russian power, but to the erroneous character of the operations.—"Du moment," says he, "que V. M. *s'enfonça* dans *l'interieur* de cet empire, l'issue des évènemens ne

* Excepting the conflicts in the vicinity of the Beresina, in effecting the passage of which, the greatness and resources of Buonaparte's military talents shone forth again so conspicuously.

fut plus douteuse, toutes les combinaisons militaires assuraient que V. M. serait prisonnière."

And, in fact, essentially the same inference may be drawn (though the admission was probably very far from intentional) from the excellent work* before so often referred to,—written by the Aid-de-Camp, and partly, it is understood, under the dictation of the late Czar.

But any further detail would on this point be tedious to the unmilitary reader, and unnecessary for the professional one: suffice it to say,—that since about a hundred thousand Frenchmen, incumbered with twenty thousand sick and wounded, were enabled, though two thousand miles distant

* Cette campagne, si mémorable par l'étonnante consommation d'hommes qu'elle occasionna, sera considérée par la postérité comme un terrible exemple du danger de s'écarter à la guerre des règles prescrites par une saine théorie. En effet, jamais le triomphe des vrais principes de l'art ne parut d'une manière aussi éclatante, que dans cette occasion. Napoléon à Moscou présente le spectacle intéressant d'un grand capitaine, qui, à la tête d'une armée innombrable, a *rempli le but militaire qu'il s'était proposé en commençant les hostilités*, mais qui cependant va perdre toute cette armée, parce qu'il a négligé ou dédaigné le grand principe de la base, qui seul peut assurer les opérations, consolider les conquêtes, et utiliser les succés obtenus sur le champ de bataille. *Cette unique faute fait échouer* une entreprise conçue par un des plus grands génies militaires qui aient jamais existé.

from their own frontiers, to remain unmolested masters for nearly seven weeks* of the antique capital of the invaded empire, situated as it is in the very heart of its dominion, eventually also only voluntarily retiring from it, while still decidedly superior in the field,—it must in candour be conceded that THE INVULNERABILITY OF RUSSIA IS YET TO BE PROVED.

* Les évènemens relatés dans les chapitres que nous venons de terminer, nous montrent déjà le commencement des désastres que la faute de Napoléon de prolonger son séjour à Moscou, à attirés sur son armée." Boutourlin.—Even after this ruinous delay, it is the opinion of the Russians themselves that the French army might have taken up "*good winter quarters*" between Kalouga and Smolensk.

## On Finance.

"*Remember the instability of England:* (said the great Eugene) *the voice of mercantile politics is ever to be heard at the doors of her parliament. The English, just, noble, upright, and generous as individuals, are just the contrary with regard to their country.*" Even were the unfavourable part of this opinion well founded, the following will, it is conceived, sufficiently prove, that no financial considerations in reality exist, at the present time, to interdict any line of policy that the national honour or interests shall point out to be expedient.

India and Ireland are as yet comparatively unexplored mines for the imperial exchequer. One of the ablest of the governor-generals of the former puts, as before quoted, the eventual surplus revenue, likely to be available from thence to the dominant country, at several millions sterling. And it is clear that we have a right to expect that the latter may be at length rendered capable of yielding a share to the general expenditure of at least ten or a dozen millions* annually, beyond what she

* If soil, population, sea-ports, and locality be any criterion.

at present contributes: thus freeing this branch of the state (England), from the necessity it has so long laboured under, of almost exclusively paying for both.

The public revenue in 1728, a period of profound peace and acknowledged prosperity, was under 7,000,000.—The then aggregate value of our exports and imports was under 14,000,000; it is now considerably above 100,000,000.—It will therefore appear that, making the fullest allowance for change in the value of money, the commerce, public revenue, and probable wealth of the nation have intermediately been augmented in a far greater ratio than the number of the consumers.

The four most expensive wars in which we have been engaged were:—

That of the Succession.
The seven years' war.
That of the revolted colonies.
Those arising out of the French Revolution.

I.—In the year 1714, being that immediately

succeeding the first of those periods, our public revenue was about 6,000,000, and the interest or annuity payable out of it, 3,350,000.

II.—The year 1763, being the one immediately subsequent to the seven years' war, the income was 9,000,000, and interest to be deducted from it, nearly 5,000,000.

III.—In 1784, being that succeeding the recognition of the United States, the revenue was about 13,000,000; while the annuity payable out of it was above 9,000,000.

IV.—In the year after the last great contest, 1816,—our revenue may be put at considerably above 60,000,000, and the annuity payable from it at rather more than 30,000,000*.

Thus it will appear that, on the last mentioned of those periods, the receipts bore a much larger proportion to the annuity or interest chargeable on them, than at any of the previous similar epochs. Nay, if we even substitute the revenue of the past year for that of 1816, it will be still found that a manifest superiority in favour of the present time holds good.—Now, as it is quite clear that incumbrances and income are purely relative—the

* Surplus revenue after payment of interest in 1793, under 7,000,000—in 1828, above 22,000,000.

one to the other,—so it follows from the above memoranda that, however severely we may at present be pressed by debt, our ancestors were even yet more so.

But as my object is only to dispel the unfounded predictions so often indulged in on this head,—a topic specially relevant to the matter in hand,—the following quotation will probably best accomplish it.

"*Notwithstanding* (says Mr. Ricardo) *the immense expenditure of the English government, during the last twenty years, there can be little doubt but that the increased production on the part of the people has more than compensated for it. The national capital has not merely been unimpaired, it has been greatly increased, and* THE ANNUAL REVENUE OF THE PEOPLE, EVEN AFTER THE PAYMENT OF THEIR TAXES, IS PROBABLY GREATER AT THE PRESENT TIME THAN AT ANY FORMER PERIOD OF OUR HISTORY *."

One word more in relation to finance. Different communities have acquired, by pursuing different methods, accessions to their public property. The Carthaginians flourished by means of commerce and war jointly,—a career not very dissimilar from

* 1821, cap. 8.

our own. But they were overthrown by a neighbouring people, who, by the use simply of the sword, made the world, barbarian, civilized, commercial or otherwise, pay tribute to them. It was solely by help of the same instrument, that the followers of Mahomet subsequently possessed themselves of the produce of so many of the exchequers, previously the reward of Roman valour. For (in some degree) a like end, some fifteen hundred years ago, another species of plan was adopted for appropriating, not actually kingdoms, but many rich and fertile domains, and splendid endowments, more or less throughout every country of Europe. This was the device of the ecclesiastics resident on the Tiber;—and a large part of the acquisitions thus, so ingeniously made, still return a noble revenue to the coffers of these pacific conquerors.—All things now lead to the inference, that the chiefs of the numerous people to whose political progress these sheets refer, are about to bend their efforts to a similar goal, though by a different route or process,—that of the bayonet.

It were well, therefore, that the enlightened economists and men of influence would recollect that even the most approved rules of science, and

the laws which govern the financial prosperity of nations, cannot with the least safety be abided by, without an accompanying vigilant precaution against the clashing expedients that may be resorted to by less scrupulous competitors. We have to deal with an empire whose only profession of honour is that of arms—led on by wily politicians, such as are usually to be found in the courts of despotic princes, and whose ambition has but too often no other limit than their abilities.

And in support of the foregoing reasoning, I would observe, that in all the modern history of this country, the two men who, in the administration of its foreign affairs, were most prompt to unsheath the sword in support of the pen, and whose policy was also the most brilliantly successful, were the Earl of Chatham and the Protector Cromwell. The latter was, at once, hated, respected, and courted by all the powers of Europe. Nay, to such an extent did these dispositions prevail, that fortresses were conquered for him and yielded up into his hands, merely to prevent the chance of his displeasure. Nor did any legal king or justly constituted minister ever obtain for the nation so much at so small a sacrifice.—Neither was the trancendent first Pitt much less,

if at all, triumphant in his course. He it was that expelled our then potent rivals from North America,—that founded our present imperial dependency of the East,—and to whose comprehensive genius, clogged though it was by imbecile colleagues, is distinctly assignable the great impetus thenceforward to be discerned in that wide-spreading developement of the British commercial and political grandeur which has subsequently so astonished the world.

But events are now fast approaching their consummation. I, therefore, hasten abruptly to a conclusion, with this reflection,—that, fortunately, at no time in our annals was there less ground, under any conceivable contingency, for apprehending a wasteful or inefficient employment of the national means and powers; and that although every one must be sensible how becoming any apparent reluctance to resort to a display of force may be on the part of one, who, of all men living, is confessedly best qualified to apply it,—still, that the present is not a question, of what may be seemly to the character of a great man, but of what is most consonant to the interests of a great people. I cannot, therefore, help exulting in the hope, that the glorious and useful task may yet again be

reserved for our Monarch, of guiding the nations to a common safety, and of giving direction to their combined efforts, not merely for repelling, but for dismembering, if need be, the overgrown autocracy of the North, as it before was for subduing the more redeemed and less appalling domination that sprang from the political tempests of the South.

# SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES, EXTRACTS,

*&c. &c.*

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## NOTE I.—*The Ottoman Army.*

EXTRACT from the translation of a Turkish Manuscript, written by Tshelebi-Effendi, one of the chief dignitaries of the Ottoman empire, Counsellor, Minister of State, &c., by order of Selim, with a view of proving to the Janissaries and the people the necessity of introducing the European discipline. In following up the purpose of this pamphlet, the Sultan lost his life.

"In truth," the writer says, "it is well known to those who are acquainted with history, that in the wars which have taken place since the invention of this new (European) system of tactics, the Ottomans have been most frequently worsted, because they found it impossible to make use of their sabres among the infidels as they wished to do, for their regular troops keep in a compact body, pressing their feet together, that their order of battle may not be broken; and their cannon, being polished like one of Marcovich's watches, they load twelve times in a minute, and make the bullets rain like musket-balls. Thus they keep up an unintermitted discharge of artillery and small arms. When the Islamites make an attack upon them with infantry or cavalry, the enemies of our faith observe a profound silence, till the soldiers of Islam are come close up to their front, and

then at once giving fire to some hundred carriage-guns, and to seventy or eighty thousand muskets, overturn our men in heaps, without so much as receiving a bloody nose. When they have thus by a few volleys caused thousands of the people of Islam to drink the sherbet of martyrdom, the surviving remnant are wont to fly. Our troops, perceiving how skilful the enemy are in the use of fire-arms, and seeing many thousand men slain in the space of half an hour, while they are unable to avenge themselves on their opponents, have necessarily begun to lose courage. But although the wicked infidels, exerting their whole strength, have, with great prudence and boldness, invented so masterly an art of war, yet the soldiers of Islam, who have not been able to make any stand against them, may justly assert that the fault does not belong to themselves: for since the enemy sends us eighty thousand charges of grape, before a thousand of our men have time to fire their muskets, it is certain that resistance, in such a case, is beyond their power."

## NOTE II.—*On the Establishment of a European Army in Egypt.*

RUMOUR not long ago assigned an intention to the French Government, of sending an expedition to Egypt. Any thing which might cause alienation between the two nations is, at the present moment, relevant to the international affairs of Europe. A very few lines will, I think, shew that, even were such an intention entertained, we might regard its issue with perfect tranquillity.

It may be laid down as a maxim, from which no hostile cabinet can with impunity depart, THAT, were all the maritime powers, both of Europe and America, to combine for the purpose, they would, as yet, be entirely incapable of maintaining a contest with Great Britain, *over a sea line of communication*, where small craft at least might not come into play.

Egypt is thus situated,—nay, it is almost insular, being approachable on the north and south by seas, and bounded on the west and east by deserts.

Let us suppose France in possession of Egypt. Malta exactly cuts the line by which the invading army could alone be supplied with stores, or reinforced. Even Buonaparte, though so often regardless of the ordinary rules of his art, did not neglect this imperative circumstance. And although it exposed his whole fleet and army to be crushed by Nelson, he still incurred the hazard of delay, in order to possess himself of so essential a connecting link. That is now beyond the power of France to do.

Suez is a miserable place, and scarcely to be called a sea-port; ships cannot approach it within three miles,

nor can fresh water be had within ten. Cosseir is not much better, and is at a very considerable distance from Cairo. There is no timber fit for ship-building nearer than Syria; and that I believe is not suitable for a large class of vessels. Nor are any other maritime stores to be had without a still greater transit. These are essential considerations, because a chief part of the value of Egypt must ever depend on its free intercourse with the eastern seas. This was even the case when it was the granary of Rome, one hundred millions of sesterces being then the annual amount of specie sent to Alexandria for that commerce. To the same source also, far more than to the value of any native products, was its opulence entirely attributable for two or three hundred years antecedently.

It does not seem at all certain that we should interfere with this attempt, were it even executed, beyond, perhaps, the interdiction thenceforward, to every flag but our own, of the navigation of the Red Sea.

But we will suppose the British Government deems it necessary to interpose in a more overt manner! The other small but valuable and cherished colonies of France must at once be at our mercy. We should probably take them forthwith, merely to prevent their becoming receptacles for cruisers, smugglers or privateers. We should then, very possibly, establish at least a depôt in the island of Cyprus, and from thence communicate with, and assist the native chiefs on the adjoining shores with a flotilla, towards the prosecution of their desultory, but annoying, efforts against the eastern flank of the invaders. One or two sloops of war within the Straits of Babelmandel, would then hermetically shut them up on the other side.

And after blockading the ports of the Delta, it would be optional with us to send ten thousand Seapoys from Bombay, to the western shore of the Gulf, to afford a nucleus for the Egyptian operations on the Upper Nile. Mehemet Ali is a man of financial resource, and might not probably object to defray the expense. This force we could with ease keep up to its complement from the Malabar coast.

These arrangements made, we might choose our own time for more energetic steps. That need not be until the enemy were thoroughly wasted and dispirited by endemical diseases, long and harassing marches, and a predatory indecisive warfare. A small British force would then probably be sufficient to wind up the affair.

But let it be granted that, in order to commit France, —the Russian envoy at Paris guarantees that his master will provide England with sufficient occupation elsewhere, and thus prevent her giving any disturbance to the occupation of Egypt,—in that case, Russia must have gained possession of Constantinople, or be close upon it.

But what will be the result to France? Whatever European power is established on the Bosphorus will soon, probably, gain a footing on the coasts of Asia Minor; and that European power which has a footing in Asia Minor, must eventually command the mouths of the Nile, from Rhodes, for instance, even independently of the route by Syria.

Thus, after perhaps eight or ten years of a heavy and onerous expenditure, and after having created establishments, just then about to yield a return, France would be compelled, according to all fair calculation, to relinquish her conquest. A single glance at the map will satisfy the reader on this point.

As long as Russia shall be within reach of Egypt with a superior army—or England is in a capacity to send thither a superior fleet, France cannot hope to maintain herself in that country.'

QUERY.—Since it is clear that, after the destruction of their fleet, the French were inevitably entrapped in Egypt,—what might have been the consequence, if we had *postponed* our expedition thither, and sent instead twenty thousand men to assist the Austrians in Piedmont, or disembarked them on the reverse of the French Piedmontese army—or on the shores of Brittany—or Flanders—or Holland? The Directorial government, then suffering humiliations both at home and abroad, was at the last stage of impotency!—Might not this additional weight, opportunely thrown into the opposite scale, have so precipitated their fall, and possibly the erection of a stronger executive in their place, before the escape of Napoleon from Africa, and so precluded his assumption of the Consulate? Our then small acquaintance with the principles of military policy, and the feebly concerted schemes of action consequent on it, not only contributed to defeat the best combinations of the Cabinet, but probably cost the nation, not *tens*—but *hundreds of millions!*

In a military or political point of view, the expedition to Egypt was wild, visionary, baseless, unsound. But personally considered, it was well calculated to spread abroad through the world the fame of the Hero, whose sword was destined ere long to shiver in pieces so many sceptres; and whose genius was then all fervid and creative. Accordingly, it was impossible to execute this

part of the plan more comprehensively, more consummately. He was himself a skilful statesman,—this he had proved in Italy. As a chief, no military man could then remotely compare with him. To the brilliancy of arms was added the still higher lustre of letters. The scene was laid upon classic ground,—untrodden in modern times,—and illustrated by stupendous vestiges of antiquity. Thus was the enterprise surrounded with all the splendour and eclat which it is well possible to conceive. Descending, however, to examine it technically, its consequence sinks very much in estimation.

The sea was the base of this operation, and that was in our possession. He could have no communication with his own country or derive resources from it. Even if he had been able to conquer Syria, conciliate the Arabs, and plant his eagles beyond the Tigris, he would still have had the Turks in rear of his left flank, and ourselves in the Persian Gulf, on the reverse of his right.

How different, and how distinctly more scientific was the proceeding of Alexander! The latter declined hazarding himself in the interior of Asia, till all was secure in his rear. Not content with the Hellespont as a base,—nor even yet with the achievement of signal victories in the field, he first extends his line of support to the Nile,—conquers all the intermediate shores and sea ports,—*established his maritime superiority*,—then, and not till then, he commences his forward movement into the centre of the enemy's dominions.

But the Memoirs of Napoleon boldly justify the policy of the measure. "The army," it is therein stated, "which was to change the destiny of India, was to march from the Nile."....."The conquest of this

province would have produced the ruin of all the English establishments in America, and the peninsula of the Ganges."..... And eventually, "the *Mediterranean would have become a French lake.*"

In a previous part, however, of the same volume, there is an acknowledgment of a very different tendency.

"But the FRENCH FLEET BEING DESTROYED, the Divan took courage and ventured to declare war against France. THE ARMY LOST A GRAND SUPPORT; its position in Egypt was totally changed, and Napoleon was obliged to renounce the hope of establishing the French power permanently in the East, by the results of the expedition to Egypt." *Here, in fact, is a complete avowal of the entire fallacy of the original design.* A fleet then that could successfully keep the sea against ours, was essential to the expedition. But this, all the world knew, France did not possess, even *before* the astounding disaster of Aboukir. The moment we discovered where the French fleet was, its utility to their army was at end. In action or destruction were thenceforward the only alternatives.

## NOTE III.—*Maritime Prospects—Russian Peasantry—Count Strogonoff.*

THE following is from a most sufficient authority * on the subject referred to—namely, the advantages of the Euxine towards creating a navy, amongst which are enumerated,

"Every description of coast, depth of water, and variety of currents. It has been well observed (says the writer,) that the country which possesses the greatest line of coast must ever prove superior in point of seamen. Now, including the seven hundred and eighty-six miles, the length of the Black Sea and that of Asof, it must be remembered that the extent of coast, without regarding sinuosities, is at least one thousand six hundred miles, nearly all the trade of which would soon fall into the hands of Russia; for the Turks, from indolence and natural aversion to the sea, would soon abandon it to them. No other nation, supposing all restrictions were abolished†, would ever be able to compete with them, on account of the easy rate at which the Russians could build, fit, and sail their vessels, the empire producing within itself every necessary article for both building and equipment at an extraordinary low price, and in the greatest abundance, while the natives are accustomed to live on the hardest

* An evidently unbiassed and conscientious adherence to fact rendering him one of the safest to quote from, not only on maritime affairs, but concerning Russia generally.

† The author is contemplating merely the freedom of the Bosphorus for the merchant ships of Russia—not the capture of Constantinople.

fare....Indeed when I *survey the maritime resources of this great Empire, I cannot persuade myself that Russia is not destined to become a great naval and commercial power.*" And again—"*it is impossible to say how soon such an alteration might be effected, particularly when we consider the acknowledged docility of temper, which all the common natives possess.*"—JONES, (Capt. R.N.) 1827.

"In 1821, there was a revolt of from five to seven thousand peasants in this neighbourhood, (Taganrog) who suffered the greatest hardships and privation, before a military force could subdue them; many died from want, and many afterwards by the knout. It is doubtful, if this ever reached the Emperor's ears; at all events it has been most carefully concealed from the rest of the empire."—*Ibid.*

"But truth is too deeply entrenched and veiled, for even his imperial exertions to explore; and he returns to his capital fatally impressed with an assurance that all is going on well and contentedly, when perhaps it is not too much to say, that more abuse and discontent reign in his dominions, and amongst his fifty-three millions of subjects, than in all the rest of Europe put together, with this dangerous and remarkable difference, that the abuses are nearly open to every body except himself, while the discontent is silent and smothered. The latter, I fear, will be the case only for a short time, and the flame, whenever it does burst, will be most fatal in its effects, perhaps devouring without remorse, that which ought to be most sacred and respected."—*Ibid.*

"Emissaries of every description had long been at work in the Morea, principally from Russia, amongst others a set generally known by the title of philosophers." —*Ibid.*

"It is a curious but well-known fact, that Strogonoff did all in his power to get the Turks to insult him, and frequently wrote to Odessa of his thorough confidence, that they would give cause of war by their conduct towards him. These letters were openly read or communicated to the public; the last had these remarkable words, 'I confidently expect my next will be dated from the Seven Towers.' But to his surprise and mortification, the Turks told him he might depart if he pleased, for they were determined to hold no more communication with him as embassador from an emperor, who, they were convinced, had never authorized his conduct, and, as they had no quarrel with Russia, they would not offer her any insult in his person."—*Ibid.*

## NOTE IV.—*On the Feasibility of an Invasion of India.*

THERE is now no time for entering on the question of a movement of a Russian corps upon the northern frontier of India; the result to be anticipated from which, would, at least in the first instance, consist rather in the injury inflicted upon the British power, than in any direct benefit to the assailants.

The tract from Orenburg* to the Aral Sea, though not formally annexed to the Russian empire, is, for the most part, completely under its sway. Many of the chiefs of the Kirghis acknowledge, even by treaty, the Czar's supremacy. Their feebleness compels them to seek a protector. The population is small and without union or strength.

A very considerable commerce is carried on by caravans between Orenburg and Khiva, Samarcand, &c. The property of the country consists in cattle, camels and horses. The latter are in droves of thousands together.

If one were to judge by the common geographical maps, we should consider this part of Tartary as almost wholly desert. But this term is used in numerous instances, in a generic sense, and by no means invariably infers sterility. Were it so, the immense stock of this country could not exist. In short, the means of trans-

* Orenburg communicates by the Ural with the Caspian. It is fortified, and particularly well supplied with artillery, as all the posts are, on that remote frontier.

port are here more abundant than in any part of the world. From the Gulf of Koltiouk, on the Caspian, is the point, from whence the Russians generally go to Bokhara and Khiva. But between the Gulf of Mertvoy and the western shore of the Aral, is not above one hundred miles.

Attock, on the Indus, may be considered as a sort of central point between the *Mouths* of the *Ganges* and the *Oxus*, although the distances are not equal. I should suppose the embouchure of the latter may be 1000 miles* from the Indus, that of the former 1400. The Oxus is navigable to within about the same distance from the Indus that the Ganges is. And Herat, Bokhara, and Samarcand are as good, if not more advantageous intermediary stations, than any between Delhi and Attock. The first sentence in the following passage from Sir William Ouseley has been already inserted elsewhere.

"In all the regions of the earth," says he, "there is not a more flourishing or a more delightful country than this, especially the district of Bokhara. If a person stand on the Kohendis (or ancient castle) of Bokhara, and cast his eyes around, he shall not see any thing but beautiful and luxuriant verdure on every side of the country; so that he would imagine the green of the earth and the azure of the heavens were united; and as there are green fields in every quarter, so there are villas interspersed among the green fields. The Sogd, for eight days journey, is all delightful country, afford-

* "The operations were on so vast a scale (our last in India, 1818,) that some of the corps, directed to a common centre and object, had been moved from stations distant not less than twelve hundred miles from each other."—Lord HASTINGS.

ing fine prospects, and full of gardens and orchards, and villages, corn fields and villas, running streams, reservoirs and fountains, both on the right hand and on the left. You pass from corn fields into rich meadows and pasture lands; and the straits of Sogd are the finest in the world."

"It must be obvious," says the Marquis of Hastings, "that should any European potentate aim at the subversion of the British Establishment in India, it would not be with so absurdly extravagant a hope, as the succeeding to a similar domination. To reduce Britain's strength, by depriving her of such sinews as India affords, would be the purpose; and the course which would suggest itself for effecting it, would be the exciting some powerful sentiment in India against us."

"As to attack from abroad, (says the same noble writer,) the intention must be long previously discovered, so that India could not be found unprepared."

This seems by no means certain. Let the Russians construct large boats on the Aral, opposite the Gulf of Mertvoy. Then the troops might sail from the vicinity of Moscow and of Orenburg to the Caspian, &c., and before their destination was known at Calcutta, the columns, with their attendant flotilla, might have nearly arrived at Samarcand, and the other points of rendezvous.

Again, states the late Governor-General,—"Though Oude had not any army, since our subsidiary force supplies the place of one for the defence and interior regulation of the country, that territory required careful attention in a military view. The country contains at least six millions of inhabitants, every adult male of whom is provided with arms, and habituated to the use

of them. The force, however irregular, capable to be thence collected in the rear of the army with which we were meeting the invader on the frontier, was a subject not be revolved without anxiety. *The knowledge of an insurrection behind them to an extent which could not be ascertained,* as our communication with the lower provinces would be precarious and interrupted, if not wholly cut off, would unavoidably agitate the minds, and diminish the confidence of the advanced troops." So, writes this able military chief, as well as civil administrator, who was as well versed in the affairs of his government as most men who ever held that office.

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NOTE V.—*On the Commercial Routes to India.*

It is, I believe, a received opinion, that the discontinuance of the overland trade with India, by Egypt and Asia Minor, is exclusively attributable to the ascertained superiority of the transit by sea round the Cape. Now this, both in time and fact, is incorrect. Thirty years previously to this event, the last remnant of general commerce in western and central Asia, was put an end to by the Turks. No competition could exist, and, therefore, no superiority could have been ascertained.

Of the advantage, however, with regard to all heavy goods, no one will be disposed to doubt; at least for the extreme north-western markets. And it is also quite

true, that under the state in which the countries alluded to still continue, the transport of even more portable descriptions of merchandise by sea must yet be the best and most commodious manner of carrying on the trade. But it is not unessential to observe, that as yet it is entirely unproved how this matter might be, in regard to the lighter and more valuable articles of interchange, were good order, the safety of caravans, and security of property in every respect established in the provinces lying contiguous to the Persian seas, the Euxine and the Mediterranean.

The caravan routes from Trebisond and Aleppo to the Tigris and Euphrates will probably be found, on examination, to be preferable to that through Egypt. Nevertheless the latter was the one solely in use at the time of Vasco de Gama's voyage,—the others having been long impassable, and in effect put a stop to, as before stated. Besides which, the Turks had already closed the Black Sea against every European flag;—making little or no use of it themselves:—and so it has actually continued even up to very recent years,—and even then with only partial, precarious, and capricious intermissions.

## NOTE VI.—*Relating to the Russian Invasion of* 1812.

GENERAL LOYD is generally esteemed by professional men, as one of the ablest military writers of modern times. There is in his works, published about fifty years ago, the following passage.

"Smolenskow is fortified, but not so as to be able to make any considerable resistance; this is the most important point on all the Russian frontiers; it is only two hundred miles from Moscow, through which the communication between Petersburg and the southern provinces passes; BY OCCUPYING MOSCOW, THE EMPIRE IS OVERTURNED. It was through this pass the Poles always entered Russia, and for a long series of years contended with success with the Russians, and even set up an impostor on the throne of that empire."

As this work is in the hands of all military men, it seems not impossible that the above passage may have had some influence on the operations of 1812. But it referred to a period when the power of the Russian government was far less extensive, as well as less consolidated.

"If Charles the Twelfth, (says the same writer) being master of Poland, instead of going to Pultowa; had taken Smolenskow, and from thence advanced to Moscow, a victory would have given him that important place, and for some time the empire."

The next sentence is prophetic.—"He could not, however, have preserved it while connected with Sweden, for the same reasons that he could not preserve his pro-

vinces on the Baltic; one unfortunate event, which must finally happen at such an *immense distance*, would necessarily have ruined him."

The following does not so well tally with results.

"Moreover," he says, "the mountains of Caucasus, which run from the Sea of Asoph to the Caspian, present so many difficulties, that neither (Russia nor Persia) can make war beyond them."

We have seen the contrary, but under great embarrassment.

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## NOTE VII.—*The Principalities.*

"THE natural richness, and the various resources of Wallachia and Moldavia, are such, that if those countries could enjoy the important advantages of a regular government and a wise administration, under which industry and agriculture should receive their due encouragement, the trade of exports laid open, the commercial intercourse with foreign nations set upon a proper footing, and, finally, the mines explored, they would in a short time become the most populous and most flourishing provinces of Europe. The harbour of Galatz would stand in rivalship with all the ports of the Black Sea, not excepting Odessa.

"The fertility of the soil is such as to procure nourishment for ten times the number of the present population, and leave wherewith to supply other countries besides;

the common return of cultivation being sixteen fold, and in more favourable seasons twenty-five."—WILKINSON's 'Wallachia'—the best and most complete account of those provinces.

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NOTE VIII.—*Extract from the Turkish Military Treatise before quoted, written by the Ottoman Minister of State, Tshelebi-Effendi, about twenty years ago, relative to an Attack on Constantinople, by taking possession of the Reservoirs, in the Forests of Domousdéré, and suspending the course of the Waters to the Capital.*

"IN the city called Petersburg, which is the residence of the Russian sovereign, are to be found men of all nations. Among these was a certain infidel, formerly an Ottoman rayah, but fixed, by his employments, in the Russian states, a man extremely rich, and a complete master of the art of deceit, acute and lively in speech, and devoid of shame and modesty.

"This man, who was at that time become an ambassador, said one day to the sovereign, in a familiar society of Franks, 'Why should you give yourself the trouble of carrying on long and obstinate wars with the Ottomans? If your design be to take Constantinople, why should you, by carrying on operations on the land side, struggle with so many difficulties? Nothing is more easy than the capture of Constantinople.' On the sovereign's desiring to know which was this easy method, the

wicked person answered as follows :—' The *Cralyä* (Empress) having formerly carried on two or three successful wars, and possessed herself of the kingdom of the Crimea, equipped a fleet on the Black Sea, and after annihilating the Tartar nation, and taking many forts and castles, reduced to her obedience the rayahs of the White Sea (Archipelago) and many trading communities : it would be easy, by following up a certain plan, to accomplish in two days the conquest of Constantinople, which need only be attacked by a single streight.' The Cralyä, pleased with this suggestion, said, 'If you prove yourself useful in rendering me that service, I will appoint you King of Constantinople for the term of your life, in the same way that I appointed a king over the country of Poland.' The person then spoke again thus :—' None of all the Ottoman troops are now ready to take the field : those of Anatolia are employed in cultivating the land and smoking their pipes ; such as inhabit Constantinople are either busied in carrying on various trades, or at least are not subject to any good discipline. Were they to assemble troops with the greatest possible expedition, they would require at least a month for that purpose. Behold, the water used for drinking in so great a city, comes from certain reservoirs which are without it. It is not, therefore, expedient for us to carry on a troublesome war with ships and troops by sea and by land. We need only dispatch to the Crimea all the Russian ships that are in the White Sea, and there, filling with troops all our vessels, large and small, we will disembark them suddenly without the channel of the Black Sea, in the district that contains the reservoirs, the walls of which we will beat down with our cannon and destroy. In one

hour this may be effected. On the waters running out, the consequence will be a great tumult at Constantinople, the news being everywhere spread that the Russians have destroyed the reservoirs of water; that they are about to assault Constantinople with all their forces; and that their ulterior projects are not known. In the space of one day, the want of water will produce confusion among them, which will be augmented by our zealous partisans of the Greek nation. The troops which are in Constantinople, instead of marching immediately against us, will pillage the public treasures, and those of their emperor, ministers, and rich men; and putting their booty hastily on board such boats and vessels as they find at hand, will endeavour to fly to Anatolia and elsewhere. The residue of the inhabitants, who remain at Constantinople, being left to themselves in this calamity, and overwhelmed with astonishment, having no water to bake bread, or to drink, will, in the course of two days, be reduced to the last extremity. So that the Russian troops, gradually advancing and entering the city, will make themselves entire masters of it.'

"The Sublime government having received intelligence of this conversation, and of the decision taken in consequence of it, the infernal treachery of the aforesaid wicked person seemed really to have conceived a feasible project. Water sleeps, an enemy is sleepless. It is especially to be considered, that the distance from the peninsula of the Crimea to the channel of the Black Sea, is such, that a ship may cross it without altering a sail; and whatever confidence we may place in our own strength, yet, God forbid that so cunning an enemy should find us in an unguarded posture; particularly since we are instructed

by the example of so many States, that owed their loss of reputation and ruin to the want of care in observing the machinations of their enemies, and in neglecting to provide in proper time efficient troops and military stores. From this source their calamities have arisen, as is written and set forth, as well in other histories, as in that which treats of the misfortune of the Sublime Person, who has received the mercy of God, and of the peace which he concluded. The Russian infidels having withal greatly improved the state of their dominions within the space of seventy or eighty years, and manifested their thirst of glory by their arrogant and insolent interference in the interior affairs of other States, and having annexed several foreign countries to their own dominions, especially the kingdom of Poland, we must not, by any means, consider ourselves secure from so treacherous and deceitful a nation. Besides all this, the upright and provident ministers of the Sublime Government, who are aware of the evil designs of the enemy, having represented to the Emperor, (who is at the summit of power, and inhabits the mansions of wisdom and understanding,) that if such an attempt as that suggested to the Cralyä by the beforementioned reprobate, should actually take place against the reservoirs, (which God forbid!) as there has been no care taken to provide either money or troops, it would be utterly impossible to dispatch with expedition against the enemy forces that were under no discipline, or to repulse them with such soldiers; and that the people of the Empire of Islam, reposing entirely on the protection of Providence, would not make the least resistance. That therefore, as it was a maxim established that in an urgent case, when some remedy must be sought, resources

must be found in the whole body of those who are attached to government, without consulting the lower orders; there was no other method of dispelling and removing the danger we have spoken of above, but by keeping a body of troops on foot ready for service. It was also taken into consideration, that even if the description of force required for the purpose really existed at Constantinople; yet in case of any danger arising on the side of the reservoirs, in the way we have mentioned, (which Heaven forbid!) as the intelligence must be conveyed from thence to Constantinople, and as the troops must assemble, it would require five days at least before they could reach their destination. May God protect and guard us! 'The serpent kills a man in Egypt whilst the Teryâc is coming from Venice,' as the proverb says."

THE END.

LONDON:
Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES,
Stamford-Street.

# OBSERVATIONS

ON

## SOME PASSAGES

IN

LIEUT-COL. NAPIER'S

## HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

BY

PERCY, VISCOUNT STRANGFORD.

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

MDCCCXXVIII.

27540

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

# OBSERVATIONS,

## &c. &c.

1. At page 143 of Lieutenant-colonel Napier's Work, that Officer adverts, in the following Note, to the Emigration of the Portuguese Royal Family, in 1807:

"This transaction furnishes an example of the "imprudence of being precipitate in granting public "honours. Lord Strangford's despatch relative to "the emigration was written (as it is confidently "asserted) not at Lisbon, but at Salt Hill, in the "presence of sir James Yeo. His lordship (uninten-"tionally of course) impressed the ministers with an "idea that to his personal exertions the emigration "should be attributed; whereas the prince regent "of Portugal, yielding to the vigorous negotiations "of sir Sydney Smith, not only embarked on the "27th, *before* Lord Strangford arrived at Lisbon, "but actually sailed without his lordship's having had "any official interview with his royal highness, and "consequently without having had any opportunity "to advance or retard the emigration. The English "ministers, eager to testify their satisfaction at that "event, conferred the red riband, not upon sir Sydney

" Smith, who had succeeded, but upon Lord Strang-
" ford, who had failed!—a result that his lordship
" could not have anticipated, or he would undoubt-
" edly have written his despatch at Lisbon when
" the facts were fresh on his mind, and when he
" could have more forcibly described the admiral's
" share in the transaction."

2. I will not comment upon the spirit in which this passage is written, nor upon the inferences to which it is evidently meant to lead. The former speaks for itself; and I shall have passed twenty-five years in public life, very much in vain, if the character which I have endeavoured to sustain during that period, be not sufficient to repel the latter. I will confine myself to facts; and I have been honoured with a gracious permission to refer to all such as, connected with the transactions in which I was engaged, may seem necessary to my vindication.

3. My Dispatches relating to the Portuguese Emigration *were* originally written, as their date proclaims, on board of His Majesty's Ship Hibernia. I had not, at that time, the assistance of a secretary; and a gentleman named Elgar, who was recommended to me by Captain Western of the London, kindly undertook that office, and copied my several Dispatches, on board of the Hibernia, as fast as they were written. Mr. Elgar continues in His Majesty's service, is now resident in London, and has confirmed this statement by the annexed letter (A).

4. *No* Dispatch was written at Salt Hill, nor in the presence of sir James Yeo. It is true, that on my journey to London from Milford Haven (where I landed), in company with captain Yeo, and attended

by the King's Messenger Sylvester, I did stop at Salt Hill for a few minutes. But it is absolutely untrue, that either there, or at any other place, from the day on which I left the Tagus to that of my arrival in London, I ever wrote one line relating to public business. Mr. Sylvester, who never quitted me during the whole of the journey, has addressed the accompanying letter to me (B), which is, I presume, perfectly conclusive on this point.

5. So much for the "confident assertion" that my Dispatches were written at Salt Hill; of which, in truth, I never heard before the appearance of Lieutenant-colonel Napier's "History." But I had heard of another assertion respecting them, which may, perhaps, have been the occasion of the mass of mistakes that are congregated together in Colonel Napier's "Note." The assertion to which I allude is, that my Dispatches were written neither off the Tagus, nor at Salt Hill, but at the house of the late Mr. Canning in Bruton-street.

6. The facts stand thus: I delivered my Dispatches at the Foreign-office on Saturday, the 19th of December, 1807. On the evening of that day, Mr. Canning sent for me, and stated, that he was exceedingly desirous that a transaction of such historical interest as the Portuguese Emigration, should not be given to the world in the shape of a series of imperfect and unconnected Extracts from my various Reports; that he preferred the form of *one*, unbroken Dispatch, to be printed *in extenso;* that it was quite impossible to publish the *whole* of my letters as they then stood, because they alluded to the opinions and services of individuals, who, having remained at Lis-

bon, were still at the mercy of General Junot; because they adverted to certain intended operations against the forts in the Tagus, then occupied by the French; and because they too strongly expressed the feelings which had been excited in my mind by the conduct of some of the Portuguese ministers, in the interval between the 8th and 17th of November, the recollection of which, he properly judged, could not fail to be painful and distressing to the Prince Regent of Portugal. For these reasons he requested me to leave out of my Reports such passages as might tend to compromise the safety of individuals, give notice to His Majesty's enemies of intended operations against them, or prove offensive to the government to which I was about to be re-accredited.

7. In making such a request, on such grounds, I conceived that Mr. Canning did his duty as a Minister of the Crown, and that I should equally do mine in acceding to it. I accordingly proceeded to execute this task in Mr. Canning's apartment, and to reconstruct the Dispatches out of the materials before me; omitting those parts, to the publication of which Mr. Canning had objected, retaining the main facts as originally stated in them, and combining into a single document the substance of several. I can declare most solemnly that no essential fact described in the original papers, was suppressed in the narrative thus prepared for the London Gazette—that no additional circumstance whatever was introduced—and that both the old and the new Dispatches were as similar in substance, and in every thing but form, as the considerations which I have mentioned, permitted them to be. I do not think that there can be a more

convincing proof of this assertion, than the very sentence with which the published Dispatch concludes* (C). I will not suppose that the utmost malignancy of party spirit can suspect me of having descended to so pitiful an artifice as that of a pretended apology for haste, if a similar apology had not formed part, as it really did, of the original documents from which, in common with other portions, it was taken.

8. The Dispatch, thus compiled, was approved at a late hour of that night, by Mr. Canning—copied on the next day (the 20th) by a gentleman, still employed in the Foreign-office—communicated (I believe) to the Cabinet—transmitted to His Majesty—sent back from Windsor on Monday, the 21st,—and, finally, published in the London Gazette of Tuesday, the 22d of December. I have been thus particular with regard to these dates, because it has been asked why my Dispatch did not appear in the regular Gazette of Saturday, the 19th—the day of my arrival in London.

9. Having thus disposed of the question as to the place where my Dispatches were written, I proceed to the charge of having suppressed in them the share which sir Sidney Smith had in the negotiation, and of having deluded His Majesty's ministers into the belief that the Portuguese Emigration had been owing to my exertions, and not to those of the Rear-Admiral; —in other words, the imputation of having defrauded him of the red riband, which was his due, and of having obtained it, under false pretences, for myself.

* I annex, for the convenience of reference, the whole of this Dispatch.

(10. Here I must desire to reject, unequivocally, any benefit that might be inferred from the employment, in Colonel Napier's "Note," of the qualifying expression "*unintentionally, of course.*" Colonel Napier must know very well that such words, in such a case, cannot have the meaning which they seem to convey; and that if I did act as his "Note" supposes me to have done, I could *not* have acted "*unintentionally,*" but in a manner just the reverse, and with a full and deliberate understanding of what I was about.)

11. But to the facts. In Colonel Napier's censure of "the Tory administration which overturned "the Grenville party" (p. 169), he assumes that the utmost which they did in the affairs of Portugal, was to "keep a naval force off Lisbon, under the com-"mand of sir Sidney Smith" (*ibid.*)

12. I reply—No naval force was kept off Lisbon under the command of sir Sidney Smith. That Officer arrived there, on a special service, on the evening of November 16, 1807, and the Portuguese Court embarked on the 27th, eleven days after the Rear-Admiral's appearance on the coast. If, therefore, the Emigration of the Royal Family was owing to the "vigorous negotiations" of sir Sidney Smith, it is clear that those negotiations could have taken place only during the eleven days above-mentioned.

13. Now I do aver, that during those eleven days, sir Sidney Smith had no negotiations whatever, with the government of Portugal. The whole of that Officer's transactions with the Portuguese government, at that period, was limited to one solitary letter to Mons. d'Araujo, the minister for foreign

affairs; which letter, dated on the 22d of November, proclaimed those measures of hostility (conditional on the *non-departure* of the Royal Family), which I, the King's Minister Plenipotentiary, had, by Dispatches from Mr. Canning, delivered to me on that very day by the Messenger Sylvester, been instructed to authorise.

14. This letter, drawn up, I am most ready to admit, with all the energy of sir Sidney Smith's character, was thus written (whatever its importance may have been), under *my* authority, as His Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary. The proofs of this assertion are contained in the annexed copies and extracts of my letters to the Rear-Admiral on the subject (D, E, F.)

15. Let it not be thought that I assume any merit from the accident of having thus officially directed the proceedings announced in sir Sidney Smith's letter. The fact is, that neither those proceedings, nor that letter, had the slightest effect in producing the Emigration, which had been definitively resolved upon at a Council, held at Mafra, on the 24th of November, *before* sir Sidney Smith's communications or mine were received by the minister to whom they were addressed. The Rear-Admiral's letter was dated on the 22d; but the Confiance, by which ship it was forwarded, was prevented, by contrary winds, from leaving the British squadron until the 24th (G), the very day on which the Council was held, and the determination to embark taken, in consequence of intelligence that the French had actually advanced.

16. To resume.—The "vigorous and successful

" negotiations of sir Sidney Smith" are thus reduced to a single letter: which letter, after all, had no influence whatever in effecting the object for which it was written; that object having been accomplished before it reached its destination.

17. Having now shown to what the Portuguese Emigration was *not* owing, I will endeavour succinctly to state the circumstances which really did occasion it. It was, (as I truly described it, in my published Dispatch of November 29) " not to be attributed solely " to the sudden alarm excited by the appearance of a " French army within the frontiers of Portugal. It " was the genuine result of the system of persevering " confidence and moderation adopted by His Majesty " towards that country, for the ultimate success of " which I had, in a manner, rendered myself respon- " sible, and which, in obedience to my instructions, " I had uniformly continued to support, even under " appearances of the most discouraging nature." It was the result of that admirable work of political providence and sagacity, the Convention, signed in London by Mr. Canning, on the 22d October, 1807. It was the result, most assuredly not of any thing that I said or did, during my brief visit to Lisbon, on the night of the 28th November, when the Royal Family were already embarked, but of the information received at Mafra on the morning of the 24th, that the invasion had begun, and that the case had thus occurred, on the actual arrival of which the Prince Regent had, from first to last, stated His departure to depend.

18. That such were the true causes of the Emigration, I will now proceed to show. On the 13th of

August (*upwards of fifteen weeks before that event*), I announced to Mr. Canning the several demands upon Portugal made by the government of France, and by the embassies of that country and of Spain, then resident at Lisbon. I communicated at the same time the solemn declaration of the Portuguese ministers, that the Prince Regent would not, under any circumstances, nor on any account, consent to the demand of confiscating the property of British subjects within his Dominions.

19. In the interval between that day and the 21st, I was employed in earnestly pressing upon the Prince Regent, through various members of the Council of State, and other individuals with whom I had been in habits of personal intimacy during nearly four years of uninterrupted residence at Lisbon, the expediency of Emigration to Brazil, as the only means of preserving the Portuguese Monarchy. I had, then, no authority to that effect from His Majesty's government.

20. On the 19th of August, the Prince Regent wrote an autograph letter to the King, declaring His fixed resolution to abandon His European dominions rather than sacrifice His honour by acceding to the full extent of the French and Spanish demands.

21. On the 21st of August, I described to Mr. Canning the effect of my confidential communications with the members of the Council of State, already alluded to, and announced the pledges which I had received from the Prince Regent, for the security of British subjects and property.

22. On the 29th of August, I informed my Court that measures for the equipment of the Portuguese fleet were actually in progress, and that I had given

a promise to the Prince Regent of British protection in the execution of His intention to retire to Brazil. I stated this (I will fairly acknowledge), in a tone almost of apology and deprecation; so uncertain was I, up to that hour, whether my government would approve of my temerity in urging so vast a project, and in engaging that His Majesty's naval resources should support it.

23. On the 2d of September, a Council was assembled at Mafra; when it was agreed that there were two possible cases, on the actual occurrence of which the Emigration of the Royal Family should take place. 1°. The French government compelling that of Portugal to violate the safety of British persons and property. 2°. The appearance, within the frontiers, of an overwhelming French force, and the occupation, by French garrisons, of any of the Portuguese fortresses.

24. These two cases were originally indicated by the Prince Regent Himself: the first, as connected with the promise already made by Him in His autograph Letter to His Majesty; the second, as constituting the only state of things which, according to His sense of duty as a Sovereign, could release Him from the obligation of remaining in Portugal, and of abiding by its fate. When resistance should have become manifestly hopeless (and that resistance, on the part of Portugal, would have been hopeless, is abundantly shown by Lord Rosslyn's Dispatch (I) to Mr. Fox, of September 2, 1806), He justly deemed that His next duty was to provide for the preservation of His Family and His Crown, by transferring them from one part of His dominions to another.

25. On the 8th of September I stated to the British Government the two contingencies on which the removal of the Royal Family was eventually to depend. On the 20th, Mr. Consul Gambier returned to his post, and I had the high gratification of receiving Dispatches from Mr. Canning (of which Mr. Gambier was the bearer) containing His Majesty's gracious approbation of all that I had done, and conveying that approbation in terms which I can never forget.

26. These Dispatches were followed (on the 24th of Sep.) by a Letter from His Majesty to the Prince Regent, in reply to that from His Royal Highness, of the 19th of the preceding month. I presented it to His Royal Highness at Mafra, on the 25th, when I had the honour of a long and unreserved conversation with Him. I found the Prince Regent fully determined to retire from Portugal, whenever the pre-supposed events should occur; but equally so, not to carry His purpose into effect until His kingdom should have been actually invaded, and a case thus made out, which should reconcile that measure to His feelings of religion and duty, " and justify Him," to use His own emphatic expression, " to God and to His People, for abandoning the " land of His Ancestors."

27. I concluded my official report of what passed at this Conference, with the following words, which record my opinion of the sincerity of His Royal Highness's determination: " His Majesty's government " need not be under any doubt respecting the inten- " tion of the Prince Regent. I am fully convinced " that He has made up His mind as to the eventual " necessity of retiring to South America." (Sept. 25, 1807.)

28. Finding, at my interview with the Prince Regent, that it was altogether impossible to induce His Royal Highness to adopt the resolution of *immediately* removing to Brazil, I ventured to suggest the plan of at least sending there the Prince of Beira, His Heir-apparent, as the precursor of His Royal Father, and as a pledge to England and to the world, that the Prince Regent's own departure would certainly and speedily follow.

29. I took upon myself the responsibility of submitting this advice to the Prince. It was finally adopted, after considerable opposition, at a Council assembled on the night of the 27th of September. The measure was forthwith announced to the foreign missions at Lisbon, by a circular note from M. D'Araujo. The suite of the Prince of Beira was actually named. It was resolved, that He should assume, at Rio de Janeiro, the title of *Condestavel do Brazil* (Constable of Brazil). A Letter was written by the Prince Regent to His Majesty, communicating this arrangement, and describing others, connected with the intended residence of the Prince of Beira in South America, which would have proved, in the highest degree, honourable and beneficial to Great Britain.

30. The French and Spanish Embassies, finding that the Court of Lisbon was really in earnest, and that a step, so inevitably leading to the Prince Regent's own departure, was thus about to take place, proceeded to make use of the passports which they had demanded some time before, and retired beyond the frontiers.

31. Matters were thus far in a favourable train, when intelligence was received of fresh reverses

sustained by the British arms in Spanish South America. The effect of this intelligence is fully described in my Dispatches of the time. It was hailed with immeasurable delight by those who were opposed to the Emigration. It was proclaimed as the accomplishment of their prophecies, and the triumph of their sagacity. A party, which had been fairly beaten, again arose, and, (as I had afterwards but too much reason to know,) with redoubled strength and influence. The fears felt by even the better portion of the Prince Regent's Ministry, for the safety of the colonies, began to disappear, and with them their confidence in the protection of England.

32. Even this crisis, though one of discouragement, was not one of any doubt to me, as to the eventual retreat to Brazil of the Royal Family of Braganza. I had just then been supplied, by the recent transactions at Copenhagen, with abundant means of showing to the Portuguese Government that His Majesty would never consent that the Naval Power of His Enemies should be increased, either through the timidity or the bad faith of other states; and of plainly intimating, that if the Portuguese Fleet were not ultimately applied to the purpose for which it was under preparation, good care would be taken that, at all events, it should never be added to that of France. These arguments were quite sufficient, not to confirm The Prince in His resolution (for that was not necessary), but to furnish Him with an answer to the entreaties and the predictions with which He was hourly assailed.

33. In the mean time, the British Factory proceeded to remove, with their families and property,

to England; in the certainty, that whether the Royal Family emigrated to Brazil or not, Lisbon must, under all circumstances, fall an unresisting prey to the French. The Convoy sailed on the 17th of October.

34. On the 20th of the same month, The Prince Regent proclaimed that "measure of modified hostility" to which the British Government, in its negotiations with M. de Sousa, in London, had already signified its assent; and the Ports of His European Dominions were closed against the Ships and Commerce of England.

35. The voyage of the Prince of Beira continued to be talked of, and day after day was appointed for it. But, on the 28th, I received a confidential Message from The Prince Regent, entreating me to desist from urging it, "as He had every reason to "believe that He should soon require the assistance "of His ships to remove, not merely The Heir Ap-"parent, but Himself, the whole of his Family and "Court."

36. From this time to the 2nd of November, preparations were still going on for the Equipment of the Fleet. It was thought that on an emergency, they would, at least, be sufficiently provided to reach Gibraltar. And, to this belief, I have always attributed the incomplete condition in which the ships were found, at the last moment, when the longer voyage to Brazil was to be undertaken.

37. On the 2d of November, Don Lourenço de Lima arrived from Paris; and, from that day, every thing changed, except The Prince Regent's own intentions to emigrate, and my confident reliance on

them. The threats, the promises, the hopes, the fears, which M. de Lima was prodigal in employing, and incessant in exciting—the circumstance of his having been so recently in direct communication with the Ministers of Bonaparte—and every mode of influence and persuasion which could be devised by one who thought, (as I believe that M. de Lima conscientiously did think) that Portugal ought; at any price, to be retained, were, at this moment, all brought to bear on the object of delaying The Prince's departure, and of inducing Him to make some further sacrifices to France, in the hope of yet preserving His European Possessions. It is with pain that I recur to this period. Suffice it to say, that some of the advisers, who then surrounded His Royal Highness, succeeded in extorting a reluctant consent that the scanty remnant of British property in Portugal, should be confiscated, and the few British subjects yet remaining there, detained; a Decree to which effect was published on the 8th of November. But it is due to the memory of the Prince Regent to declare, that I have the most positive proof that He did not agree to this unhappy measure, except under a full and honest belief that *all* British Subjects and *all* British Property had been safely removed from Portugal during the preceding month; and thus, that His Decree, while it gave him one more chance, such as it was, of saving His Kingdom from the grasp of Bonaparte, could do no real injury to the interests of England.

38. Of this, however, I was not to judge. A solemn engagement to the King, my Master, had been violated; the "line of modified hostility to which

"my Government had most reluctantly consented," had been overstepped; and it became my duty to give a public demonstration, that "His Majesty "would never permit any country to be an enemy "to England with impunity." Accordingly, on the 10th of November, I demanded my passports, and took the other steps described in my published Dispatch.

39. It was immediately thought by the persons who had the ascendancy at that period, that the departure of the British Minister might be turned to account, by being represented to France as an additional proof of the submission of Portugal to her demands, and that, by hastening it as much as possible, sufficient time might yet be gained to stop the march of the invading army. My departure was accordingly urged with the utmost eagerness and impatience; and as I had not received an answer from Vice-admiral Purvis, (then commanding off Cadiz), to my request for a vessel to convey me to England, a Portuguese Ship of War was placed at my disposal. I was however relieved from the necessity of accepting this offer, by the appearance of sir Sidney Smith's squadron off the Tagus, on the 16th of November, to which I proceeded in an open boat, and which I joined late on the night of the 17th.

40. Here let me state, that the very last communication which I received from the Prince Regent, almost at the instant of my leaving Lisbon, was a renewed and solemn declaration of His fixed determination to depart, if, and so soon as, the French should enter His Kingdom; and that my very last act towards my own government, was again to place upon

record my unabated reliance on that Royal Promise, notwithstanding the discouraging appearances of the moment, and the various expedients (all more or less unfavourable to England) to which the Portuguese Cabinet had lately resorted, in the delusive hope of yet propitiating France.

41. Still, whatever might be my opinion of the value of this declaration, I was obliged, by the tenour of my Instructions, and by a sense of what was due to the King's Dignity, not to allow the Portuguese government to pass, "with impunity, the bounds "which His Majesty had thought fit to set to His "forbearance." I therefore proposed to sir Sidney Smith, by a letter, dated on the 20th of November, and subjoined in the Appendix (I), to place the Tagus in a state of Blockade. The Rear-Admiral and I were speedily relieved from the responsibility of this proceeding, by Dispatches from Mr. Canning, directing me (under the precise case which had occurred) to cause it to be instituted. The Letters which, after the arrival of Mr. Canning's Dispatches, I addressed to the Rear-Admiral, have already been referred to (D. E. F); and they went to advise a more rigorous and extensive system of Blockade than that which I had suggested in my previous letter of the 20th.

42. But, together with these Dispatches, I received a copy of the Convention, which, on the 22d of the preceding month, had been signed in London by Mr. Canning and M. de Sousa. That Instrument appeared to present so many chances of reconciling the two Courts, and of terminating the painful state of things to which the late measures of the Portuguese government had led, that I could not but discover in it,

new and powerful means of negotiating with success, aided, as those means would have been, by the effect which the blockade of the Tagus (practically established since the 20th), might have already produced at Lisbon. On the 23d of November, I accordingly addressed a letter to M. d'Araujo, in which I requested an Audience of the Prince Regent, with an engagement that my public character should be respected; and I dispatched my letter to Lisbon on the 24th, by His Majesty's Ship Confiance. That vessel conveyed, at the same time, the communication from sir Sidney Smith to the Portuguese Minister, under date of the 22d, to which I have adverted (Par. 13) as constituting the whole of that officer's "share in these "transactions." It is scarcely necessary to add, that when the Confiance left the British Squadron on the 24th of November, neither the Rear-Admiral nor I had the slightest knowledge of what had already passed on shore; namely, the arrival of intelligence that the French had begun their march, and the consequent resolution taken by the Prince.

43. In M. d'Araujo's Answer (K) dated on the 25th of November, and received on the 26th, he announced, together with His Royal Highness's consent to the proposed conference, the two important facts of the French having reached Abrantes, and of the Prince Regent having resolved to embark forthwith. Consequently, *when I left the Hibernia*, to go to the Audience, I knew perfectly well that I should not have to *negotiate* with His Royal Highness for an object which He was at that very instant in the act of accomplishing. But *when I requested the Audience*, it certainly was in the belief that negotiations might still be necessary; and therefore it was, that

I stated in my Dispatch that " I had determined to " take upon myself the responsibility of renewing " them, after my public functions had actually ceased." It is necessary to make this distinction between my intentions at the two periods—*when* I solicited my audience, and *when* I proceeded to it.

44. I undertook, therefore, to wait upon the Prince Regent, with other views than those of exhorting Him to do what had already been done. I wished to obtain farther evidence than that of M. d'Araujo's Letter, that the Emigration was really on the point of taking place, for the purpose of furnishing sir Sidney Smith with an official justification for suspending the hostile measures which he had instituted—a justification which M. d'Araujo's Letter to me would, alone, have been insufficient to supply. With this intent I wrote a Letter to the Rear-Admiral (L) after I had seen the Prince Regent, and had obtained ocular demonstration that the case had occurred, in which, according to our instructions, sir Sidney Smith would be at liberty to apply the force under his command " to its original purpose, that of saving the Royal " Family of Braganza from the tyranny of France."

45. I was also solicitous to remove all doubts that might have arisen in the mind of the Prince Regent as to the nature of His relations with England, and as to the manner in which His Fleet was likely to be received by the English squadron off the Tagus. His Royal Highness knew that a " state of hostility" did, *de facto*, subsist—that the conduct of His Ministers had provoked it—and that it was yet uncertain in what manner He might be treated by the Admiral of a Sovereign on whose dignity and whose interests He had so recently authorised an unjustifiable attack.

That uncertainty could be fully relieved only by an official assurance on my part, that His Majesty would "generously overlook those acts of unwilling and momentary hostility to which His Royal Highness's "consent had been extorted." I was the more anxious to have an opportunity of giving this assurance, because I could not but remember what was the sort of influence which prevailed at the Court of Lisbon but a few days before, and because I feared that it might still be sufficiently powerful to create delays and difficulties at a crisis when every thing depended upon promptitude and decision.

46. I arrived at Lisbon on the night of the 28th of November, and almost immediately saw M. d'Araujo, who was already on board ship. I then proceeded to the vessel in which the Prince Regent was embarked, and, notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary in Colonel Napier's "Note," I *had* a long and a most confidential interview with His Royal Highness. I found Him, as I expected, under considerable apprehensions as to the nature of His situation with regard to His Majesty; but "fully "determined" (I use his own words) "to throw Himself on His Majesty's forgiveness, and, at all events, "to prefer the noble enmity of England to the "false and insidious friendship of France." His resolution to depart was irrevocably taken. It required no confirmation from me. I had then, as Colonel Napier truly states, "no power either to "advance or to retard the Emigration." But, when did I ever assume that I *had?* or take credit to myself for any thing which passed at that interview with His Royal Highness? My duty, on that occasion, was very plain, and my labour very light. It was

merely that of removing the uneasiness which His Royal Highness could not but feel, and which was at once dispelled by my interpretation of the Convention of October 22d,—and by the " united assurance of " an English Minister and an English Admiral," that all the circumstances to which His Royal Highness reverted with compunction and regret, would be forgotten by the Monarch whom we had the honour to serve, and that " the British squadron then be- " fore the Tagus should be employed to protect His " Royal Highness's retreat from Lisbon, and His " Voyage to Brazil."

47. I have now sufficiently shown, 1°. That the emigration was *not* owing to the " negotiations of " sir Sidney Smith." 2°. That it was *not* owing (what assuredly I never pretended) to my visit to Lisbon on the 28th of November. 3°. That it *was* owing to a series of transactions and engagements which had taken place in the interval between the 13th of August and the 17th of November. That I had some little share in those transactions, and in the conclusion of those engagements, was not only the belief of His Majesty's Government, formed at the time, from my Dispatches and other contemporaneous information, but such it continued to be, when, in the progress of events, every possible detail of evidence had been collected and considered. Ten years after,—when Mr. Canning must have had abundant opportunities of revising his original opinion—when sir Sidney Smith himself had returned from his command in Brazil, and could, consequently, have spoken to all the facts and circumstances of the Portuguese emigration—ten years after (in Fe-

bruary 1817), Mr. Canning thus expressed himself in the House of Commons, in the Debate on the Lisbon Embassy:—"I will tell the House why the "testimony of Lord Strangford would have had "so powerful a weight with me on this subject. "In 1807, at the time when the Court of Portugal "emigrated to the Brazils, I had the honour to fill "the Office now filled by my noble friend (Lord Cas- "tlereagh). When the first intelligence of the in- "tended Emigration reached this country, there was "then, also, an abundance of conflicting and contra- "dictory reports; and, I believe, I may say, that, for "several days, I alone, in London, alone, perhaps, "among my colleagues, was persuaded of the exist- "ence of that intention. At that time, I knew no- "thing of Lord Strangford, except from his official cor- "respondence; but that correspondence had inspired "me with a full reliance upon the authenticity of his "sources of information, and upon his knowledge of "the Prince Regent's mind; and Lord Strangford "*all along* affirmed, that the Prince Regent intended "to emigrate. The general persuasion at Lisbon was, "that the Court would *not* emigrate, even up to the "very day when, *as Lord Strangford had predicted*, "the Prince actually embarked in the Tagus, and set "sail for Brazil *."

48. That my humble services to the Crown and to the Country may have been overrated and overpaid, through the gracious indulgence of the Two Royal Masters whom it has been my pride to serve, I am most unaffectedly ready to admit. But I have not

* Mr. Canning's Speeches, 1828. Vol. iii. p. 479.

the presumption to arraign the distribution of honours which my Sovereign may think proper to make; nor to claim, with Colonel Napier, the right of deciding on whom He ought, and on whom He ought not, to bestow them. Nor, if Colonel Napier's assertion, that it was "*the English Ministers* who conferred "the red riband upon me," be meant to insinuate that there was any distinction between *my* case and others, in which a similar honour has been conferred, can I, either in fact or in feeling, submit to such an imputation. For the liberal recommendation of my services, which those Ministers conveyed to the foot of the Throne, I feel, as I ought to do, deeply and sincerely grateful. But I will not consent, that a boon of which I am justly proud, shall be robbed of its highest grace and value, by being attributed to any other Hand than that, from which, exclusively, I had the honour to receive it. On the subject, however, of the favours bestowed upon the occasion of the Portuguese Emigration, Mr. Canning is again my witness—and I hope that it is a better impulse than vanity, which induces me to transcribe another Extract from the Speech to which I have already alluded. "I must once more go back to the "year 1807. I have said that when, in that year, the "Royal Family of Portugal adopted the Resolution "of emigrating to the Brazils, I had the honour to "hold the Seals of the Foreign-office. I had thus "an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the "wishes of The Prince Regent of Portugal, in favour "of Lord Strangford, *who had been employed to* "*advise and to urge* that splendid and magnani- "mous Emigration. It was my duty to report those

" wishes, and to recommend the services of Lord " Strangford to the consideration of my Royal Master. " The result was, that his Lordship was appointed " Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- " tiary; was invested with a red riband; and might " also have received an advance in the Peerage, which " (for reasons nothing to the purpose of this night's " discussion) he declined." The " *wishes* of The " Prince Royal of Portugal," here alluded to, were, that I should be the King's Envoy at His newly-established Court—the reward for my services " *re-* " *commended* by Mr. Canning to his Majesty's con- " sideration," was the Order of the Bath.

49. In the course of these Observations, I have freely adverted to many things to which, under other circumstances, I should scarcely, as a servant of the Crown, have permitted myself to allude. But it is one of the proudest distinctions and best securities of English Public Service, that the obligations of official reserve are never allowed to stand between a man and the vindication of his honour. It is, however, peculiarly satisfactory to me to think, that the lapse of time, and the change of circumstances, have enabled me to defend my own character without, I trust, any inconvenient disclosures of diplomatic transactions, or any possible detriment to the public interests.

*Harley-street, London,*
*May* 14, 1828.

# APPENDIX.

(A.)

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. Elgar to Viscount Strangford.*

Coast Guard Office, London,
8th May, 1828.

My Lord,

In answer to your lordship's inquiry, I have to state that I recollect perfectly the circumstance of my having been employed by your lordship on board of His Majesty's Ship Hibernia, in the month of November, 1807, to copy out your several Dispatches to Mr. Canning, relating to the emigration of the Portuguese Royal Family.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your lordship's most obedient servant,
JNO. ELGAR,
Purser, Royal Navy.

Viscount Strangford, G.C.B.

(B.)

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. Sylvester to Viscount Strangford.*

Brixton, May 7th, 1828.

My Lord,

I accompanied your lordship to England in His Majesty's Ship Confiance in December, 1807, and attended your lordship and Captain Yeo from Milford Haven to London. During that journey, which we performed with the utmost expedition, your

lordship certainly did not stop anywhere, except to change horses, and to the best of my recollection, at Salt Hill, to make some alteration in your dress, previous to reaching London,

Your lordship's humble servant
to command,
CHARLES SYLVESTER.

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(C.)

*Copy of a Dispatch from Viscount Strangford to Mr. Secretary Canning.*

His Majesty's Ship Hibernia, off the Tagus,
November 29, 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the Honour of announcing to you, that the Prince Regent of Portugal has effected the wise and magnanimous Purpose of retiring from a Kingdom which he could no longer retain, except as the Vassal of France; and that His Royal Highness and Family, accompanied by most of His Ships of War, and by a Multitude of His faithful Subjects and Adherents, have this Day departed from Lisbon, and are now on their Way to the Brazils, under the Escort of a British Fleet.

This grand and memorable Event is not to be attributed solely to the sudden Alarm excited by the Appearance of a French Army within the Frontiers of Portugal. It has been the genuine Result of the System of persevering Confidence and Moderation adopted by His Majesty towards that Country; for the ultimate Success of which I had in a Manner rendered myself responsible; and which, in obedience to your Instructions, I had uniformly continued to support, even under appearances of the most discouraging Nature.

I had frequently and distinctly stated to the Cabinet of Lisbon, that in agreeing not to resent the Exclusion of British Commerce from the Ports of Portugal, His Majesty had exhausted the Means of Forbearance; that in making that Concession to the peculiar Circumstances of the Prince Regent's Situation, His Majesty had done all that Friendship and the Remembrance of

ancient Alliance could justly require; but that a single Step beyond the Line of modified Hostility, thus most reluctantly consented to, must necessarily lead to the Extremity of actual War.

The Prince Regent, however, suffered himself for a Moment to forget that, in the present State of Europe, no Country could be permitted to be an Enemy to England with Impunity, and that however much His Majesty might be disposed to make Allowance for the Deficiency of the Means possessed by Portugal of Resistance to the Power of France, neither His own Dignity, nor the Interests of His People, would permit His Majesty to accept that Excuse for a Compliance with the full Extent of her unprincipled Demands. On the 8th Instant, His Royal Highness was induced to sign an Order for the Detention of the few British Subjects, and of the inconsiderable Portion of British Property which yet remained at Lisbon. On the Publication of this Order I caused the Arms of England to be removed from the Gates of my Residence, demanded my Passports, presented a final Remonstrance against the recent Conduct of the Court of Lisbon, and proceeded to the Squadron commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, which arrived off the Coast of Portugal some days after I had received my Passports, and which I joined on the 17th instant.

I immediately suggested to Sir Sidney Smith the Expediency of establishing the most rigorous Blockade at the Mouth of the Tagus; and I had the high Satisfaction of afterwards finding, that I had thus anticipated the Intentions of His Majesty; your Dispatches (which I received by the Messenger Sylvester on the 23d) directing me to authorize that Measure, in case the Portuguese Government should pass the Bounds which His Majesty had thought fit to set to His Forbearance, and attempt to take any farther Step injurious to the Honour or Interests of Great Britain.

Those Dispatches were drawn up under the Idea that I was still resident at Lisbon, and though I did not receive them until I had actually taken my Departure from that Court, still, upon a careful Consideration of the Tenor of your Instructions, I thought that it would be right to act as if that Case had not occurred. I resolved, therefore, to proceed forthwith to ascertain the Effect produced by the Blockade of Lisbon, and to propose to the Portuguese Government, as the only Condition upon which that Blockade could cease, the Alternative (stated by you) either of

surrendering the Fleet to His Majesty, or of immediately employing it to remove the Prince Regent and his Family to the Brazils. I took upon myself this Responsibility in renewing Negotiations after my public Functions had actually ceased, convinced that, although it was the fixed Determination of His Majesty not to suffer the Fleet of Portugal to fall into the Possession of His Enemies, still His Majesty's first Object continued to be the Application of that Fleet to the original Purpose, of saving the Royal Family of Braganza from the Tyranny of France.

I accordingly requested an Audience of the Prince Regent, together with due Assurances of Protection and Security; and upon receiving His Royal Highness's Answer, I proceeded to Lisbon on the 27th, in His Majesty's Ship Confiance, bearing a Flag of Truce. I had immediately most interesting Communications with the Court of Lisbon, the Particulars of which shall be fully detailed in a future Dispatch. It suffices to mention in this Place, that the Prince Regent wisely directed all His Apprehensions to a French Army, and all His Hopes to an English Fleet; that He received the most explicit Assurances from me that His Majesty would generously overlook those Acts of unwilling and momentary Hostility to which His Royal Highness's Consent had been extorted; and that I promised to His Royal Highness, on the Faith of my Sovereign, that the British Squadron before the Tagus should be employed to protect His Retreat from Lisbon, and His Voyage to the Brazils.

A Decree was published Yesterday, in which the Prince Regent announced his Intention of retiring to the City of Rio de Janeiro until the Conclusion of a general Peace, and of appointing a Regency to transact the Administration of Government at Lisbon during His Royal Highness's Absence from Europe.

This Morning the Portuguese Fleet left the Tagus. I had the Honour to accompany the Prince in His Passage over the Bar. The Fleet consisted of Eight Sail of the Line, Four large Frigates, several Armed Brigs, Sloops, and Corvettes, and a Number of Brazil Ships, amounting, I believe, to about Thirty-six Sail in all. They passed through the British Squadron, and His Majesty's Ships fired a Salute of Twenty-one Guns, which was returned with an equal Number. A more interesting Spectacle than that afforded by the Junction of the Two Fleets has been rarely beheld.

On quitting the Prince Regent's Ship, I repaired on board of the Hibernia, but returned immediately, accompanied by Sir Sidney Smith, whom I presented to the Prince, and who was received by His Royal Highness with the most marked and gracious Condescension.

I have the Honour to inclose Lists of the Ships of War which were known to have left Lisbon this Morning, and which were in Sight a few Hours ago. There remain at Lisbon Four Ships of the Line, and the same Number of Frigates, but only one of each Sort is serviceable.

I have thought it expedient to lose no Time in communicating to His Majesty's Government the important Intelligence contained in this Dispatch. I have therefore to apologise for the hasty and imperfect Manner in which it is written.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

STRANGFORD.

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(D.)

*Extract of a Letter from Viscount Strangford to R. A. Sir Sidney Smith.*

H. M. S. Hibernia, 22d Nov. 1807.

Sir,

In compliance with the commands of His Majesty's Government, I have the honor to inform you that, in my judgment, the time is arrived for the execution of those instructions with which you are furnished, for the purpose of carrying into effect any measures of hostility against Portugal, which may be in your power.

I am, therefore, to represent to you the propriety and necessity of establishing the most rigorous Blockade, at the mouth of the Tagus, and of preventing the entrance of vessels of any description into the Port of Lisbon.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) STRANGFORD.

Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith.

(E.)

*Extract of a Letter from Viscount Strangford to R. A. Sir Sidney Smith.*

H. M. S. Hibernia, Nov. 24, 1807.

Sir,

The Instructions which I have lately received from His Majesty's Government, point to all the possible modes of conduct which might already have been taken by the Portuguese Government, under the present circumstances.

Some of those cases, which can authorize the adoption of actual hostilities on your part, have occurred.

The shutting the Ports of Portugal has been accompanied by ulterior measures hostile to Great Britain.

In compliance with the commands of His Majesty's Ministers, I have, in consequence, signified to you the expediency of establishing immediately the most rigorous Blockade at the mouth of the Tagus———

Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith.

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(F.)

*Copy of a Letter from Viscount Strangford to R. A. Sir Sidney Smith.*

H. M. S. Hibernia, 24th Nov. 1807.

Sir,

In reply to your Letter of this date, I beg to observe that, although the Blockade of the Port of St. Ubes be not expressly commanded by the Instructions which we have received from His Majesty's Government, I am convinced that the omission was purely accidental, since the vicinity of that place to Lisbon would evidently afford refuge to all Vessels warned off the latter Port, were it not included in the same Blockade.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) STRANGFORD.

Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith.

(G.)

If there could be any doubt of the accuracy of my own Journal on this point, it might be easily cleared up, by a reference to the Log of the Confiance, which must exist, (I presume,) in the proper Department.

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(H.)

*Extract of a Dispatch from The Earl of Rosslyn to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Lisbon, Sept. 2, 1806 (laid before The House of Commons, in pursuance of their Address of Feb. 15, 1807).*

—— I am sorry to say, that I cannot see the least grounds to expect vigorous efforts from this Nation in its own Defence; and it is evident that no Force Great Britain can possibly furnish, would of itself be adequate to arrest the progress of a French Invasion.

In short, it is my duty to state that I entirely despair of the possibility of defending Portugal against a French Invasion, by any means found here, or that Great Britain can, even with great sacrifices, supply.

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(I.)

*Extract of a Letter from Viscount Strangford to Sir Sidney Smith.*

H. M. S. Hibernia.
20th Nov. 1807.

Sir,

The Portuguese Government has authorized the seizure of British Property and the detention of British Subjects in Portugal, with the hope of thus preventing the entry of French or Spanish Troops into the Prince Regent's Dominions.

Whatever motives the Portuguese Government may choose to allege for these measures, their tenor and effects are not to be mistaken. And it is clear, that the adoption of this conduct, con-

sidering it either as a matter of necessity or of choice, must preclude the immediate application of the Squadron under your command to the amicable purpose for which it was originally destined, and of which the Government of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent is already sufficiently apprized.

The accession of Portugal to the cause of Spain and France, distinctly announced in the Prince Regent's Decree of the 20th ult. (of which I have the honour to annex a translation), appears to place her in the same situation with regard to England, as the latter powers, and imposes the necessity of preventing her from augmenting her means of annoying Great Britain, either by her own efforts, or by those of her, now, avowed allies.

I have therefore to submit to your better judgment the expediency of directing the Force under your command, to intercept the entry into Lisbon of such articles and stores as might be employed by Portugal for the purpose of carrying on hostilities against Great Britain, or of aiding those of His Majesty's Enemies, considered as such, previously to the date of the Prince Regent's Proclamation of the 20th ult.

Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith.

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(K.)

*Copy of a Letter from Mons. d'Araujo to Viscount Strangford.*

Palais d'Ajuda, 25 Nov. 1807.

MILORD,

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir hier Votre lettre en date du 23 du courant; et j'ai attendu pour Vous répondre, le retour du Prince Regent, Mon Maître, qui se trouvait à Mafra. Il m'ordonne de Vous dire que Vous pouvez en toute sureté venir à l'audience que Vous avez demandée, et que Votre personne et Votre caractère seront respectés comme ils doivent l'être.

Son Altesse Royale m'ordonne aussi de Vous communiquer qu'Elle a pris le resolution de se retirer avec toute la Famille Royale dans Son Escadre qui sera prête à sortir après demain.

Les Français ont pénétré dans le territoire du Portugal, et le dernière nouvelle que je viens de recevoir est que leur avant-garde est arrivée à Abrantes.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

D'ARAUJO.

(L.)

*Copy of a Letter from Viscount Strangford to Sir Sidney Smith.*

Lisbon, 28 Nov. 1807.
At Night.

SIR,

I AM to inform you, that a great and rapid change has taken place in the conduct of the Portuguese Government, and that "preparations are actually, and bonâ fide, making, with due "alacrity, for the execution of those Articles of the Convention "which relate to the disposal of the Portuguese Navy*."

The Prince Regent and all the Royal Family are embarked, and propose to sail instantly, as a French army is within nine leagues of Lisbon.

Time will not admit of your entry into the Tagus for the purpose of co-operating in the preparations necessary for the removal of the Portuguese Fleet, as you will probably receive this Letter after His Royal Highness has already passed the Bar. And it is on this ground that His Royal Highness does not acquiesce in the preliminary surrender of the Forts of St. Julian and the Bugio.

Every vessel belonging to the Portuguese Marine, whether Royal or Commercial, is engaged and prepared to accompany His Royal Highness.

It is utterly inexpedient to throw any unnecessary difficulties in the way of His Royal Highness's departure, or to raise any question that might be avoided, for I am convinced that so great is the excitement of the people, and so strong the consequent alarm of the Royal Family, that all depends on the support and encouragement which His Royal Highness may receive from us, and of which I have given him the most frank and unequivocal assurances.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) STRANGFORD.

* The words of our Instructions.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

A

# REPLY

TO

## LORD STRANGFORD'S "OBSERVATIONS,"

ON

SOME PASSAGES

IN

## COLONEL NAPIER'S HISTORY

OF THE

## WAR IN THE PENINSULA.

BY WILLIAM NAPIER,

LIEUT.-COLONEL, &c.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

1828.

Map Rep
27540

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

# REPLY

TO

## LORD STRANGFORD'S "OBSERVATIONS,"

&c. &c.

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I HAVE been told that Lord Strangford's "Observations" upon some passages in my History of the Peninsular War require an answer. I am free to confess that I entertain a contrary opinion; but, yielding to the advice of others, I offer the following brief remarks, as sufficient to support my claim to the character of an impartial historian; and, as I am not willing to admit that the stigma which his Lordship's first observation would seem to fix upon me (that of being instigated by party spirit) is deserved, I will begin by requesting Lord Strangford to look at the Edinburgh Review for April 1808; he will there find, under the head of "Portuguese Emigration," a specimen of the manner in which party writers handle such a subject.

That article has, I believe, never been contradicted, and therefore I might justly use it as an historical record; but I rather choose to rest my reply upon an analysis of Lord Strangford's own observations, from which I am entitled to assert, that he has acknow-

ledged the truth of most of the essential points advanced in my historical notice of the Portuguese emigration, and that his apparent contradictions are so unskilfully, or rather so skilfully, managed, as to avoid the objects which they seem to be levelled at.

In page 4, Lord Strangford says, that his "*despatches* relating to the Portuguese emigration *were* originally written, as their date proclaims, on board the Hibernia," and he adduces Mr. Elgar's letter as confirmatory of the fact; but my "note" refers not to Lord Strangford's *despatches*, but to that *single despatch*, which, being dated "29th November, 1808, H. M. S. Hibernia, off the Tagus," was nevertheless written in Mr. Canning's house, Bruton-street, on the 19th of December: hence neither Mr. Elgar's letter nor Lord Strangford's assertion, although both are perfectly true, touch the question. In the next paragraph, however, Lord Strangford appears to come more directly to the point.

He says, that "*no* despatch was written at Salt Hill, nor in the presence of Sir James Yeo;" but he also says, that "it is absolutely untrue that, either there or at any other place, *from the day he left the Tagus* to that of *his arrival in London*, he ever wrote one line relating to public business," and he refers to Mr. Silvester's letter as conclusive on that head. Now, of these two assertions the latter may be strictly true, yet not at all conclusive, any more than is Mr. Silvester's letter, because Lord Strangford arrived in London precisely the same day* that he

* Lord Strangford says he arrived in Bruton-street on Saturday night. Captain Yeo thought it was Sunday morning that Lord Strangford and himself were together at Salt Hill. Can his Lordship have made a mistake of a day in this instance, such as he has evidently made in his despatch relative to his arrival in Lisbon the 27th of November?

arrived at Salt Hill, and yet he wrote on that day and in Mr. Canning's house, the despatch dated "29th November, H. M. S. Hibernia, off the Tagus."

With respect to "*Sir James*" Yeo's having been present during the writing at Salt Hill, the fact is explicitly denied by Lord Strangford; but my words were, that it was "*confidently asserted*," meaning thereby (as a reference to my note will prove) confidently asserted by others, not by me. Now, I repeat that the fact has been so asserted by many persons. I had a written assertion of it before me at the time of penning the expression. I knew that Sir James Yeo himself was the original authority for the anecdote, and I have had farther information to the same purport since (see Appendix, A): nevertheless I considered that Sir James Yeo was dead; and that some misconstruction of his words might have arisen; so that it would be more consonant to justice to leave that matter doubtful. Hence the qualifying expression, "as it is confidently asserted."

Lord Strangford's denial is however perfectly conclusive to me. I believe that Sir James was mistaken. I believe that the letter written in his presence, and sent off by a king's messenger, related to private and not to public business; and if my work should reach a second edition, the text shall run thus: Lord Strangford's despatch, dated the 29th November, H. M. S. Hibernia, off the Tagus, but really written the 19th December at Mr. Canning's house, Bruton-street, London.

Lord Strangford, however, assures us that, with the exception of "some passages" tending "*to compromise the safety of individuals, to give notice to his Majesty's enemies of intended operations*, or

*that might prove offensive to the government to which he was about to be reaccredited"* (a reasonable bill of exceptions truly!), no essential fact contained in the original despatches was suppressed in the revised one. Perhaps not; but the question in discussion is, whether that despatch, or narrative, or composition, or whatever it may be called, did or did not faithfully relate the events which had taken place? Whether it gave a true or an erroneous *impression* of Lord Strangford's exertions upon the occasion of the Portuguese emigration? A few extracts from the despatch itself, placed in juxtaposition with the statement now put forth by his Lordship, will set this matter in a fair light.

| *Lord Strangford in Despatch.* | *Lord Strangford in "Observation."* |
| --- | --- |
| "I accordingly requested an audience of the Prince Regent, together with due assurances of protection and security; and, upon receiving H. R. Highness's answer, I proceeded to Lisbon *on the 27th*, in his Majesty's ship Confiance, bearing a flag of truce. *I had immediately* most interesting communications with the court of Lisbon, the particulars of which shall be fully detailed in a future despatch. It suffices to mention in this place, that the Prince Regent wisely directed all *his apprehensions to a French army, and all his hopes to an English fleet;* that he received the most explicit assurances from me, that his | Page 22, paragraph 46. "I arrived at Lisbon on the *night of the 28th instant*, and almost *immediately* saw Mr. A'Aranjo, who was already on board ship. *I then proceeded* to the vessel in which the Prince Regent was embarked, and, notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary in Colonel Napier's note, I had a long and most confidential interview with his Royal Highness. I had then, as Colonel Napier truly states, no power either to advance or to retard the emigration; but when did I ever assume that I had, or take any credit to myself, for any thing that passed at that interview with his Royal Highness?" |

Majesty would generously overlook those acts of unwilling and momentary hostility, &c. &c.; and that the British squadron before the Tagus should be employed to *protect his retreat from Lisbon* and his voyage to the Brazils."

To Lord Strangford's question ending the foregoing extract from the "*Observations*" I reply, that I never accused his Lordship of taking credit for his exertions at an interview had *the night of the 28th* with the Prince Regent on *board ship;* but I did assert, that his Bruton-street despatch conveyed an *erroneous impression* as to his personal proceedings. I assert it again. I assert, that a despatch, in which it is stated that Lord Strangford proceeded to *Lisbon the 27th*, and *immediately* had most interesting communications with the court of Lisbon, does not convey the idea that Lord Strangford arrived in the *night of the 28th*, and saw the Prince Regent on *board ship;* and this goes to the very pith of the question, because the embarkation of the royal family took place upon the 27th; and that fact, coupled with the "*apprehensions directed to a French army*," the "*hopes to an English fleet*," and the explicit assurance that the British squadron "*would protect*" the Prince's "*retreat from Lisbon*," inevitably led to the conclusion, that the *immediate communications* produced the resolution to embark; than which nothing could be more erroneous.

But it seems that notwithstanding my assertion to the contrary, Lord Strangford had a long and most confidential interview with the Prince Regent on board ship on the night of the 28th. The expression "any

official interview" used by me, may certainly be construed to mean, that Lord Strangford had no interview whatever with the Portuguese Prince; but, taken with its context, it is plain that it refers only to an interview demanded for the purpose of urging the emigration; and in that sense Lord Strangford admits its truth.

I now come to an examination of the relative merits of Lord Strangford and Sir Sydney Smith, with reference to the emigration; and here I must acknowledge that the words "*kept* a naval force off Lisbon" do imply more activity and zeal for our interests in Portugal on the part of the English ministers than the facts as stated by Lord Strangford will justify. I accept of his correction, and in a future edition I will substitute the words "*sent* a naval force."

Lord Strangford rests his claim on a long series of previous negotiations. I do not deny his Lordship's perseverance in these negotiations; but I do deny, and justly, that his perseverance was successful. The utmost that can be said is, that in despite of the confiscation of English property and the detainder of English subjects, and although he was himself driven, as it were, ignominiously out of Lisbon, and forced to join the fleet in an open boat, and although these insults were put forward by the Portuguese Prince as a peace-offering to the French monarch, Lord Strangford still *had hopes!*

The Prince Regent exhibited the most timid and irresolute character, and there was a powerful faction in his court opposed to the emigration; but Lord Strangford still thought that fear would prevail over indolence, that the Prince would finally emigrate; and

he did emigrate! that is, Lord Strangford *guessed well.* In America this might be a positive merit, but there they have no red ribands. Let us, however, examine a little closer into the facts, even such as we have them on his Lordship's authority.

Early in August, the Prince Regent, through his minister, solemnly assured Lord Strangford, that he would not on any account consent to the demand for confiscating the property of British subjects in Portugal.

The 19th of August, the Prince wrote an autograph letter to the King of England, in which he declared his fixed resolution to emigrate rather than sacrifice his honour by consenting to the full intent of the French and Spanish demands.

The 2d of September, a council being held at *Mafra,* it was agreed that the emigration should take place in either of the following cases. 1st, If the French should attempt to compel the Prince to violate the rights of British subjects in their persons or property. 2d, If an overwhelming French force should cross the frontier and take possession of the Portuguese fortresses.

On the 2d of November, Mr. de Lima, a Portuguese courtier, returned from Paris; he was adverse to the emigration, and on the 8th of November *all British property was confiscated, and British subjects detained as prisoners.* Here then the first contingency on which the departure of the Prince was to depend had taken place. Did the emigration follow? No! but the British minister was driven from Lisbon. Nevertheless the Prince Regent privately assured the latter that he would still emigrate if the *French army advanced.*

Meanwhile a state of war commenced. Lord

Strangford's functions ceased, and Sir Sydney's came into full activity. Lisbon and St. Ubes were blockaded, and Portuguese ships were detained for adjudication in the prize courts. The 20th of November, Junot crossed the frontier, and on the 24th, a council was held by the Prince Regent, at which (the second case having arrived) the emigration was, says Lord Strangford, resolved upon, and thus the Prince's promise redeemed. Not so fast, my Lord. The resolution also taken in the council held at Mafra was to emigrate rather than to sacrifice British subjects and their property; yet when the push came, the first were detained, the second was confiscated. The Prince Regent also promised the King of England that he would emigrate rather than sacrifice his honour by acceding to the demands of France and Spain; yet he drove the King's representative from his court to please the French; and thus, according to Lord Strangford, he broke his word, his public, solemn, voluntary promise to the sovereign of England, when he thought by so doing he could mollify the anger of the French monarch: and that being the case, can it be doubted that he would as readily have broken his private promise to Lord Strangford, if there had been no other causes than the advance of the French army to induce him to keep it?

Those causes were, first, the reception of a *Moniteur*, in which it was written by a man who rarely broke his political promises, that the *House of Braganza had ceased to reign.* Secondly, the "*solitary letter*" of Sir Sydney Smith, which not only offered the assistance of the English fleet to forward the emigration, but menaced Lisbon with an immediate attack, if that measure should be delayed.

Lord Strangford says that Sir Sydney's letter had

no influence on the determination of the Prince Regent, but I maintain that there is good historical ground for believing that the resolution of the council on the 24th was by no means final; that the Prince had still the desire to procrastinate, nay, that he would have accepted *terms* from Junot, if he could have got them, and that it was not until the 26th that the resolution to emigrate was irrevocably fixed. (See B.)

Lord Strangford, indeed, asserts, that Sir Sydney's letter was written under his authority, but Sir Sydney's story runs thus: "The whole question of their departure, or remaining prisoners to Junot, turned on my opening the door again, on my *single judgment*, after it had been shut by the expulsion of Lord Strangford from Lisbon, and the consequent beginning of a state of war, and my exercising my *single discretion* in not allowing that state to continue."

Between contradictory authorities I, as an historian, have a right to choose, and I must be allowed without offence to follow Sir Sydney's version; first, because Lord Strangford had *no authority*, his functions *had ceased*, and Sir Sydney, as commander-in-chief of the fleet, acting under an Admiralty warrant, founded on the order in council of November 1807, was entitled to seize all Portuguese vessels, even the royal fleet, and send them to England as prizes, without paying attention in any manner to Lord Strangford, who, as I am informed, had actually applied to Sir Sydney for a frigate to convey him to England, previous to this letter having been written. Second: the letters marked (D. E. F.) referred to by Lord Strangford as affording proofs of his having authorized the letter in question, relate, not to that letter which contained

the threat of an immediate attack on Lisbon, but to the blockade of the Tagus and St. Ubes. The question may, however, be settled by the parties concerned. I leave it to Sir Sydney Smith to say whether this letter was not shown by him, *after signature*, to Lord Strangford for the express purpose of proving to his lordship that his authority was considered at an end, and that the admiral was acting as commander-in-chief, and on his own responsibility. It is sufficient for me to choose to the best of my judgment between such opposite statements.

Mr. Canning's speeches are, however, triumphantly quoted by Lord Strangford in proof of his merits relative to the emigration. The testimony would, I think, be more valuable if the despatch had not been composed in Bruton-street; but, at all events, Mr. Canning's *spoken speeches* upon Portuguese affairs have not always been considered good authority even by himself, if we may judge from the alteration made in the printed version of that celebrated oration delivered in 1827.

But what after all is the amount of Mr. Canning's testimony? That Lord Strangford "*had all along affirmed*" that he "*had predicted*" that the emigration would take place, that he had been "*employed to advise and to urge*" that splendid and magnanimous emigration. Splendid and magnanimous! To abandon a brave and generous people is then splendid! to fly trembling from the face of an enemy is magnanimous! I have often heard of a magnanimous death in defence of one's country, but a magnanimous running away I never heard of before.

Lord Strangford, however, advised and urged this magnanimous and splendid measure; he predicted

that it would take place; and it did take place. So Lord Liverpool once talked of a march to Paris, and the march to Paris was in due time accomplished. I believe Lord Liverpool does not wear a Waterloo medal, and I believe that Lord Strangford's predictions would never have been fulfilled, if the Moniteur containing the intimation relative to the House of Braganza had not been received, and if Sir Sydney Smith's "*solitary letter*" had not arrived just in the favourable moment to give full effect to the fear created by the Moniteur.

If the Prince Regent had really been resolved to emigrate previously, why were his ships not preferred for the voyage? why all the confusion and distress to individuals that ensued from the want of previous arrangement when he did embark? why was the British property confiscated? why was the British minister driven from the court? and why, if the Prince was so friendly to the English, with the British minister, why, I ask, did that minister leave him in ignorance of the fact, that most valuable property and many British subjects were still in Portugal, when he signed the decree of confiscation?

It is as clear as a Lisbon sun, and indeed Lord Strangford himself almost says as much in paragraph forty-five, that this weak Prince, exposed as he was to the efforts of powerful contending factions, would have gone on vacillating and irresolute, until Junot had seized him in his palace, had not the Moniteur put an end to his hopes of mollifying the French, and Sir Sydney's vigorous negotiation put an end to his indolence.

If therefore the red riband was a reward for inducing the splendid and magnanimous running away

of the Prince Regent, it should be cut into three parts at least, and distributed between Lord Strangford, Sir Sydney, and the writer of the Moniteur. Thus much for the intrinsic merits of the case as far as I am implicated by my historical note.

I do not ask of Lord Strangford if he is aware that the Prince Regent expressed his *surprise* that the Bruton-street despatch should have represented him as being influenced in his determination to emigrate by Lord Strangford's remonstrance; I do not ask his lordship if it be not a *mistake in his Bruton-street despatch* to say that he accompanied the Prince Regent in his *passage over the bar of Lisbon;* I do not ask him if the captain of the Hibernia was not the *first Englishman that the Prince* met with from the time of his quitting Lisbon, until after he had cleared the mouth of the river. I know the Prince said so, when in the Brazils; but I am content to establish the general accuracy of my own historical note, and in that note I have asserted positively only three essential facts; 1st, That Lord Strangford's Bruton-street despatch did not do justice to Sir Sydney Smith; 2d, That it gave an erroneous impression of his Lordship's own proceeding; 3d, That Lord Strangford got a red riband for it. I have, I think, shown that it *did not* do justice to the admiral, and Lord Strangford's own statements prove that *it did* give an erroneous account of his proceedings on the 27th; but it appears that he got a red riband for his predictions!

# APPENDIX.

## (A.)

*Letter from Mr. Smith to Col. Napier.*

Dawlish, June 16, 1828.

DEAR SIR,

In reply to your inquiry made on the part of your brother, I can safely say, that he is not the only person who has heard the report of a despatch having been written at Salt Hill; for I have heard it too, and my informant was Captain Yeo (afterwards Sir James Yeo).

He told me that he saw Lord Strangford write at Salt Hill what he conceived to be a despatch, and that what was then written was sent off by a king's messenger. This impression (whether mistaken or not) was what was on sir James Yeo's mind, I am perfectly certain; but I can myself speak only to the fact of his having communicated it to me.

I remain very sincerely yours,

C. D. Smith.

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## (B.)

*Letter from Vice-Admiral Sir Graham Moore, K. C. B., to Lieut.-Col. Wm. Napier.*

Cobham, Surrey, June 4, 1828.

MY DEAR NAPIER,

I have a perfect recollection of having been informed by different Portuguese gentlemen amongst those who accompanied the late King of Portugal (at that time Prince Regent) to the Brazils, that his embarking on the 27th day of November, 1807, was a measure *not resolved upon until the day previous to its taking place;* that the Prince had always entertained some hope of being able to accommodate matters with the French; that he never would have ventured on the step he did, had the British

squadron not appeared; and that a letter sent in by Sir Sydney Smith, *turned the scale.* He had long been wavering and changing, according to the news and reports of the day, and scarcely any body at Lisbon thought that he would put his declared intention into execution, which, in a great degree, accounts for the unprepared state the fleet was in (when it run out of the Tagus), which for confusion, dirt, and disorder, exceeded any scene I ever beheld. From all that I learned in the Brazils, and from what passed off Lisbon and on the passage, my opinion has ever been, that the presence of the British squadron *off* Lisbon, the message sent in by Sir Sydney Smith, and the rapid advance of the French army under Junot, thus placing him, as one might say, between the devil and the deep sea, were the real causes of the emigration of the Prince Regent and the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils. I have also a perfect recollection of the *surprise which every body at* Rio de Janeiro felt when the despatch, signed Strangford, and dated "His Majesty's ship Hibernia, off the Tagus, Nov. 29, 1807," appeared there. It seems to me of very little importance whether that despatch were written at Salt Hill or in Mr. Canning's apartments in London.

I am, &c. &c.

GRAHAM MOORE.

*Note.*—The words in italics are not so marked in the original letter, but are printed thus to draw attention to the parts that bear most on the question.

THE END.

LONDON:
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# FURTHER

# OBSERVATIONS

ON

## SOME PASSAGES

IN

## LIEUT-COL. NAPIER'S
## HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR,

OCCASIONED BY

LIEUT.-COL. NAPIER'S "REPLY," &c.

BY

PERCY, VISCOUNT STRANGFORD.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

MDCCCXXVIII.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

# FURTHER

# OBSERVATIONS,

## &c. &c.

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1. SINCE the publication of my "Observations, &c." Colonel Napier has thought proper to reply to them. I lament that my statement has failed to be as convincing to him as I hoped it would have been to all impartial persons, and that I have not succeeded in removing his persuasion that he is better informed of the transactions at Lisbon in 1807, than those who were on the spot, and who were officially employed in conducting them.

2. Colonel Napier begins by adverting to the twenty-third number of the Edinburgh Review, as "a specimen of the manner in which *party-writers* "handle such subjects"—and yet, in the same page, and "in support of his claim to the character of an "*impartial historian*," he adds, "that he might "justly have used them," (*i. e.* the representations of *party-writers*,) "as an *historical* record." He says, moreover, that he "might so have used them, because they have never been contradicted."

3. It is very true that I did not take the trouble to contradict those statements, nor to notice any of the anonymous attacks which were made upon me at the time. But Colonel Napier must allow one to think that a very different measure of attention was due to

charges made under the sanction of his name, from that which I felt disposed to yield to the imputations of anonymous writers.

4. Colonel Napier has thus, it seems, waved his right of using, as "an *historical* record," the *party*-statement in the Edinburgh Review. I fear that I have not gained much by the Colonel's forbearance. I have referred to the article in question, and I do not find that the author, however zealous a partisan, goes so far out of his way as to impute to me such an action as the suppression of the merits and services of another person, for the sake of enhancing my own. In truth, the writer of that article appears to have been as ignorant as myself, of the "vigorous and successful negotiations of Sir Sidney Smith;" for, however unwilling to allow the merits of the Portuguese emigration to the British government, or to its agent, he certainly does any thing but ascribe it to that distinguished officer, whose name he only mentions in reference to the supposed assertion in his Dispatch, "*that he saw the hills covered with French troops**," —when, according to the reviewer, "*there was not a "soldier of that nation within eighty miles of Lisbon.*" If, therefore, Colonel Napier be entitled to consider the statements of that writer as "*historical* records," when they affect *me*, he would be equally bound to consider them as such when they affect *Sir Sidney Smith*. For my part, I shall show, and I presume that on his, Sir Sidney Smith would have no difficulty in showing, that they affect neither.

* Sir Sidney Smith does *not* say so, though the Reviewer attributes this expression to him. His words are, *merely*, "*the French army on the hills.*"

5. In Colonel Napier's favourite form of a *note*, he insinuates, (p. 4,) that I must have mistaken the day of my arrival in London, because, "Captain Yeo "*thought* it was on *Sunday* the 20th, and not on "*Saturday* the 19th of December." The following document, which appeared in all the newspapers of the time, will prove, not only the day, but almost the hour, on which I reached London.

"Foreign Office, *half-past two*, P. M.
December 19, 1807.

"MY LORD,

"I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship "that Lord Strangford, His Majesty's Minister Pleni-"potentiary to the Court of Lisbon, is *just arrived*, "having left the Portuguese fleet on the 5th instant, "between Madeira and the Western Isles, under "convoy of a British squadron, with a fair wind, "steering for the Brazils.

(Signed) "GEO. CANNING."

*To the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor.*

The matter is, in itself, of little importance, except as a fresh proof of the mistakes to which a too confident reliance upon hearsay evidence may sometimes give rise.

6. Captain Yeo *thought* also, (as appears from Mr. C. D. Smith's letter, in Col. Napier's Appendix,) that "what I wrote at Salt-hill, in his presence, was a "Dispatch." I do recollect to have written two hurried notes in the bar-room of the Castle Inn at that place, while we were changing horses there. One of them (still in existence) was addressed to my agent, stating, that I should be in town in a few

hours, and directing apartments to be taken for me—the other was to the dearest of my personal friends, to inform him that I had arrived, and that I should call on him immediately after waiting on Mr. Canning. Those notes were forwarded by the King's messenger, Sylvester, from whom I parted at Salt-hill, having no further occasion for his services when so near the end of my journey.

7. That Captain Yeo should have seriously believed, and gravely acknowledged himself to have believed, that two notes, written under such circumstances of haste, and in the public bar-room of an inn, were *official dispatches*, is, at least, very surprising, and does, I think, demonstrate the somewhat remarkable facility with which those who do me the honour to animadvert on my proceedings, fall into mistakes and misconstructions respecting them.

8. Colonel Napier, however, seems now convinced that Captain Yeo's representation, (if, indeed, that officer could ever have seriously made it,) was altogether erroneous; and he takes the new course, with which my own frank and voluntary avowal has apparently furnished him, of throwing over my Dispatch the suspicion of having been fabricated for some unknown but unworthy purpose, by insisting that it was "written at Mr. Canning's house in Bruton-street."

9. I have already admitted that this Dispatch was, as far as manual operation was concerned, undoubtedly *written* in Bruton-street, but I repeat, that it was a mere compilation and arrangement of my original dispatches, all and every one of which were written and dated on board the Hibernia;—that it was so arranged and compiled *under the special*

*directions of the Secretary of State*—that it contained nothing that was not contained in them, and omitted nothing but that which it would have been equally cruel and absurd to have proclaimed to the world. I was at the time, and I still am, decidedly of opinion, that Mr. Canning was quite justified in desiring that arrangement, and that he would have been quite unjustifiable if he had needlessly exposed individuals to the vengeance of Junot, or had gratuitously informed the French Commander, that such or such forts in the Tagus might be successfully attacked, with such or such a number of troops; for, in the suppression of such facts and such circumstances, and in the omission of such remarks as were likely to offend the Sovereign to whom I was about to be accredited, (and in this degree *only*,) did my published Dispatch vary from the originals out of which it was compiled. And I did then, and I do still, consider that I should have been more liable to the imputation of affixing to my Dispatch an erroneous date, if I had dated it from London, than by retaining the date under which every part, I might almost say, every sentence, of it was originally written. Colonel Napier terms the omissions in that Dispatch, "a reasonable bill of exceptions, truly!"—I repeat, that it would have been both cruel and absurd, not to have made such exceptions.

10. After these explanations, (the last which I shall feel myself bound to give upon this subject,) I leave Colonel Napier to pursue, or not, his intention of stating, in the next edition of his "History," that my Dispatch, "though dated the 29th November,

"His Majesty's Ship Hibernia, off the Tagus, was "really written on the 19th of December, at Mr. Can- "ning's house, Bruton-street, London." But, in fact, whether it were written at Salt-hill, or in Bruton-street, or off the Tagus, or at any other place which it may please Colonel Napier hereafter to discover, has nothing to do, either with the *main* question—the *truth* of my Dispatch—or with the *secondary* question, which Colonel Napier has been pleased to raise, that of the respective shares of Sir Sidney Smith and of myself, in the Emigration of the Portuguese Royal Family.

11. Colonel Napier places in juxta-position, two passages, the one from my Dispatch, the other from my "Observations;" and he appears to believe that he has detected a contradiction between them, because in the former I state that "I *proceeded* to Lisbon on the 27th," and in the latter, that "I *arrived* at Lisbon on the 28th of November." There is no contradiction whatever in these two statements. I *did* leave the Hibernia *to proceed* to Lisbon, on the evening of the 27th, and I *did* reach that city on the night of the 28th of November. The log of the Confiance will explain what was the state of the wind and the weather at the time, and, consequently, why I did not arrive sooner. It would, I think, have been more generous and more candid to have anticipated this simple and natural explanation, than to have at once assumed that the apparent variation between the two passages was an incorrect statement of facts.

12. Colonel Napier says, however, that "the pith of the question is," that "my printed Dispatch con-

veys an erroneous idea of my personal proceedings." I deny most distinctly, that either Mr. Canning or myself had any intention of producing such a result. I wrote the several Dispatches out of which the single published Dispatch was compiled, with a recent and vivid impression of all the facts which they described. That description was a true and faithful one. It seemed to me, while I was writing it, to be an accurate statement of all that I had said and done, and it was honestly designed to convey the same to the minds of others. I meant no deceit—Mr. Canning meant no deceit; and, never suspecting that deceit could be imputed to us, I was naturally satisfied with what I knew to be the truth, and took little pains to guard against the interpretations which the hypercriticism of party might, subsequently, fasten on my words. It is hard, that after a lapse of twenty-one years, I should be held responsible for those interpretations, the possibility of which I could not, at the time, imagine—which I, consequently, took no care to prevent—and which, even now that they have been developed, I protest that I do not understand. It is hard too, that they were not brought forward, in this substantive form at least, until after the death of Mr. Canning, whose character is, perhaps, as much implicated in them as mine, and who would no doubt have repelled them, with far greater powers assuredly than I possess, but certainly with not less of honest indignation than I feel.

13. I have said that I *did* not mean to "convey an erroneous impression of my proceedings" in the Tagus—in other words, to represent my interview

with The Prince Regent as having caused, or even as having influenced His Royal Highness's departure. I will show, that I *could* not have had such an intention. Putting aside the obvious question of *what* possible utility, either to Mr. Canning or to myself it could have been for *me* to have fabricated an unfaithful statement, or for *him* to have not merely connived at, but actually enjoined it, (since whatever alterations were made in my original Dispatches *were made under his orders*, as the King's Secretary of State for the Foreign Department,) I would ask, whether it is to be supposed that the Ministers did not read Sir Sidney Smith's Dispatches as well as mine? and that if any discrepancy existed between them, (which I boldly assert, in justice to the Admiral, as well as to myself, could *not* have been the case,) they would not have instantly inquired into, and cleared up the doubts to which such discrepancy might have given rise? Is it to be supposed that with the risk of such an inquiry before my eyes, I should have ventured on a fabrication which was to be attended with inevitable discovery? Is it credible that Sir Sidney Smith *could* have been so unjust to his own fame, and so unconscious of his own deserts, as to have omitted in *his* Dispatches the important fact, (if it had been a fact,) that to *his* negotiations was due one of the most interesting events of modern times, if those negotiations had been, as assuredly they were not, the cause of that event?

14. Colonel Napier states that "Sir Sidney Smith's "story" runs thus! "The whole question of their "departure or remaining prisoners to Junot, turned "on *my* opening the door again, on my *single* judg-

" ment, after it had been shut by the expulsion " of Lord Strangford from Lisbon, (and the conse- " quent beginning of a state of war,) and *my* exer- " cising my *single* discretion in not allowing that " state to continue."

15. Where this " story of Sir Sidney Smith" (which Colonel Napier inserts with the marks of quotation) is to be found, I really do not know. Since the day, (the 22nd of December, 1807,) when the Dispatches of the Rear-Admiral and mine were simultaneously published in the London Gazette, I, at least, have never seen nor heard of any complaint on the part of Sir Sidney Smith, of any inaccuracy in my statements, and I cannot doubt that if the Rear-Admiral *had* seen any thing to complain of, he would have lost no time in setting His Majesty's Government right, by explaining whatever he might have thought to be inaccurate. On the passage, however, now quoted by Colonel Napier, whencesoever it may have been taken, I shall make a few observations.

16. Undoubtedly, as Commander of a powerful British Squadron, Sir Sidney Smith *might* have prevented The Prince Regent from putting to sea, or *might* have captured His Royal Highness, His Family, and Fleet, or *might* have permitted them to be captured by General Junot. But the question is, whether, if he had done so, and if he had refused to " open the door," *he would have acted according to the tenour of his instructions*, which provided for every possible case and contingency? Whether, in short, he *could*, in virtue of those instructions, have ventured to oppose the egress of the

Royal Fleet? And if, *under his instructions*, he could not, he dared not, have acted otherwise than as he did, most properly, act, what becomes of that exercise of " his *single* judgment," and of " his *single* " discretion," to which the Emigration is now attributed, according to " Sir Sidney Smith's story," as told by Colonel Napier?

17. The word " *single*" twice, and somewhat ostentatiously employed in Colonel Napier's quotation, must be meant as a denial that *I* either had, or could have had, any share in the decision of these important affairs. I can only say that my own instructions, and, to the best of my remembrance, those of the Rear-Admiral, enjoined us to act in strict co-operation and communication : that Sir Sidney Smith was ordered to shape all his proceedings according to my advice ; and that, in fact, the most entire and friendly concert and understanding did, to the utmost of my knowledge, belief, and recollection, subsist between the Rear-Admiral and me, on every point connected with those transactions. Sir Sidney Smith's instructions are, I presume, upon record, and will prove, if referred to, whether my impression on this subject be accurate or not. But, in truth, Sir Sidney Smith's own published Dispatches show, beyond the possibility of doubt, that there *must* have existed a degree of concert between us, altogether inconsistent with the meaning evidently implied by the word " *single*," in the foregoing quotation.

18. Colonel Napier then proceeds to affirm, that " 'my functions ceased after my ignominious expulsion " from Lisbon," and to inquire whether Sir Sidney Smith did not show to me his letter to the Portu-

guese minister, *after* he had signed it, for the express purpose of proving to me that my authority was at an end. Of my "*expulsion*" from Lisbon, I will only say, that it was my own act and deed. I thought it my duty to withdraw from a Court, the Ministers of which had broken a promise to the King my Sovereign, by whatever circumstances of coercion that breach of promise might have been occasioned. Of the "ignominy" which accompanied my "*expulsion*," the world will judge when assured, that the finest frigate in the Portuguese navy was completely fitted up for my accommodation, and was placed at my disposal without any limitation as to time or distance. If I did not avail myself of the courteous offer of the Portuguese Government, it was simply because I did not think it right so to do. I alone, therefore, am responsible for whatever circumstances of "ignominy" may be thought to have attended my departure from Lisbon. I may, perhaps, be allowed to observe, that this very circumstance of the offer of a Portuguese ship of war is mentioned in my former pamphlet (par. 37.), though, singular as it may appear, Colonel Napier, in *reply* to that pamphlet, and, of course, after having read it, speaks of my being "*driven* "*ignominiously* out of Lisbon, and *forced* to join the "fleet in an open boat."

19. As to the circuitous contrivance by which Sir Sidney Smith is represented to have "intimated to me that my functions had ceased," I have not the most distant recollection of its having been resorted to. There can be no doubt that my functions must, in one sense of the word, have ceased, when I retired from the Court to which I was accredited; but that they had *not*

ceased in the sense in which Colonel Napier uses the term (i. e. as in relation to Sir Sidney Smith, and to the transactions which took place after I came on board of his ship), there is the public and irrefragable proof of Sir Sidney Smith's own Dispatches, in the London Gazette of the 22d of December, in which, while describing those transactions, and the circumstances of my last visit to Lisbon, the Rear-Admiral says, "The instructions WE had received were acted upon "to their fullest extent," &c. "Lord Strangford "having received an acquiescence to the proposition "which had been made by US," &c. "To adopt "the means open to US," &c. "That confidence "which his word of honour, AS THE KING'S MINI-"STER PLENIPOTENTIARY," &c. "OUR hopes and "OUR expectations have been realized to the utmost "extent," &c. Surely these passages, both in themselves and in context with the whole of the Dispatches, prove to a demonstration that Sir Sidney Smith did not consider that he was acting "*singly*," or that "*my* "*functions had ceased.*"

20. Colonel Napier observes that "*I guessed well.*" It is true that, several months before the emigration took place, I did assure my Government, on evidence quite conclusive to my mind, that the Prince Regent would embark for Brazil so soon as *two* pre-supposed cases should occur (not so soon as "*either*" of the two cases should occur, as Colonel Napier most unaccountably states it), and that, day after day, I continued to repeat those assurances, and, of course, to endeavour, by all the means in my power, to make my predictions good. It is true that Government gave the fullest credit to them, and to the evidence on which they were

founded. And it is true that, when the *two* cases did actually occur, and that *both* of the conditions on which the Prince had made his departure to depend, were completed, His Royal Highness did embark, and did thus justify my previous assurances to my Court. All this, according to Colonel Napier, was "a *guess*." Be it so. In the same manner, the result of any political transaction whatsoever, after having been foreseen and announced, and matured by every effort of unremitting diligence and exertion, may be characterized as a fortunate "*guess*."

21. But Colonel Napier is pleased to state (p. 9.), that the Prince Regent's promise to emigrate depended upon *either* of the following cases: 1st. "If "the French should attempt to compel the Prince "to violate the rights of British subjects in their "persons or property. 2d. If an overwhelming "French force should cross the frontier and take "possession of the Portuguese fortresses,"—and he proceeds to infer that, as His Royal Highness did not emigrate, when the *first* of these contingencies took place, He had no intention to fulfil His engagement. It is really worthy of notice in this place, that I did, in my pamphlet, most distinctly state, that the Emigration was to depend *also* on the invasion of Portugal by the French. My words, though Colonel Napier seems to have so strangely overlooked them (and that, too, on a point which is the very gist of the case), are as follow: "I found the Prince fully "determined to retire from Portugal whenever the "pre-supposed event should occur; but equally so, "not to carry His purpose into effect *until His king-*

" *dom should have been actually invaded,* and a case " thus made out which should reconcile that measure " to His sense of religion and duty, and justify Him " (to use His own emphatic expression), to God and " to His people, for abandoning the land of His an- " cestors." (Par. 26.)

22. Of Colonel Napier's allusions to the Americans —to their lack of red ribbons—to Lord Liverpool—to the Waterloo medal—to the march to Paris—to Mr. Canning's speeches—and, above all, to the somewhat novel contrivance of dividing the Order of the Bath, " *between*" *three* individuals, I will say nothing, as I cannot discover that these pleasantries, however ingenious and excellent, bear, in the slightest degree, on the question originally at issue between their author and myself.

23. Colonel Napier asserts, that the unexpected declaration in the *Moniteur of the 2d of November,* " that the House of Braganza *had* ceased to reign," was the proximate cause of the Emigration. It may tend to improve the *historical accuracy* of Colonel Napier's work, that I should inform him that there is no allusion whatsoever to the House of Braganza in the *Moniteur* of the *2d of November.* But in a minor and scarcely official paper, the *Journal de l'Empire,* of the 31st of *October,* there appeared some remarks on His Majesty's declaration relative to the Copenhagen Expedition. In this long paper, which was copied into the Moniteur of the 1st of November, there is the following passage, describing the supposed fatal policy of England towards her allies. " England " would have lost (or ruined) Denmark, if that court

" had yielded to fear. It is thus that she will have " lost (or ruined) Portugal, and that the House of Bra- " ganza, IF it makes common cause with England, " WILL HAVE *ceased to reign**." There is a wide difference between this *conditional* menace of the Journal de l'Empire, and the *definitive* sentence which Colonel Napier represents Bonaparte to have pronounced, *ex cathedrâ*, " that the House of Bra- " ganza HAD ceased to reign." In truth, this quotation from the Journal de l'Empire is not at all stronger than a passage, previously inserted in the Moniteur, under the rubric of Lisbon, and the date of the 4th of October, which states, (in reference to the reluctance of the Prince Regent to unite Himself with France,) that " an act of alliance between a conti- " nental sovereign and England, *is equivalent to an* " *act of abdication*†." Colonel Napier must also permit me to remind him, that almost the very same words had been previously pronounced by Bonaparte himself, early in October, to the whole of the corps diplomatique assembled at a fête given by, or to, the Queen of Holland, and that they were publicly known at Lisbon on the 23d of the same month. If, therefore, the Emigration of the Royal House of Braganza was the mere instantaneous result of the panic which this declaration inspired, why did they not emigrate

* " Elle aurait perdu le Dannemarc, s'il avait cédé à la crainte. " C'est ainsi qu'elle perdra le Portugal, et que la Maison de Bra- " gance, SI elle fait cause commune avec l'Angleterre, AURA " *cessé de régner*."

† " Il est passé comme en proverbe, qu'un acte d'alliance d'un " Souverain du Continent, avec l'Angleterre, *equivaut à un acte* " *d'abdication*."

(when they first had notice of it on the 23d of October? Simply because *both* of the two cases on which The Prince all along made the Emigration to depend, had not then occurred.

24. Colonel Napier says (p. 10) that Bonaparte "*rarely broke his political promises.*" Fortunately for Himself, the Prince Regent of Portugal was not of Colonel Napier's opinion—an opinion which is, I believe, somewhat uncommon, though it assuredly finds its proper place in an "History," the second sentence of which declares, that "all the wars of France, up to the treaty of Tilsit, were essentially *defensive.*"

25. It is stated by Colonel Napier, that "there is "good *historical* ground for believing that the reso-"lution of the council held at Mafra, on the 24th of "November, was by no means final." Without pretending to be so well qualified as Colonel Napier to judge of what constitutes "historical" evidence, I must be allowed to think that both the Council and its resolution *were* final, for this plain reason, that no other Council whatever was held afterwards, and that the resolution adopted at the Council of the 24th was executed within four and twenty hours after it had been taken. And I repeat that it was so taken *before* Sir Sidney Smith's letter (to which the determination of the Council is so strangely attributed) was received, or could have been received at Mafra. In point of fact, the Rear-Admiral's letter was never laid before that Council, and might just as well have remained in Sir Sidney Smith's desk, for any share which it had, or could have had, in producing their decisions.

26. Colonel Napier indulges in some sarcastic allusions to the terms of eulogy in which Mr. Canning spoke of the Emigration, which it suits Colonel Napier to describe as a mere "*running away.*" Surely Colonel Napier should be the last to suppose that a *retreat* before a French army is necessarily a "*run-*" *ning away,*" however deplorable (to use his own words) the "vacillation, confusion, and distress," with which, unhappily, it may have been attended!

27. Colonel Napier concludes with stating three questions, adding, however, that he "will not *ask* "them." I do not understand this distinction. But as these questions are placed on Colonel Napier's pages, I must take leave to consider them as having been asked, and to place the answers on mine.

28. In the first place, it was no "mistake to have asserted," (as I again assert,) that I "accompanied the Prince in His passage over the Bar of Lisbon." I mean, that I was in the very same vessel with His Royal Highness; and not merely that I attended Him, while I was in another ship. I did so accompany His Royal Highness, (i. e. I was in the very same vessel with him) till the junction of the two squadrons, and till I went on board the British Flag-ship, whence I returned with Sir Sidney Smith into the Royal Presence.

29. In the second place, with reference to the question, whether "the Captain of the Hibernia "was not the *first Englishman that the Prince met* "*with,* from the time of his quitting Lisbon, until "after he had cleared the mouth of the river," it would be certainly incorrect to say that *I* was the first

Englishman whom He *met*, inasmuch as I was actually on board His ship. Who was the first *other* Englishman whom His Royal Highness met on that day, I do not recollect, nor do I suppose that Colonel Napier can be at all solicitous to know. He means, no doubt, to insinuate that the Captain of the Hibernia preceded me. That I deny; I was on board The Prince Regent's ship when she met the Hibernia.

30. In the third place, and with respect to the assertions on this subject attributed to The Prince Regent, and to the "*surprise*" which His Royal Highness is said to have testified, when in Brazil, at the representations contained in what Colonel Napier *now* thinks proper to term my "Bruton-street Dispatch, I will beg leave to cite the following passages from a letter which was addressed to me, some days ago, by a gentleman of the highest reputation for integrity and honour, who preceded me in my mission to Rio de Janeiro, who, up to the time of my arrival there, was in daily intercourse with The Prince Regent, of the most unreserved and confidential kind, and with whom it is quite natural to suppose that His Royal Highness must have fully and frequently discoursed on so important and so recent an event, as that in which He had just been the principal actor. The following, then, are the words of Sir Francis Hill:

"In my many conversations with His Royal High-
"ness, respecting His departure from Lisbon in 1807,
"He *never* expressed to me, nor appeared to entertain,
"any opinion at all unfavourable to the accuracy of

" the statement given in your printed Dispatch of the
" circumstances of that transaction. He *never* in-
" timated any *surprise* in consequence of any part of
" that statement. And He *never* denied to me the
" fact which you describe in it, of your having accom-
" panied His Royal Highness on His passage over the
" Bar of Lisbon."

31. Colonel Napier must permit me to think that such evidence as the above is of more authority than the hearsay on hearsay conjectures of the "*pas-*
"*sengers in Sir Graham Moore's ship,*"—assisted though those conjectures may have been, by the
" *news and reports of the day* *."

* Vide Sir Graham Moore's Letter in Colonel Napier's Appendix.

*Harley-street,*
*August* 12, 1828.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

# NOTES

ON

# THE CAMPAIGN

OF

## 1808—1809,

IN THE

# NORTH OF SPAIN.

IN REFERENCE TO SOME PASSAGES IN LIEUT.-COL. NAPIER'S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA, AND IN SIR WALTER SCOTT'S LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

BY LIEUT.-COL. T. S. SORELL,

MILITARY SECRETARY AND AIDE-DE-CAMP TO SIR DAVID BAIRD, DURING THE CAMPAIGN.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

MDCCCXXVIII.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

# PREFACE.

THE following Notes have been written with a design of placing in a correct point of view the proceedings of the division of the British army which landed at Coruña, under the command of sir David Baird; and of pointing out some mistakes which occur in late publications, relative to the Campaign of 1808-1809, in the North of Spain. This, it is thought, will be best accomplished by giving extracts from the original correspondence on the subject; which, as many of these extracts have not yet been published, may at all events furnish matter of reference to the future historian. It is intended to show—

1st, That every effort was made to prepare the division which landed at Coruña for the field, and to effect its junction with that under sir John Moore.

2dly, That sir David Baird did not, as stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, in his History of the War in the Peninsula, retire from Astorga to Villa Franca, until ordered to do so by sir John Moore.

And, 3dly, That the disorder and irregularity which attended the retreat ought principally to be

ascribed to the fatigues and privations which the army underwent, and not to any want of exertion on the part of the officers in command.

In laying these Notes before the public, the writer has not the slightest intention to detract from the general merit of the works to which he has occasion to refer, but is actuated solely by considerations of public justice and private friendship.

*London, June* 20, 1828.

# NOTES,

*&c.*

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In lieutenant-colonel Napier's account of the early part of the campaign of 1808–1809, that officer notices the want of assistance and co-operation that both sir John Moore and sir David Baird experienced from the Spanish government and authorities. It would not, therefore, be necessary to advert to that period, were it not that the events which then occurred are so intimately connected with those which followed, that it would be impossible to fulfil the object I have in view without alluding to our earliest transactions in Spain.

It may, however, first be proper to notice an error in sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon Bonaparte*, although that error has not escaped the attention of lieutenant-colonel Napier. Sir Walter Scott is mistaken in supposing that sir David Baird was sent by sir John Moore to Coruña. Sir John Moore was serving with the British troops in Portugal, under the command of sir Harry Burrard, when the English government determined to employ a force in Spain under sir John Moore's orders. Sir Harry Burrard was directed to place twenty thousand men of the troops already in Portugal under the command of sir John

* Scott's Napoleon, vol. vi. p. 266.

Moore, and about twelve thousand were sent direct from England to Coruña, under sir David Baird. The plan of the campaign was framed in England by the British government, with the advice of the marquis de la Romana. It was intended that the British troops should advance towards the Ebro in support of the native armies, then represented to be in great force, and in the most efficient order. Indeed, such was the delusion which prevailed at the time in this respect, that the only fear expressed in Spain was, that the French might escape across the Pyrenees; and the plans most frequently discussed were those for an invasion of France. Sir John Moore had the option of proceeding by sea from Lisbon to Coruña, uniting there with sir David Baird's force, and marching his whole army through Galicia, or of moving the corps at Lisbon through Portugal. He preferred the latter alternative, and directed sir David Baird to advance from Coruña on Astorga, whilst he proceeded from Lisbon to Salamanca; intending to form the junction at a point in Spain to be afterwards determined on. From the reports he had received respecting the state of the roads through Portugal, he was induced to send the cavalry and the principal part of his artillery by a circuitous route through Merida, Almaraz, and the Escurial.

On the 13th of October, 1808, the fleet of transports which conveyed the division of British troops under sir David Baird to Spain, anchored in the port of Coruña. The nature of his reception, and of *some* of the difficulties which he experienced in preparing his corps for field service, will perhaps be best shown by a reference to part of his correspondence.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, at Lisbon.*

Coruña, 13th October, 1808.

"I have the honour to report to you my arrival in the port of Coruña, in command of a division of his majesty's forces, and to transmit, for your information, a return of the strength of the different corps of which it is composed.

"My instructions from lord Castlereagh direct me, after reporting my arrival to you, to lose no time in disembarking the troops, and, immediately on clearing the infantry transports, to send them to Lisbon, for the purpose of receiving on board part of our force there, destined to act in this part of Spain, in conjunction with the troops from England, under your orders.

"An unexpected difficulty has, however, arisen to prevent an immediate obedience to these orders, as the junta of this province does not consider itself authorised to receive us, or to permit our disembarkation, without the previous sanction of the supreme government of the kingdom.

"An extraordinary courier has accordingly been despatched to Madrid to obtain this permission; and I have written to Lord William Bentinck, in that city *, urging him to use every effort in his power to obtain a speedy and favourable reply to our application; on receipt of which I shall lose no time in carrying my instructions into effect," &c.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore.*

Coruña, 15th October, 1808.

"——Instead of arrangements being made for our reception, as I was led to expect would be the case,

* Lord William Bentinck had been employed on a political mission at Madrid. Mr. Stuart, however, had succeeded him at this time, but his lordship remained in that city in communication with the Spanish government.

the provincial government was not only unprepared to receive us, but appears disinclined to afford us any active assistance.

"—— As we brought no money with us, I have been compelled to endeavour to obtain a supply, and I am in expectation of procuring five thousand pounds. I am afraid we shall find great difficulty in fulfilling that part of my instructions which relates to the purchase of horses and mules, as they appear to be extremely scarce in this province."

It was expected by the British government that we should have found no difficulty in procuring money after our arrival in Spain for bills on the treasury: in this expectation we were completely disappointed, and much inconvenience was at first experienced in consequence. The division was to be equipped for field service in Galicia. It was, therefore, necessary to procure horses and mules for the conveyance of stores, baggage, &c.; but none could be obtained without immediate payment. Destined to a country which was represented to be enthusiastic in the cause we came to defend, it was naturally supposed in England that our wants would be cheerfully supplied. Every effort was made by sir David Baird to remedy the effects of this disappointment.

*Sir David Baird to the British consul at Oporto.*

Coruña, 17th October, 1808.

"Being in the greatest want of money for the payment and equipment of his majesty's forces in Galicia, I have directed the deputy commissary-general at this place, to send an assistant to Oporto, for the purpose of endeavouring to procure cash for bills on the British treasury; and I beg to request you will afford him every assistance in your power," &c.

*Sir David Baird to lord Castlereagh.*

18th October, 1808.

"——I am at a loss to know how we shall be able to subsist the troops, without we can find some means of getting money. We have as yet been only able to raise about six thousand pounds," &c.

At length the courier who had been despatched to Madrid arrived at Coruña, three days later than his return was expected by the provincial junta.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore.*

Coruña, 24th October, 1808.

"——The courier who was sent to Madrid on the subject of our disembarkation returned on the 22d instant; and another messenger arrived from that city yesterday, and brought me letters from Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart. The answer of the supreme government to our application, as read by Mr. Frere last night, in presence of the junta of this province, is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of expressing any anxiety to promote our views, or dissatisfaction at the impediments thrown in our way by the Galician government, it merely *permits* us to land here in the event of it being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero, and directs that, if a disembarkation takes place, it shall be made in detachments of 2000 or 3000 men each, which are to be successively pushed on into Castile, without waiting for the necessary equipment of mules and horses. As the execution of this plan might bring part of my division in contact with the enemy (in the event of the Spanish armies experiencing a defeat) before a junction with you, and is in direct opposition to the instructions I received from lord Castlereagh, and to your orders, I felt it my duty to object to it in the strongest terms, and

finally to declare, that, unless I was permitted to quarter the troops in this province until the necessary provision of draught cattle could be procured, I should feel myself compelled to suffer them to remain on board until I had communicated with you and received your further orders.

"At length, after a great deal of discussion, and much opposition on the part of the junta, it has been decided, that we shall be cantoned in the towns and villages on the two principal roads leading from this place towards Leon and Castile, until such time as the necessary equipment can be effected to enable us to take the field," &c.

In pursuance of this arrangement, the troops were successively brought on shore; but as obstacles to our proceedings presented themselves every moment, sir David Baird found it necessary to apply to Mr. Stuart at Madrid, for the purpose of getting a Spanish officer appointed to carry on our intercourse with the local authorities.

*Sir David Baird to Charles Stuart, Esquire.*

Coruña, October 25th, 1808.

"—— The utter impossibility of making any satisfactory progress in our arrangements whilst we are under the necessity of referring every subject to a junta composed of a dozen persons, some of whom throw obstacles in the way of every measure that is suggested, urges me to request that you will point out to the supreme government, in the strongest manner, the importance of appointing some person of authority, to remain with the British troops at present here, with full powers to make such arrangements as may be requisite for their accommodation and supply, and to enable them to move," &c.

The motive for urging this request will be properly understood, when it is explained that, although the British troops arrived at Coruña on the 13th of October, it was the 24th before any article of fresh provision could be procured or purchased for them: they had till then been supplied with rations from the transports. Such was the conduct of a people whom we came to protect. One cause of their backwardness was about this time discovered,—they distrusted our real intentions, and suspected us of a design to seize the arsenal of Ferrol. So jealous were they, that two or three officers, who rode over to see the place, were refused admission into the town; and a division of Spanish troops, which was on its march from the south of Galicia to join Blake, was suddenly ordered to retrace its steps, for the purpose of garrisoning and securing that fortress.

*Sir David Baird to colonel Gordon.*

Coruña, 25th October, 1808.

"—— The progress of our preparations has been much delayed and impeded by an almost total want of assistance from the government of the province. The junta has been liberal in making promises, but has hitherto failed in every instance in fulfilling them; and until yesterday, notwithstanding every exertion, I found it absolutely impossible to procure an ounce of bread for the soldiers. No other article of provision has yet been obtained, although, from the arrangements now in progress, I am in hopes of securing regular supplies for the troops when landed," &c.

Notwithstanding the difficulties and delays which crossed sir David Baird at every step, the leading

division of his column, composed of the light brigade under brigadier-general Craufurd, was put in march towards Astorga on the 28th October, only six days after permission to land the troops had been received at Coruña. On the preceding day sir David Baird announced this movement as follows:

*Sir David Baird to lord Castlereagh.*

Coruña, 27th October, 1808.

"—— We have indeed procured a sufficient sum of money to pay the troops up to the 24th of this month; but the balance remaining is so small, that unless we speedily receive a considerable sum in addition, it will be *impossible* to proceed with our arrangements, as the Spaniards require payment in specie, not only for mules and horses, but for every article of provisions they furnish.

"—— We have hitherto been unsuccessful in our endeavours to procure draught cattle; four or five mules being all we have as yet been able to get."

"—— Notwithstanding these circumstances, three regiments will commence their march on the road towards Leon to-morrow, and will proceed as far as Lugo. They would have moved yesterday; but just as they were setting out, the person who had contracted to supply them with provisions in their cantonments refused to fulfil his engagement.

"—— The rains have just set in with great violence," &c.

This letter shows that we were still left to our own resources, without the slightest assistance from the Spanish authorities. Indeed, there was little doubt but that some of them made a profit of our difficulties, and derived pecuniary advantage from the

contracts they obliged us to have recourse to, instead of furnishing us upon the same footing with Spanish troops, as was proposed by sir David Baird.

By the 3rd of November, the whole of sir David Baird's division, except one battalion, was in march. On that day he wrote:

*Sir David Baird to sir J. Moore.*

Coruña, 3rd November, 1808.

" —— All the regiments of my division (with the exception of the 3rd battalion 60th) are now on shore, and moving slowly towards Astorga. I cannot, at this moment, positively fix the day when my advance will reach that place; but I trust nothing will, at all events, occur to delay it beyond the 13th of this month.

" In the mean time measures are concerting for the establishment of a depôt; and the first division of waggons with provisions left Coruña for Astorga this morning. From all the information I have been able to collect, that town is a very proper place for the establishment of a magazine. The only doubt I entertain respecting it, is whether it may not be rather too far advanced," &c.

This was found too true in the sequel. Lieut.-colonel Napier, at page 470, in speaking of the retreat through Astorga, says, " In the preceding month large stores had been gradually brought up to that town by sir David Baird; and as there were no means of transport to remove them, orders were given, after supplying the immediate wants of the army, to destroy them. But Romana, who would neither defend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promise, pre-occupied Astorga with his fugitive army; and when the English divisions marched in, such a tumult

and confusion arose, that no orders could be executed with regularity, no distribution be made, nor the destruction of the stores be effected," &c.

Astorga was fixed on by sir John Moore as a principal depôt for the army, and orders were given in a letter from him, dated Lisbon, the 26th October, to send provisions there sufficient for 20,000 men for ten days.

Having thus explained the nature of our situation during the period which immediately followed our arrival in Spain, I shall now proceed to notice some further passages in colonel Napier's work.

At page 428, colonel Napier says, "The 26th (November) the head of sir David Baird's column was at Astorga, but the rear extended beyond Lugo."

As Coruña was fixed on as the grand depôt for the whole army, and was the point where it was intended that every thing coming from England should be landed, and as major-general Broderick was left there with a British battalion, it may be said that sir David Baird's rear extended to that port. Indeed, this was in some degree the fact, for it was necessary to occupy the different towns on the whole line from Astorga to Coruña, for the purpose of furnishing escorts and assistance in forwarding the supplies moving on. But the head of sir David Baird's column was at Astorga as early as the 13th of November, and it was well closed up to that town by the 29th of the same month.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore.*

Coruña, 7th November, 1808.

"—— The troops continue on their route towards Astorga. The first division will arrive (if no unlooked-for accident should delay it) on the 13th;

and by the 19th I expect we shall have seven regiments in that town and its immediate neighbourhood. We are also forwarding provisions and ammunition as quickly as our circumscribed means will permit. We have derived no sort of assistance from the government. The junta have repeatedly promised us carts, but have invariably failed in sending them; and we have been compelled to rely solely on our own efforts to obtain the means of conveyance," &c.

" —— The first division of carts with provisions will reach Astorga about the 18th instant, and every exertion shall be made to complete the depôt you propose establishing there. I think, however, it may become a question (which you will hereafter be able to decide), whether it may not be advisable that a principal magazine should be formed further back, and in rear of the defiles leading from Galicia into Leon. I transmit enclosed copies of some letters and other documents respecting the state and proceedings of the Spanish armies, and the reinforcements which have arrived, or are expected by the French, in Navarre and Biscay; by which it appears that the enemy in those two provinces only, will receive an accession to his force of 78,000 men by the 10th instant."

" —— It is my intention to leave Coruña about the 10th or 12th instant for Astorga," &c.

The intelligence which, at this time reached sir David Baird of the large reinforcements which the enemy were receiving, made him very desirous to hasten his junction with sir John Moore. This desire was augmented on the 9th, by a communication from the provincial junta, of a despatch from general Blake, announcing his defeat near Zornosa, on the 31st of October. Nothing, however, could rouse the junta to a sense of their danger, or induce them to

afford us the smallest assistance. Sir David therefore again wrote to Madrid, upon the necessity of having a Spanish commissioner with the British troops.

*Sir David Baird to Mr. Frere.*

Coruña, 11th November, 1808.

"—— I propose setting out to-morrow or next day, for the purpose of approaching sir John Moore, now, I understand, advancing towards Salamanca. Indeed, the expediency of an early junction becomes every day more apparent, as, from the large reinforcements which are pouring in, to the French army in Navarre, it might become doubtful (in the event of their pushing rapidly forward into the plains of Castile and Leon) whether, if it was much longer delayed, it could be effected at all. Under such circumstances, the continued indifference and inattention to our wants, which we experience from the Galician junta, is particularly mortifying, and strongly proves the necessity, that the central government should depute some person of consideration to accompany the army, with power to procure from the local authorities, not only of this province, but of any others we may pass through on our advance, such aid and assistance as the country can afford, and may be necessary to enable us to move. From the want of such an arrangement, we have been compelled to make contracts for provisions and forage at a most exorbitant rate; and the British government is thus subjected to a loss, which might be prevented by our being furnished upon the same terms as the Spanish troops, or by issues from the government magazines," &c.

On the 13th of November, sir David Baird left Coruña for Astorga.

On the 13th, 15th, 16th, and 17th November, sir John Moore wrote as follows:

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 13th November, 1808.

"—— The French have entered Burgos, and have driven from it part of the Estremaduran army. In what force they are, or whether their intention is to advance farther, I know not. If they advance whilst we are assembling, they will embarrass us. I do not understand the movements of the Spanish generals: they are separated without the possibility of aiding each other; the one in Biscay, the other on the Alagon, leaving the whole country in our front, whilst we are collecting, to the enemy. I have addressed Castaños to know his views, when I shall be better able to decide what step to take. In the mean time, the great object for us is to unite. I wish, as soon as you have ascertained that they can be subsisted, that you would push on your corps on Benevente. I shall probably, by the time they reach that, order them to continue on Zamora, and ultimately we may be able to have the whole assembled in Zamora, Toro, and this place.

" —— In all this, however, you must be guided by the information you receive of the enemy. Were they to advance immediately, whilst the regiments on this side were moving forward in succession, I should have no option but to fall back," &c.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 15th November, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"In the night of yesterday I was informed that the French had entered Valladolid on the 13th. This morning the post from Valladolid, has not arrived, and the report of the French being there is confirmed.

Their force is not stated; but as it is to be presumed that a small force durst not have ventured so far, I am preparing to retire upon Ciudad Rodrigo, in order to concenter my force, which is now marching on and from that place to this. Two regiments came in here yesterday, and two are coming in to-day. The whole will not be here before the 25th. Under such circumstances, I have no option but to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo. My motions afterwards will depend upon circumstances. I expect hourly intelligence of the movement of the enemy. I shall not quit this place until I find they are marching on it. In the mean time I keep every thing ready for a start. You must, of course, not separate your force by sending any part of it towards this, until you find that the enemy have retired from Valladolid, and that I continue here. In short, you must now look to yourself; be ready to fall back, if necessary, on Coruña, or take such steps as circumstances direct.

"——We have done what we could to join and be of use to this nation; if we have not succeeded, it is their fault, not ours. We had a right to expect that they would have been able to cover us until united.

"Believe me," &c.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 16th November, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"I expect, in the course of this day, accurate information of the movement of the French from Burgos. It does not appear that they have ever been in Valladolid in any number; and certainly, I believe, they have not yet been beyond it. In the present circumstances I think you should collect your whole force at Astorga and its neighbourhood; by means of your cavalry you can keep a good look out, and by

other means you can be informed of every movement the enemy makes towards you; and, at the same time that you keep your corps in readiness to join me when I desire it, you must prepare to retreat on Coruña should circumstances render it necessary. Of these last circumstances you must be alone the judge. You must retire rather than commit, in any degree, the safety of your corps. It is when united that we can alone do good, not by fighting separately partial actions, if they can be avoided." &c.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 17th November, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"Last night, an officer I had sent out on the Valladolid road for information returned. He was in Valladolid. All the inhabitants, the magistrates and fifty or sixty people excepted, had abandoned it on the arrival of the French, who entered the town on Sunday afternoon, the 13th instant, with a thousand cavalry and two pieces of artillery.

"—— My wish is, if possible, to assemble the army between Zamora and this place. I hope the enemy is not yet prepared to disturb us; but in coming to me you must use your discretion, and act upon the information you receive of his movements," &c.

These four letters sir David Baird received whilst on the road from Coruña to Astorga, where he arrived late on the night of the 19th. He answered them immediately after his arrival.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore.*

Astorga, 19th November, 1808.

"—— In addition to the information you communicate respecting the movement of French troops, I have received positive intelligence, that the army of

general Blake, after sustaining repeated attacks, has been completely defeated, and almost entirely dispersed. The general himself, with the very small portion of his force which he was able to keep together, has retired to the mountains bordering on the Asturias; and it appears that a few of the fugitives and some artillery are collecting at Leon, which is threatened by the enemy.

"I enclose copies of some reports which have been addressed to colonel Craufurd and myself upon the subject.

"Under these circumstances, I confess I am of opinion, that it would be attended with much danger if I were to make any partial advance on Benevente, until some cavalry have come up and a considerable portion of my force is collected; as it would be easy for the enemy, if they are in any strength, to intercept and cut off the communication between my advanced corps and the rest. By the 28th or the 29th, we shall have at this place at least one regiment of dragoons, the horse artillery, three brigades of six-pounders, and the greater part of my infantry; and I should then be in sufficient force to advance with some degree of security.

"Should you, however, be desirous that I should move forward with what troops I have at present here, I will instantly do so; and I beg to assure you, my dear sir John, that in every instance, and on every occasion, it will be my most anxious desire to meet your wishes and views.

"In pursuance of the advice and directions in your letter of the 15th, I am making arrangements to secure my retreat on Galicia, should such a measure unfortunately become indispensable. Coruña would be a bad point to retire on, as the harbour is completely commanded from the surrounding heights.

I have sent directions to have Vigo and the neighbouring sea-ports examined, and I expect reports on the subject very soon.

"Every possible effort has been made to complete the equipment of this division, but owing to the total want of assistance, which we experienced in Galicia from the local authorities, (and which I have had repeated occasions to notice to you) our success has not been great. In this province I hope, however, to be more successful, and that we shall very speedily be able to collect the number of mules and horses we require," &c.

To this letter sir John Moore immediately replied.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 21st November, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"As I was sending off an officer to you with the enclosed, your letter of the 19th arrived.

"My wish all along was, and still is, that you should use your entire discretion in obeying whatever order I send you, and I shall only feel comfortable in proportion as I am assured that you will do so. Do not, therefore, advance a man from Astorga until you think it safe to do so. When you are ready you will apprise me, and I shall move a corps from this to Zamora, and shall probably go with it myself. But if the French, in consequence of Blake's defeat, turn a force against you, we must give up the junction, and you must retreat and re-embark; in this case it would be well to send the cavalry, for which no ships will be found, through Portugal to Lisbon, from whence they might join me, and yourself with the troops sail for that port, at which place I should write to you for your further proceeding," &c.

The enclosure, alluded to at the commencement of this letter, and which was consequently written first, was another letter from sir John Moore, in which he repeated his intention, if circumstances should permit, of collecting the army at Salamanca, Zamora, and Benevente.

On the 21st, sir David wrote again to sir John Moore.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore.*

Astorga, 21st November, 1808.

"—— I enclose a letter I received late last night from General Leith, communicating the entire defeat and dispersion of Blake's army, and a report from captain Pasley of the royal Engineers, upon the same subject. From that army I can now expect no assistance or support. A number of fugitives from that and the Estremaduran corps, entirely destitute of order and without proper officers, have, I understand, entered Leon, and joined a small party already in that city. The whole may amount to about 150 cavalry and 2000 or 3000 infantry; and they have some artillery and thirty-four pieces of ordnance belonging to Blake's army in the town. The commanding officer of the artillery came here last night and proposed joining me with his guns, which I directed him to do, as there is no chance of Leon being successfully defended if the enemy advances in any force. I have also ordered the cavalry to join me as speedily as possible, as they may prove of great service in reconnoitring, &c. until such time as our own dragoons come up.

"—— In my last letter of the 19th, I pointed out, that as far as I was then able to judge, it would not be advisable to make any partial advance of the troops

at present here, until such time as part of the cavalry, the ammunition, and money were come up; and until we were able to procure some positive information respecting the movements and views of the enemy, who in addition to Bessieres'* force which advances by the road from Burgos, have now the army that defeated Blake unoccupied. By the 29th I expect to have the greater part of my infantry, with one regiment of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery in this neighbourhood, and I should then be able to move with greater confidence and security, if not previously compelled to fall back, by the advance of a superior force of the enemy. Should I at present advance to Benevente and the French approach, a retreat would become very difficult for infantry, through an open country, and in face of a powerful cavalry.

"I must, however, repeat, that if you are desirous that I should immediately advance what troops are here, I shall instantly do so; although I think such a measure might be attended with considerable danger, as, in addition to our want of cavalry, we are at this moment *destitute of spare ammunition*, which from colonel Murray's letter to Bathurst, *appears also to be the case with your force.*

"I have caused persons to be sent forward by Leon and on the road to Palencia, to obtain information; and I shall not fail to communicate the result of their observations to you. I enclose two reports which reached me this morning. I have also despatched engineer officers to the rear, for the purpose of ascertaining what impediments to the progress of the enemy we might occasion by the destruction of

* Marshal Bessieres was stated to have about 14,000 or 15,000.

bridges, &c. in the event of being hard pressed and compelled to fall back on Galicia."

" I remain," &c.

And yet sir Walter Scott in his life of Napoleon Buonaparte, volume 6, page 275, states " a retreat into, if not through Galicia was the only mode of avoiding the perils by which the British were surrounded. The plan of defending this strong and mountainous province, or at least of effecting a retreat through it with order and deliberation had been in view for several weeks. Sir David Baird's division had passed through it on their advance to Astorga; yet so imperfect at that time was the British general staff, that no accurate knowledge seemed to have been possessed of the roads through the country, of the many strong military positions which it presents, or of the particular military advantages which it affords for defensive war."

In reference to this passage see sir David Baird's letter to sir John Moore, dated 8th December, page 33.

Colonel Napier, at page 433, says, " While awaiting the reply, he directed sir David Baird, if the enemy showed no disposition to molest him, to push the troops on to Salamanca as fast as they should arrive at Astorga. Sir David was proceeding to do so, when Blake advised him that a considerable French force was collecting at Rio Seco and Ampudia with a view of interrupting the march. This arrested the movement, and Baird, after destroying some of his stores at Astorga, fell back to Villa Franca. As sir John Moore's information led him to believe that Blake's report was false, he recalled Baird, but valuable time was thus lost." &c.

The reasons which led Sir David Baird to think it would be injudicious to advance further than Astorga before the 29th of November, have already been shown from his letters. Until that day he would not have a sufficient force up, to enable him to move with security, as the country between Astorga and Benevente is an open plain, and he was without cavalry. Colonel Napier states at Page 431, that the movement which sir John Moore contemplated in case "he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time" was "to abandon all communication with Portugal, and throwing himself into the heart of Spain, to rally Castaños' army (if it yet existed), upon his own, to defend the southern provinces, and trust to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce." This I think must be a mistake. It will be seen presently what sir John Moore himself says upon the subject. At all events it is most certain, that any movement, at the moment alluded to, which would have caused us to abandon all communication with Portugal and Galicia, (and this would have been a necessary consequence of throwing ourselves into the heart of Spain), must inevitably have been followed by the ruin of the army. A considerable portion of sir David Baird's division was still in the rear. The whole of sir John Moore's force was not yet collected; but what was of still more importance, both divisions were deficient in ammunition, as appears by sir David Baird's letter to sir John Moore of the 21st.

But even supposing the whole of the army to have been united, the execution of such a plan would have been prevented by the defeat of Castaños at Tudela

on the 23d of November, the day on which the next letter I shall quote was written.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore.*

Astorga, 23d November, 1808.

"My dear sir John,

"I wrote to you on the 19th and 21st from this place, explaining the nature of our situation; and was in hopes I should have had the satisfaction of hearing from you in reply to my first communication, before this. The length of time which has elapsed since I despatched that letter makes me apprehensive that you may have felt it expedient to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo, or that our communication may be intercepted.

"The more I consider our situation, the more I am convinced of the danger that would attend my making, at the present moment, any movement in advance, or attempt to join you, before my force is more collected. We have no kind of support to expect from the Spaniards, who are completely dispersed, and driven from the field; and if I were to move forward the infantry I have at present here, I should necessarily expose myself to be beaten in detail, without a chance of being able to oppose any effectual resistance.

"The enemy are certainly at Mayorga, and their parties have pushed forward almost close to Benevenţé. From my present want of cavalry, I have not been able to ascertain how forward their infantry may be.

"—— I enclose a copy of some intelligence communicated by a person who was sent from Leon to obtain information respecting the movements of the

French, and of a letter written by Colonel Graham from the head-quarters of Castaños' army.

"From the latter, it is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have been. In all probability, Castaños and Palafox may by this time have experienced a reverse similar to that of Blake, in which case the Spaniards would have no force deserving the name of an army in the field," &c.

By a remarkable coincidence, it happened that, at the moment when sir David Baird was thus expressing his fears for Castaños, the work of destruction against that general was going on.

Sir David Baird was in constant communication and correspondence with the Marquis de la Romana, then at Leon. On the 26th, he wrote to apprise the marquis, that in the event of his receiving intelligence that sir John Moore had retired, or that the enemy approached Astorga in force, he should be obliged, in obedience to the orders he had received, to retreat forthwith on Galicia. He recommended also, that, in that case, the marquis should fall back on the Asturias.

About this time, sir David Baird experienced considerable uneasiness, in consequence of reports which reached him respecting movements of the enemy, and also from his not having received any intelligence for several days from sir John Moore. He thought it probable that sir John might have found it necessary to retire: he therefore made arrangements for retreating on Galicia, and communicated his intention to do so, to lord Castlereagh and sir John Moore.

His mind was however soon after relieved by the receipt of a letter from Salamanca.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 26th November, 1808.

"—— I do not believe that yet the enemy have any considerable corps at Rio Seco, or Ampudia. My information is very incorrect, if they have any infantry so near; for some days past, they have had eight or nine hundred cavalry at Valladolid.

"—— All your precautions are perfectly good. I have explained myself to you already so fully, that I need say no more; whatever you do I am certain will be right."

"—— I have written my sentiments fully to government by this messenger. Do not detain him longer than to write yours, which I believe do not differ much from mine; and the sooner the eyes of the good people of England are opened, the better."

Sir David Baird's fears respecting sir John Moore being thus removed, he immediately proceeded to Leon, and had an interview with the marquis de la Romana; who expressed a hope that, in the course of eight or ten days, he should be able to assemble from eight to ten thousand men. The appearance of the Spanish troops was, however, far from encouraging, as they seemed to be entirely devoid of order, half-armed, and in want of every thing*.

Sir David Baird, on his return from Leon, addressed lord Castlereagh, stating, that, after having experienced much anxiety in consequence of the long silence of sir John Moore (from whom he had not heard for five days), he had the satisfaction to

* Sir David Baird sent, some time afterwards, colonel Symes (an intelligent and judicious officer), on a particular mission to Romana; the real object of which was, to ascertain correctly the state of the Spanish troops; and nothing could be more unfavourable than the report that officer made. See this report in Mr. James Moore's Narrative, page 211.

find, by a letter from that officer, that the communication was still open; and as the enemy had not advanced with the rapidity, or in the force, which circumstances had led him to expect, he had abandoned the intention of retreating, and should endeavour to effect a junction with sir John Moore, as soon as his whole force was collected.

On the 28th, sir John Moore wrote to sir David Baird.

Salamanca, 28th November, 1808.

"—— The marquis de la Romana's intelligence is wrong; the French have no infantry on this side of Burgos. They have infantry, I believe, at Aranda de Duero. They are moving against Castaños, and have reached Soria. They have intercepted his communication with Madrid; and have in view to turn his left, whilst probably another corps attacks him in front.

" —— The junta have taken the alarm, and will retire to Toledo, if not to Cordova.

" —— I hold my resolution to remain and form the junction in the manner already explained in my former letters. In the execution of this, you will use your own discretion as I do mine. If the enemy move against you, you cannot do it; you will, in that case, retreat, giving me notice. If he moves against me, I must do the same, and I shall give you notice. Your retreat cannot be more difficult than mine will be. I have but one brigade of artillery, and no cavalry. On the 1st of December you will be able to move with one regiment of cavalry, and such number of infantry as you choose to take. I wish, therefore, you would do so as far as Benevenié, where you may arrive on the 2nd. I shall move from this on the 1st towards Zamora and Toro, at each of which places we shall arrive from this also on

the 2nd. I shall myself be with the corps at Toro, from whence I shall communicate with you." &c.

On receipt of this letter, the necessary orders were given by sir David Baird, for moving forward on the 1st of December; but these orders were countermanded, in consequence of a second letter from sir John Moore, written on the evening of the same day.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 28th November, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"I have received this evening, despatches from Mr. Stuart at Madrid, announcing the defeat and dispersion of Castaños' army. The French in Spain are estimated at eighty thousand men, and thirty thousand are expected in the course of a week. It certainly was much my wish to have run great risks in aid of the people of Spain; but after this second proof of how little they are able to do for themselves (the only two armies they had having made so little stand), I see no right we have to expect from them much greater exertions. At any rate, we should be overwhelmed before they could be prepared.

"I see no chance of our being able to form a junction, as certainly at Burgos the French have a corps, which will now move forward.

"I have, therefore, determined to retreat upon Portugal, with the troops I have here, and if possible with Hope's corps, if by forced marches he can join me. I wish you to fall back on Coruña. Send back immediately your stores under such part of your force as you judge proper. You may then stay with the rest a little longer, if you can depend upon knowing

the movements of the enemy. I propose this, as were you at once to retire, it might encourage the enemy to push at once at Hope and me, and prevent our junction, which is the more necessary, as I must stop upon the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon as long as possible. On your arrival at Coruña, you will, of course, embark and sail for the Tagus, where orders shall be waiting you. Write immediately to England, and give notice of what we are doing, and beg that transports may be sent to Lisbon: they will be wanted; for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended.

"Believe me," &c.

On the 29th, sir John Moore wrote again as follows:

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"I have nothing to add to what I wrote to you last night. You will make your retreat, concealing your intention as long as you can. I had written to the marquis de la Romana that I should assemble the army, and act, if possible, with him. That is now out of the question, tell him. When, on the frontier of Portugal, I shall be ready to retire, if circumstances render it eligible, or by embarking and going round to another part of Spain, we may be more useful. We by no means abandon the cause of Spain, but only withdraw from a situation where, without aiding it, we should ourselves be destroyed." &c.

It was not until after the receipt of these orders, that a retreat was commenced. Instructions were

sent to halt the different corps and stores advancing, and subsequently they were put in motion to the rear. Colonel Napier certainly mistakes in supposing that any stores were destroyed.

On the day he received sir John Moore's last letter, sir David addressed the marquis de la Romana.

*Sir David Baird to the marquis de la Romana.*

Astorga, 30th November, 1808.

"I feel great concern in acquainting your excellency that at a late hour last night, I received a despatch from Sir John Moore, announcing the defeat of General Castaños's army, and directing me immediately to fall back, for the purpose of joining him, either by sea or by the way of Portugal; it being impossible, under existing circumstances, to effect our junction by the road through Benevente and Zamora.

"I lose no time in apprising your excellency, that in consequence of these orders I am preparing to move the infantry to the rear; the cavalry I propose leaving at Astorga a few days longer.

"As I have reason to believe that the Spanish troops are in great want of shoes, blankets, canteens, and havresacks, I beg to acquaint you, that I shall be able to spare you a quantity of each kind, (which were intended for sir John Moore's division), and to request you will appoint proper persons to receive them, at Villa Franca and Lugo." &c.

In order to tranquillize the minds of the Spanish people on the subject of our retrograde movement, it was judged proper to prepare an address to the inhabitants of Galicia and Leon, which was translated into Spanish and printed. Its circulation was however limited by subsequent events. It was as follows.

"The unfortunate events which have recently occurred in Biscay and on the Ebro, and the consequent movements of the enemy, having rendered it indispensably necessary that his Britannic Majesty's forces in Spain should unite and concentrate, for the purpose of being enabled to afford effectual support and succour to the Spanish people in the glorious efforts they are making in defence of their independence; lieutenant-general sir David Baird, commanding the division in Galicia and Leon, announces to the loyal inhabitants of these kingdoms, that he has received orders from sir John Moore, commander-in-chief of the British armies in Spain, to lose no time in proceeding to join him by the way of Portugal.

"The object of this movement is in no way connected with any intention of withdrawing from Spain, or abandoning its cause, so dear to Great Britain; but solely with a view of assembling the British army, for the purpose of acting on some point where its services may be more required and more useful.

"The kingdom of Galicia, strong from the nature of the country, will require no force to defend it, beyond its own brave army, now assembling at Leon, under the marquis de la Romana; and the presence of an additional number of troops in its passes and on its mountains, would but tend to exhaust its resources, without adding to its security.

To the inhabitants of these kingdoms, the warmest acknowledgements of the British army are due, for the friendly reception it has met with; and the lieutenant-general trusts, that the same sentiments of attachment and regard, which now exist, will continue to animate the two nations towards each other for ages to come.

"In quitting, probably for a short time, this part

of the Peninsula, the lieutenant-general feels it his duty to call upon the inhabitants of these districts, by their loyalty to their king, their affection for their families, and by every tie they may venerate or hold dear, to rise in defence of their religion and their country! Without the most vigorous efforts on the part of the people and the government, the cause of Spain is in danger; if these are made, it cannot, with the assistance of divine providence, fail of being successful."

On the 3d of December, sir David wrote again to Romana, in reply to an urgent application to delay the retreat.

*Sir David Baird to the marquis de la Romana.*

Astorga, 3d December, 1808.

"I have this instant had the honour to receive your excellency's letter of yesterday, and although, in obedience to my orders, I had commenced the retreat of my division on Villa Franca, yet, in consequence of your excellency's opinion, that the continuance of a British force at Astorga is essential to afford security to the Spanish army assembling at Leon, and to enable it to retire upon Galicia in safety, I am induced to halt the troops in their present positions, and to direct the cavalry to remain at Astorga for a few days, by which I shall afford time and opportunity to sir John Moore to send me any fresh instructions he may wish, in case he should have any such intention.

"I have the honour," &c.

The above extracts will prove that colonel Napier mistakes, in supposing that sir David Baird had fallen back on Villa Franca without instructions to

do so from sir John Moore. Sir David Baird received the order to retreat on the 29th of November; on the 3d December, he was still at Astorga with all the cavalry, and the greater part of the infantry. The cavalry, indeed, never retrograded, but proceeded a few days afterwards, under lord Paget, to join sir John Moore.

It may be asked why, if the cavalry could join sir John Moore from Astorga, the whole force there might not have done the same? Experience has proved that this was practicable; but it was doubted at the time. Cavalry could move with much greater security through an open country than infantry, and they might make longer marches. Perhaps, also, sir John Moore, having determined to retreat on Portugal, did not wish to be embarrassed by any additional infantry; and certainly it was important not to uncover the road from Astorga to Coruña, which would have risked the loss of the dépôts and stores of the army on that line.

On the 2d of December sir John Moore wrote as follows:

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 2d December, 1808.

"——As you have transports but for one regiment of cavalry *, and you will perhaps be under the necessity of marching the other two through Portugal, I should be glad you would send one to me. I do not think that it will run the smallest risk at this moment on the route by Benevenié to Zamora. I say this, upon the supposition that you have not sent them all already back towards Coruña, in which case I do not wish one to be brought back; but if one of

* The cavalry consisted of the 7th, 10th, and 15th hussars.

the regiments is still at Astorga, and your intelligence, like mine, assures you that it can be done without risk, I should wish to have it here.

"—— Buonaparte is at Burgos, probably waiting the arrival of reinforcements to move forward in this direction. Whether my junction with you could have been accomplished or not, I know not; it would have been attended with the risk of the destruction of the whole; and if accomplished, would have left us to contend single-handed with the whole French army; for the Spaniards are dispersed, and until the present government is changed, and men of more ability are brought forward, there is little chance of their being able to form any thing to join us, or to resist France. If they are able we shall see, and we shall be still able to go to their assistance. I am satisfied with the decision I have made; how it will be viewed by others, or approved in England, God knows!

"I remain, faithfully," &c.

Sir David Baird proceeded from Astorga to Villa Franca on the 4th of December. His presence there became necessary, in consequence of the change of circumstances. The counter-march of every thing on the road from Coruña towards Astorga, had unavoidably created considerable confusion. As all were moving upon one line, artillery, troops, baggage, stores, provisions and forage, and as large quantities of the two last were bringing up to form dépôts, the road was much encumbered, and it required very active superintendence to establish order. Every thing, however, was fairly on its way towards Coruña by the 7th, on the evening of which day sir David heard from sir John Moore as follows:

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 5th December.

" My dear sir David,

" The city of Madrid have taken up arms, have refused to capitulate to the French, are barricading their streets, and say they are determined to suffer every thing rather than submit. This arrests the French, and people, who are sanguine, entertain great hopes from it. I own, myself, that I fear this spirit has arisen too late, and that the French are now too strong to be resisted in this manner. There is, however, no saying, and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, that Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this evening. I must beg, therefore, that you will suspend your march until you hear from me again, and make arrangements for your return to Astorga, should it be necessary. All this appears very strange and unsteady; but if the spirit of enthusiasm does arise in Spain, and the people will be martyrs, there is no saying, in that case, what our force may do. I hope, in the mean time, that the regiment of cavalry is coming to me which I asked you for.

" Believe me," &c.

Immediate orders were despatched to stop the further retreat, and early on the following morning, sir David Baird wrote to sir John Moore.

Villafranca, 8th December, 1808.

" My dear sir John,

" At a late hour last night I received your letter of the 5th instant, and, in compliance with your desire, immediate orders were sent off to halt the regiments in the different positions they occupied, and to suspend any further preparation for re-embarkation. One brigade had reached within a day's march of St. Jago, on the road to Vigo.

"I trust long ere this letter reaches you, that you will have been joined by lord Paget and the cavalry. I was induced to send the three regiments, for the reasons I have already stated in two former letters.

"It has frequently occurred to me that, in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Galicia and part of Leon, than, by my proceeding to join you at Salamanca, to abandon the defence of these provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the marquis de la Romana, and if you judged it proper, by a flank movement, to join us in the neighbourhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that, by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed and determined to make in defence of the national independence. The royal road from Coruña to this place and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous; and, with the sea open to us, we should be able to receive with facility such reinforcements and supplies as the British government might deem it proper to send. I do not think much difficulty would be experienced for a few months, from a want of provisions. The country abounds with cattle: bread, indeed, would be required; but flour might be obtained from England; and, in the mean time, Galicia would have an opportunity of arming under our protection; and our presence in Spain would furnish a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spaniards *," &c.

* The above is copied from the original Notes on which the letter was founded. The letter itself was, I believe, more full and explicit on the subject of a defence of Galicia; but no complete copy seems to have been kept.

On the same day sir David Baird received further instructions from sir John Moore.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 6th December, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"I wrote to you last night to suspend your retrograde movement. I now write to you to beg that you will put to the right about, and return, bag and baggage, to Astorga. The people of Madrid, it is said, are enthusiastic and desperate, and certainly at this moment do resist the French. The good which may result from this it is impossible to say. I can neither trust to it, nor can I altogether despise it. If the flame catches elsewhere and becomes at all general, the best results may be expected. If confined to Madrid, that town will be sacrificed, and it will be as bad, or worse than ever. In short, what is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended. I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it." &c.

On the 10th, sir John Moore wrote again from Salamanca.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 10th December, 1808.

"——Madrid has capitulated: but the people say the duke of Castel Franco and M. de Morla have betrayed them, and they refuse to part with their arms. The French have the gates, the Retiro, and the Prado. Madrid thus continues to occupy a part of the French army. Saragossa still holds out, and they say they are endeavouring to collect forces in the south. Thus

all cannot be directed against us, and we must try our hands." &c.

On the 12th, sir John Moore wrote again.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Salamanca, 12th December, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"I have received both your letters of the 8th.

"—— I am much obliged to you for your opinion on the Galicias and Vigo; and it is that which now probably I shall follow, should such a measure become necessary. I am therefore most anxious that magazines should be formed on that communication. I have written home to direct that all transports, &c. should call at Coruña, and go to Vigo, unless otherwise directed. Coruña must be the place for all supplies from England. The communication through Portugal is difficult and tardy."

On the 13th of December, sir John Moore arrived at Alaejos, and wrote on the following day.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

Head Quarters, Alaejos, 14th of December.

"My dear sir David,

"I received last night your letters of the 10th and 11th instant. It was my intention to have moved to-morrow on Valladolid, but a letter from Bonaparte to Marshal Soult at Saldanha, which we have intercepted, (the officer who carried it having been murdered by the peasantry,) has induced me to change my direction, and shall be to-morrow, with all the troops I have, at Toro and its immediate neighbourhood. It appears that Marshal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, has with him two divisions at Saldanha, besides one

under the Duc d'Abrantes, which is collecting at Burgos, and another under the Duc de Trevise, which has received orders to march on Saragossa, but which of course may be recalled. Madrid has submitted and is quiet, and the French from thence are marching upon Badajos. Their advanced guard was at Talavera la Reina on the 10th instant. My object is now to unite the army as soon as possible, you at Benevente, and I at Toro, from whence, either by a forward or flank movement, the two corps can be joined. I shall direct all my stores from Zamora to be forwarded to Benevente. The arrangement with respect to yours, which I communicated to you in my letter of the 12th may go on, by which we shall have a certain portion at Benevente and the rest at Astorga and the rear. It appears from the intercepted letter, from deserters and from prisoners we have taken, that the French are in complete ignorance of our present movements and think we have retreated. As they will now know the truth, what change this may make in their march on Badajos, I know not, but Marshal Soult will certainly be checked in his intended operations, which were projected upon the supposition that he had nothing but Spaniards to oppose him. Every arrangement which I before directed with a view to enable us to live in the Gallicias should be strictly attended to, for though in the first instances, we may not have opposed to us, more than we can face; it will be in the power of the enemy to increase their force, far beyond our strength," &c.

On the 16th of December, sir John Moore was at Toro, and sir David Baird at Benevente. From Toro, sir John Moore wrote as follows.

Toro, 16th of December, 1808.

"My dear sir David,

"Upon my arrival here yesterday, I received from the messenger your letter of the 12th; to-morrow I purpose to march to some villages, which I understand will hold all this corps, within two or three leagues of Benevente. I shall then be so near to you, as to give perfect security to the assembling of your corps at that place; I shall then also be able to have the pleasure of meeting you.

"I cannot help again pressing upon you to take every measure for the forming of magazines at Astorga, Villa Franca, and on the road to Coruña, for though we may do something here, we must always look to a retreat on Galicia. For the present, whilst the army united is so near, I do not see that any corps of the enemy can attempt to disturb the passage of our stores by Astorga, or endeavour to place himself between us and the passes into Galicia," &c.

From some passages in the two last letters it would appear that sir John Moore at that time directed his attention to Galicia, in the event of his being obliged to retreat.

On the 20th of December, the junction of the two corps was effected at Mayorga.

I trust it has been satisfactorily shown that no time was lost by sir David Baird, either in preparing his force for the field, or in pushing it forward for the purpose of joining sir John Moore. On the 13th of November, the head of sir David's column reached Astorga: sir John Moore's advance only entered Salamanca on the following day. By the 29th, sir David Baird had with him at Astorga the greater part of his infantry, one regiment of cavalry, a troop of horse-

artillery, and three car brigades of the same arm. Sir John Moore had at Salamanca his infantry, and one brigade of artillery, but no cavalry.

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I shall now proceed to offer a few observations on the advanced movement which followed the concentration of the army.

It is a maxim in war, which ought never to be departed from, that the object in view should be adequate to the risks to be incurred in endeavouring to attain it*. That the object was not worth the risk in the present instance, in the opinion of sir John Moore himself, is evident by his letters †. The advance was originally intended as a diversion in favour of the southern provinces (for Madrid was known to have fallen), and to this object was subsequently added (in consequence of the intelligence obtained at Alaejos on the 13th December) the chance of successfully attacking Soult. Considered solely as a diversion, if it could have been made before the surrender of the capital, it might perhaps have been of some value. But after that "bubble had burst," there was nothing known to be in arms, to take advantage of it; and the risk was far too great to be incurred on vague rumours of troops being about to assemble in the south; the value of such rumours

* Perhaps the Duke of Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula furnish the best practical illustration of this principle upon record.

† See various passages in the extracts from sir John Moore's letters already given. See also his letter to lord Castlereagh, dated Astorga, 31st of December.

"From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult. As a diversion, it answered completely; but as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose."

"—— This army, I have no doubt, would have distinguished itself had the Spaniards been able to offer any resistance; but from the beginning it was placed in situations in which, without the possibility of doing any good, it was itself constantly risked."

Also his letter to lord Castlereagh, dated Coruña, 13th of January, 1809:

"—— Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten. There was no Spanish force to which we could unite."—Moore's Narrative, Appendix, pages 128, 129, 130. 132.

being well understood by the commander of the forces. In regard to the chance of defeating Soult, the consummate skill with which the movements of the French were directed, was too well known to justify us in calculating on the blunders of our enemy; and certainly it was too manifestly the interest of the French marshal to draw us on as far as we would go, to make it reasonable to suppose that he would not have gradually retired as we advanced, to give time to a superior force from the south, to intercept our retreat, and cut us off from Galicia.

In a despatch from Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, dated Downing-street, 10th December, 1808, Mr. Canning observes:

* "You will recollect that the army which has been appropriated by his majesty to the defence of Spain and Portugal is not merely a considerable part of the disposable force of the country: it is, in fact, the British army. The country has no other force disposable: It may, by a great effort, reinforce the army for an adequate purpose, but another army it has not to send.

"——You are already apprised, by my former despatch (enclosing a copy of General Moore's instructions) that the British army must be kept together under its own commander; must act as one body for some distinct object, and on some settled plan.

"It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no danger; when, through that difficulty and danger, the commander is enabled to see his way to some definite purpose: but, in order to this, it will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously arranged, and that the British army should not again be left, as that of sir John Moore and sir David Baird have recently been, in the heart of Spain, without one word of

* See Appendix to Colonel Napier, page 73.

information except such as they could pick up from common rumour of the events passing around them." &c.

This despatch was written under a supposition that sir John Moore had continued his retreat on Portugal; and could not have reached Mr. Frere in time to have had any influence on the events of the campaign: but it refers to former instructions, breathing a similar spirit: and yet Mr. Frere thought himself justified in urging the commander of that army to hazard its fortunes and safety, upon the most loose and uncertain information.

It is much to be lamented that sir John Moore did not feel himself fully at liberty to follow the dictates of his own excellent judgment, instead of yielding to suggestions and opinions which, being founded on false data, scarcely merited serious attention. When the British minister at Madrid urged him to advance, he was himself deceived and deluded. He grounded his advice on statements respecting the strength and success of the Spanish armies, which the commander of the forces knew to be erroneous. The advice thus given, under false impressions, ought not perhaps to have had any influence, but the situation of sir John Moore was one of great and almost unexampled difficulty.

Perhaps it is to be regretted that the suggestion thrown out in sir David Baird's letter of the 8th December from Villa Franca was not adopted, as an alternative between the dangers of an advance and the inconveniences of a retreat.

Had the British army been collected on the frontiers of Galicia about the middle of December, there can be little doubt that it would have been able to have maintained itself, at least during the winter; and, long before spring, the face of affairs was com-

pletely changed by the departure of Napoleon and of the force which followed him to the Austrian war. The question of a defence of Galicia was very different at the time when the letter alluded to was written, from what it became when we were retiring rapidly through the country, with an enemy pressing upon our rear. When the suggestion was offered, our strength was unimpaired, our equipment perfect, and the great body of the French was occupied with Madrid. Between the 8th of December, when the letter was despatched from Villa Franca, and the 29th, when we retreated through Astorga, much might have been done to improve our situation: besides, the enemy, in the hope of intercepting our retreat, were drawn on us, in consequence of our advance, earlier than would otherwise have been the case. In the breathing time which probably would have been allowed us, Lugo and other points might have been fortified, positions taken up and strengthened, depôts established, and, by a judicious disposition of our force, the danger of being turned by the road through Orense, and by those from the north of Portugal and the Asturias might have been sufficiently guarded against. The road which passes through Orense is particularly difficult, and had been reported to sir David Baird, by the officers he sent to examine it, as susceptible of defence by a very inferior force. The others are still more impracticable; and were, at the time, almost impassable from the season and the snow.

The kingdom of Galicia contains upwards of a million and a half of inhabitants (perhaps nearly one sixth of the whole population of Spain). The army of Romana might have recruited itself under our protection: and I very much question whether the

presence of a British force on the frontiers of that province (particularly considering its geographical position on the right of the French line of communication from the Bidassoa to Madrid*) would not have operated more effectually, as a diversion in favour of the south of Spain, than our momentary irruption into Castile.

I see no reason to suppose that we should have experienced any serious difficulty in subsisting the army. Salt provisions might, if necessary, have been drawn from the provision ships which accompanied our division to Coruña; and although the mountains of Galicia are barren, the valleys are fruitful, and amply stored with cattle. Indeed, a country that feeds a population of fifteen hundred thousand souls, cannot want the means of supporting thirty or forty thousand additional individuals, particularly when the latter possess the power of enforcing requisitions.

But the situation of the enemy in our front would have been very different. Colonel Napier says, at page 474, that, "sweeping the rich plains of Castile with their powerful cavalry, they might have formed magazines at Astorga and Leon; and from thence been supplied in abundance, while the English were starving."

I do not think it probable that the French, at that season of the year, could have formed magazines any where near the entrance of the mountainous districts of Leon and Galicia; and to have remained in force

* The opinion of Bonaparte on the influence which the occupation of Galicia by an enemy to France might have had on the war in Spain is recorded in a letter which was written under his dictation to General Savary, at Madrid, a short time before our arrival at Coruña. In speaking of the relative importance of the operations of the different French corps, and in alluding to that commanded by Marshal Bessieres, who was acting against the army of Galicia, the emperor says, "Enfin, le moindre insuccès du Maréchal Bessieres intercepte tous les communicatione de l'armée, et compromettrait même sa sureté: le General Dupont se bat pour Andujar, et le Maréchal Bessieres se bat pour les communications de l'armée, et pour les opérations les plus importans aux affaires d'Espagne," &c. —See Colonel Napier, Appendix, page 32.

for any considerable time in the gorges of the mountains would have been impossible. Indeed, it does not appear that the French have ever formed magazines to any extent in Spain, or have been able to keep a large army concentrated in that country for any considerable length of time. In the progress of his work, colonel Napier will have more than one occasion to notice the inflexible firmness with which the duke of Wellington maintained his defensive positions on the confines of Portugal, in face of a very superior force, until the want of provisions compelled the enemy to separate, which became a signal for offensive operations on his part.

That sir John Moore thought favourably of the plan in question is apparent, both from his letters to sir David Baird of the 12th, 14th, and 16th of December, already referred to, and from a passage in a despatch he addressed to lord Castlereagh from Salamanca, almost immediately after he had received sir David Baird's suggestion. In this despatch, dated the 12th December, he observes: "If I am forced to retreat, it will probably be on the Galicias. The road is good, and the country is capable of being defended. In this case we shall want flour, as the country produces only cattle in abundance *." Thus repeating the information sir David Baird had communicated on the subject.

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It only remains for me to notice the retreat. In alluding to it generally, it must certainly be admitted that much disorder prevailed, and that many irregularities were committed by the troops. This always has been and ever must be the case, where soldiers are required to make greater efforts than their physical powers are calculated to support; especially when

* See Moore's Narrative, Appendix, page 92.

under those feelings of moral depression which always attend a retreating army. Similar scenes have occurred on every similar occasion; and if examples were necessary to prove the truth of this remark, they would be furnished by what has happened under the two greatest commanders of the age: in the retreat from Burgos in 1812, and in the almost total disorganization of the French army during Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

The question then seems to be,—to what cause ought principally to be ascribed, the disorders and losses which attended the retreat to Coruña? Did they proceed from any defect in the character and composition of the army? from a want of proper attention to their duties on the part of the officers? or from the force of the circumstances in which the army was placed?

A retreat in the face of a powerful and active enemy is always an operation of infinite difficulty: but various unfavourable circumstances, combined with the rapidity with which the one in question was conducted, to render it peculiarly disastrous. I do not mean to question the necessity which dictated this speed, but it may fairly be urged in extenuation of the charges which have been brought against the army. Colonel Napier admits that the conduct of the troops was excellent during the advance: I see no sufficient reason to suppose they would not have continued to merit the same praise, had not their discipline been impaired by over-exertion. When the moral and physical powers of the officer are exhausted by fatigue, it is fruitless to expect that he can be attentive to the conduct of the men; and when the soldier is worn down by constant marching and want of food, he becomes deaf to the voice of his officer, and indifferent to every thing but to a sense of his own immediate necessities.

Sir John Moore wrote to lord Castlereagh from Benevente on the 28th of December, shortly after the commencement of the retreat*:

"Since I had the honour to address you, on the 16th, from Toro, the army has been almost constantly marching through snow, and with cold that has been very intense. The weather within these few days has turned to rain, which is much more uncomfortable than the cold, and has rendered the roads almost impassable." And again, from Astorga, on the 31st†: "It is impossible to deny that its (the army's) discipline has been affected by the late movements: the shoes and necessaries are destroyed; and for some time after it reaches the coast, the men will be in the worst state." And this was said when the army had still two hundred miles to march, and before the commencement of our most formidable difficulties!

A reference to dates, and to the map of the country, will show the length of the marches which the army performed. But it was not the length of the marches, so much as their almost incessant continuance, the nature of the country they had to traverse, and the inclemency of the season and weather, which prostrated the strength and depressed the moral energies of both officers and men. Compelled to move on one road, carried in many places over, or along the sides of stupendous mountains, and completely broken up by the constant passage of heavy carriages, the progress of the column was necessarily very slow. To the difficulties of the road were added the obstacles caused by the fall of horses, and other accidents to the train of guns and artillery-waggons which accompanied the troops. These broke the order of the march,

* See Moore's Narrative, Appendix, page 121.
† Moore's Narrative, Appendix, page 130.

and occasioned numerous delays, more distressing by far to the soldier than a continued progress; as he remained, without the power of resting or sheltering himself, exposed to the violence of frequent storms of snow and hail. The men's shoes were worn out, or lost in the snow and mud: some died from fatigue and cold; and what greatly added to the distress of the scene, many women and children had accompanied their husbands and fathers on the advance. Most of these unfortunate beings now perished; and their sufferings furnished pictures of human distress and misery which it would be difficult for the imagination to colour too highly.

This is not an overcharged representation of what the army endured: I am confident it will be confirmed, in its fullest extent, by every officer in sir David Baird's division who witnessed the march over the mountain near Nogales, the night march from the position in front of Lugo to Guiteritz, and that of the succeeding night, from Guiteritz to Betanzos.

I own I feel jealous for the honour of the army which served in Galicia. Much was expected from it by the country, and much I think it would have done to merit its approbation and gratitude, had the course of events been more favourable to a development of its energies. Although the difficulties by which it was environed made it impossible that it could acquire renown; perhaps, if circumstances had permitted its commander to follow the principles which guided Fabius, it might at least have been sufficiently fortunate to have escaped reproach.

At page 476, Colonel Napier says, "The reserve and the cavalry marched during the night to Bembibre. On their arrival, Baird's division proceeded to Villa

Franca; but the immense wine vaults of Bembibre had such temptation, that many hundreds of his men remained behind inebriated," &c.

Sir David Baird's division left the banks of the Ezla on the morning of the 29th of December. It reached Astorga, a distance of about twenty miles, on the evening of the same day. The town was fully occupied by other troops, including the Spanish army of Romana. Much difficulty was consequently experienced in getting the men under cover; and before that could be effected, and a very scanty supply of provisions procured, the night was far advanced. As early as four o'clock on the following morning (30th December) the division was on its march for Manzanal (a village in the mountains, on the road towards Coruña), where it was intended to bivouac for the night. The weather was most severe, and the snow deep on the sides of the road; the road itself a mass of mud, from causes which have already been explained. The column reached Manzanal towards the close of a winter day. There was little cover for the men; but they screened themselves as well as they could from the wind, under banks and inequalities of the ground. Provisions were wanting: but, after considerable delay, some bullocks were procured and slaughtered; and the men were preparing their meal, when orders were received from the commander of the forces to proceed forthwith to Bembibre (another long march towards the sea), and the whole was in motion by ten o'clock the same night. A large portion of the men had not had time or means to prepare their food: yet, thus fasting, they proceeded on their way; and it was six o'clock on the following morning (the 31st) before they reached Bembibre, worn

down by fatigue and want of sleep. The inhabitants closed their houses, and refused admission to the soldiers: the consequence was, that some were broken into; and as, when open, the men poured into them in search of food and rest, many of the wine-cellars were entered, and much intoxication was the consequence; the effect of the wine being evidently increased by the exhausted state of the soldiers.

The halt at Bembibre was but for a very few hours: the early arrival of the commander of the forces with the reserve made it necessary to proceed; and before noon the division was again on the march to Cacavellos. The effects, however, of this unrelenting march were now becoming so apparent, that, previously to quitting Bembibre, I was sent by sir David Baird to sir John Moore (whilst the former was attending the punishment of some soldiers for their excesses in the town), to submit to the commander of the forces whether, under all the circumstances of the case, it might not be better to risk a loss of men by endeavouring to make a stand, than incur the certainty of diminishing our force and means by urging the retreat. The commander of the forces being, however, of opinion that circumstances made it necessary to proceed, the division moved to Cacavellos, where it arrived late on the evening of the 31st; having thus marched nearly sixty miles since the morning of the preceding day, during which period it had, with very short intervals, been constantly under arms*.

At Cacavellos and in the neighbouring villages the troops were quartered for the night, and moved on the following day, through Villa Franca to Herrerias. At Villa Franca the division only halted to

* I state the distance from recollection; but I think I have rather underrated the length of the march in question.

receive rations. A considerable depôt of provisions and forage had been formed in that town: but much had been consumed or wasted by the divisions which preceded us. This evil did not arise from a want of exertion on the part of the commissariat: it was an almost inevitable consequence of our situation, and must always occur, to a certain extent, where sufficient time cannot be allowed to preserve order, or to make the requisitions and distribution with regularity. As appears to have been the case at Smolensko and at Wilna, on Bonaparte's retreat from Moscow, the soldiers crowded round the magazines, and the provisions disappeared as soon as produced, without regard to weights and measures: and thus a store, which was calculated to have subsisted the whole army several days, yielded, under our unfortunate circumstances, only a partial and irregular supply.

It may naturally be asked, Why were not impediments thrown in the way of the advancing enemy, to retard his progress, as proposed, in the event of a retreat through Galicia, in sir David Baird's letter to sir John Moore, of the 21st November? It was one of the fatalities we were doomed to experience, that an order which was given by sir John Moore at Astorga, to destroy the intrenching tools, on account of a deficiency in the means of transport, was too literally interpreted, and too largely applied. The consequence was, that the engineer officers who were employed to mine two or three bridges, could not procure the instruments which were necessary to form the mines properly, and they therefore exploded partially, without producing their full effect. This was no fault in the officers, but arose, I believe, entirely from the cause I have mentioned.

I do not think it requisite to notice what colonel

Napier says, at page 479, respecting the employment of a dragoon to convey a despatch, further than to observe that, if the words "blameable irregularity" are intended to apply to the conduct of the dragoon, I must consider the expression as far too mild; if to the general, as much too strong, and indeed altogether uncalled for by the nature of the case. It has always, I believe, been a common practice to employ orderly dragoons to carry despatches. They are selected as trusty and well-behaved men. In cases of importance it may be better to send staff officers: but the staff is limited in number, and may be otherwise employed. I do not recollect the particular circumstance alluded to by colonel Napier, further than that an orderly dragoon who was sent with a letter to a division which preceded us on the retreat, lost the letter. It related, I thought, to a change in the direction of the retreat, which was originally intended to be made on Vigo instead of Coruña; nor was I aware that the accident had occasioned any loss of men, or any serious inconvenience beyond the countermarch of a brigade which had advanced a day's journey on the road towards Vigo.

It is not necessary for the object in view to pursue the course of the retreat any further. Sufficient has perhaps been said to show, that any want of attention on the part of the officers, or of order and obedience in the men, ought principally to be ascribed to the fatigues and privations they underwent, which made it physically impossible that they should properly fulfil all their duties as soldiers. Oppressed by want of sleep, and exhausted by constant marching, they moved on, silent and sullen, regardless of, and indifferent to, every object which surrounded them. If any doubt should exist as to the extent of their suf-

fering, the records of the military hospitals which they crowded on their arrival in England would prove the state of disease and debility in which they returned.

I have no doubt colonel Napier's remarks, at page 488, are perfectly correct, and that the reserve preserved greater order during the retreat than the other divisions. This, in a great measure, was a necessary consequence of their proximity to the enemy, which created a mental excitement not felt by the rest of the army. Had we been advancing, or following, instead of retiring from our foe, I am persuaded the same ground might have been passed over by the same men, in a shorter space of time, and with a diminished sense of fatigue.

In his account of the action at Coruña, Lieutenant-Colonel Napier says, at page 496, "This being observed by the commander-in-chief, who directed in person the operations of Baird's division," &c.

This passage seems to require some explanation. Sir David Baird's division formed the right of the British army. The action began by a cannonade from eleven guns which the French had placed on a height which commanded that part of the position. Sir John Moore immediately rode to the right; and as the enemy's columns, which descended the hill to attack sir David Baird's division, approached, sir David asked the commander of the forces if he did not think it was time to move forward to meet them, inquiring also if sir John would give the word of command? He replied, "No, Baird, do you." The order was immediately given to advance, and the fire of musketry soon after began.

Sir David Baird was wounded very early in the action. A grape-shot struck the upper part of his

left arm, and shattered the bone a few inches from the shoulder. He was immediately obliged to dismount from his horse; but, recovering from the shock, he was desirous of remaining on the field. This, however, the nature of the wound made impossible; and he proceeded first to Coruña, and afterwards on board his majesty's ship Ville de Paris. The shot entered so near the shoulder that the arm could not be amputated in the usual way. It was removed altogether out of the socket of the shoulder in the course of the same evening.

By the death of sir John Moore, the command of the army devolved on sir David Baird; but his situation incapacitated him from exercising it. Early on the ensuing morning, therefore, he formally resigned it to lieutenant-general Hope, requiring from that officer a report on the events of the preceding day, and requesting him to carry into effect the intentions of our deeply regretted commander. This done, he signed the despatch which announced to his majesty's government the loss we had sustained, and the honourable though unfortunate termination of the campaign.

THE END.

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